Summaries of Published Opinions, 1017 COBJ, Vol. 46, No. 9 Pg. 91
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
July 13, 2017
2017 COA 92. No. 10CA1476. People v. Jacobson. Statutory DUI Affirmative Defense Instruction Not Given Sua Sponte—CRS § 42-4-1301(2)(a)—Jury Instruction—Jury Questions—Invited Error.
In 2014 COA 149, the Court of Appeals reversed defendant's conviction for failure to poll the jury about exposure to extraneous, prejudicial information. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded to this Court. Before the Court's mandate was issued, defendant requested that die Court decide two unresolved issues, either of which could lead to reversal of the judgment of conviction entered on jury verdicts finding her guilty of vehicular homicide, driving under the influence (DUI), and other related charges arising from a collision between her truck and a taxi. The Court granted the request.
Defendant first argued that the trial court erred in failing to sua sponte instruct the jury on the DUI affirmative defense of having consumed alcohol between the time she stopped driving and when her blood alcohol testing (BAC) occurred. Defendant testified at trial that she was sober when the accident occurred at about 10:30 a.m., but 15 minutes later, she drank a Vitamin Water bottle that contained one-half 99 proof schnapps. Defendant was contacted by two police officers at 10:58 a.m. She later failed a roadside sobriety test and was taken to a hospital for blood draws. The prosecution presented expert evidence that defendant's BAC would have been .274 at the time of die accident. Defense counsel did not request die trial court to instruct the jury on the DUI affirmative defense of having consumed alcohol between die time she stopped driving and when die testing occurred.
It was undisputed that there was sufficient evidence to warrant an instruction on the affirmative defense. The prosecution argued that by proving that defendant was intoxicated at die time of the accident, it necessarily disproved die affirmative defense that defendant did not become intoxicated until a later time. As die Supreme Court stated in Montoya v. People, 2017 CO 40, a defense that operates solely by negating elements of the crime is disproved by die proving of those elements. Accordingly, die Court found no error in the trial court's failure to instruct die jury sua sponte on die affirmative defense.
Defendant then argued, for die first time, that a jury instruction and die court's response to a related jury question reduced die prosecution's burden. The instruction in question explained that "the amount of alcohol in the Defendant's blood at the time of the commission of the offense, or within a reasonable time thereafter, as shown by chemical analysis of the Defendant's blood or breath, gives rise to the following [listing of statutory presumptions]." During deliberations, die jury asked whether this was at or around 10:30 a.m. (die time of the accident) or at any time thereafter (on or around the time she was stopped by the police at 10:58 a.m.). Following discussion with counsel, the court answered that it could be either or both, but that any decision must be unanimous.
Defense counsel did not object to the instruction and participated in the formulation of die answer to the jury question. The Attorney General thus argued that defendant invited any error. The Court declined to address die invited error argument because defendant did not argue there was an incorrect statement of the law. Defendant's argument that the instruction encouraged conviction based on her intoxication "a reasonable time after" die accident is directly contradicted by another instruction that required the prosecution to prove that defendant had been intoxicated when the accident occurred. In addition, defendant did not show how the jury could have found her heavily intoxicated at 10:58 a.m. but not 28 minutes earlier. Defendant also didnotproduce evidence to contradict the prosecution's expert that chugging alcohol at 10:45 a.m. would not explain the results of the three later blood draws, given how the body metabolizes alcohol. Finally, prior cases hold that 30 minutes after an accident is not "more than a reasonable time" afterward. Consequently, the Court declined to reconsider whether the prosecution disproved die affirmative defense.
The Court interpreted defendant's last argument as raising a temporal discrepancy between the charging document and the references to "a reasonable time after" in die jury instruction and court's response to the question. Based on the extensive colloquy on both die instruction and the court's answer to the jury question, in which defense counsel actively participated, the Court concluded any error was invited.
The judgment was affirmed.
2017 COA 93. No. 16CA0050. People v. McKnight.
Marijuana—Dog Sniff Search—Probable Cause—Reasonable Suspicion—Suppression of Evidence—Amendment 64.
At defendant's suppression hearing, Officer Gonzales testified that he saw a truck parked in an alley that then left die alley and eventually parked outside a house for about 15 minutes. The house had been the subject of a search roughly seven weeks earlier that turned up illegal drugs. When die truck drove off, Officer Gonzales followed it, saw it turn without signaling, and pulled it over. Defendant was driving the truck. The officer recognized defendant's passenger from previous contacts with her, "including drug contacts" FROM THE COURTS COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS involving the use of methamphetamine. At Officer Gonzales's request, Sergeant Folks came to the scene with his certified drug-detection dog, Kilo. Kilo alerted, the truck was searched, and the officers found a "glass pipe commonly used to smoke methamphetamine" that contained white residue. Defendant was charged with possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence found in his truck, arguing that the police violated his constitutional rights by conducting a dog sniff search without reasonable suspicion and by otherwise searching his truck without probable cause. The court denied the suppression motion, the case proceeded to trial, and defendant was convicted of both counts.
On appeal, defendant contended that under the Colorado Constitution, the deployment of the drug dog was a search requiring reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The Court of Appeals first noted that Amendment 64 legalized possession for personal use of marijuana of one ounce or less by persons 21 or older. Therefore, under Colorado law, a drug dog's alert can reveal, in addition to contraband, the presence of something in which a person has a legitimate expectation of privacy (i.e., the possession of one ounce or less of marijuana). Consequently, a dog sniff should be considered a "search" for purposed of article II, section 7 of the state constitution where the occupants of the vehicle are 21 years or older.
Defendant also argued that the dog's alert, in combination with other relevant circumstances, did not give police reasonable suspicion to search his truck and thus the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress. A warrantless search effected by a dog sniff of the exterior of a vehicle must be supported by reasonable suspicion. Under the circumstances of this case, the police lacked the requisite reasonable suspicion, the dog sniff was invalid, and the methamphetamine methamphetamine recovered as a result should have been suppressed.
The judgment was reversed and the case was remanded.
2017 COA 94. No. 16CA0259. In re Marriage of Kann.
Post-Dissolution of Marriage—Laches as a Defense to Collection of Spousal Maintenance Arrearages and Interest—Implied Waiver and Estoppel.
A decree of dissolution of marriage between husband and wife was entered in 1989. Husband agreed to pay wife lifetime maintenance of no less than $1, 200 per month. In the event of breach, the prevailing party would be entitled to recover costs, expenses, and reasonable attorney fees. For the next 26 years, husband never paid maintenance and wife never asked him to do so.
In 2015, wife retained counsel and sought entry of judgment for $520,636.32—$289,200 in unpaid maintenance and $231,436.32 in interest. She also requested a maintenance modification if die court did not award her die full judgment. Husband raised the affirmative defenses of waiver, estoppel, and laches. He also requested that the court terminate his maintenance obligation if it awarded wife die full judgment. The trial court (1) concluded that husband was required to pay maintenance under the decree; (2) held that Colorado law does not recognize die laches defense; (3) found that husband had failed to meet his burden of proof on die waiver and estoppel defenses; and (4) enforced die full judgment against him. The court also decreased the maintenance going forward to $800 per month and awarded wife attorney fees as the prevailing party under the separation agreement.
On appeal, husband argued that he should have been able to raise laches as a defense. While a novel issue in Colorado, courts have addressed die issue as to child support and child support combined with maintenance. Based on these cases, die Court of Appeals concluded that laches is available as an affirmative defense when a party seeks maintenance arrearages as well as the interest on those arrearages. The Court remanded for the trial court to reconsider die full scope of the laches defense on the existing record.
Husband also challenged die rejection of his implied waiver and estoppel defenses. The record supports die trial court's rejection of husband's waiver argument. As to estoppel, husband...
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