Summaries of Published Opinions, 0917 COBJ, Vol. 46, No. 8 Pg. 98

46 Colo.Law. 98

Summaries of Published Opinions

Vol. 46, No. 8 [Page 98]

The Colorado Lawyer

September, 2017

August, 2017

COLORADO SUPREME COURT

June 5, 2017

2017 CO 58. No. 14SC699. People v. Rock. Jury Instructions—Lesser Offenses.

Te People sought review of the Court of Appeals’ judgment reversing Rock’s convictions for second-degree burglary and theft. See People v . Rock, No. 11CA1936 (Colo.App. July 3, 2014). The trial court denied Rock’s request for an additional, lesser included offense instruction on second-degree criminal trespass, on the ground that second-degree criminal trespass is not an included offense of second-degree burglary. Te Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that in denying Rock’s request, the trial court erred and that the error was not harmless with regard to either of Rock’s convictions. Te Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals because second-degree criminal trespass is not a lesser included offense of second-degree burglary under the strict elements test, as clarified in Reyna-Abarca v. People, 2017 CO 15, 390 23 P.3d 816.

2017 CO 59. No. 15SC421. Carter v. People.

Criminal Law—Miranda Warnings—Jury Deliberations.

Carter petitioned for review of the Court of Appeals’ judgment in People v. Carter, 2015 COA 36, ___ P.3d ___, which affirmed, among others, his conviction of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. With regard to a videotaped interrogation by the police, the district court denied a motion to suppress defendant’s statements, rejecting all of his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment claims, including his assertion that he had not been adequately advised, as required by Miranda v. Arizona, of his right to have an attorney present during interrogation. It also denied defendant’s motion to limit access to that videotape during jury deliberations. In a fractured opinion, in which all three members of the division of the Court of Appeals wrote separately, the intermediate appellate court affirmed with regard to both of these assignments of error.

Te Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Because the Miranda advisement of defendant reasonably conveyed that he had a right to consult with counsel, both before and during any interrogation by the police, and because the district court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the jury unrestricted access to both a video recording and transcript of defendant’s custodial interrogation, the trial court did not err.

2017 CO 60. No. 15SC470. People v. Corrales-Castro.

Criminal Law—Withdrawal of Guilty Plea—Crim.P. 32(d)—Guilty Pleas—Ineffective Assistance of Counsel—Deferred Judgment.

Osvaldo Corrales-Castro pleaded guilty to criminal impersonation and received a one-year deferred judgment. He successfully complied with the terms of the deferred judgment, and in May 2010, the Court withdrew his guilty plea and the charge was dismissed with prejudice pursuant to CRS § 18-1.3-102(2), which provides that, upon “full compliance with [the conditions of a deferred judgment],” the guilty plea previously entered “shall be withdrawn and the charge upon which the judgment and sentence of the court was deferred shall be dismissed with prejudice.” In 2013, Corrales-Castro fled a motion to withdraw his guilty plea pursuant to Crim.P. 32(d), which authorizes “a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty . . . before sentence is imposed or imposition of sentence is suspended.” Te district court denied the motion and the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Crim.P. 32(d) authorizes the withdrawal of an already withdrawn plea. Te Supreme Court held that the plain terms of Rule 32(d) require a plea to exist for it to be withdrawn. Therefore, Crim.P. 32(d) does not authorize withdrawal of Corrales-Castro’s plea. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ judgment.

2017 CO 61. No. 14SC957. Espino-Paez v. People.

Criminal Law—Withdrawal of Guilty Plea—Crim.P. 32(d)—Guilty Pleas—Ineffective Assistance of Counsel—Deferred Judgment.

Jose Espino-Paez pleaded guilty to the use of a schedule II controlled substance and received a deferred judgment. When he successfully completed the terms of the deferred judgment, his guilty plea was withdrawn and the charge was dismissed with prejudice. In 2012, Espino-Paez fled a motion to withdraw his plea pursuant to Crim.P. 32(d). Te district court denied the motion, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the district court had no authority to withdraw the plea because it had already been withdrawn. For the reasons discussed in the lead companion case, People v. Corrales-Castro, 2017 CO 60, ___ P.3d ___, announced the same day, the Supreme Court held that the plain terms of Rule 32(d) require a plea to exist for it to be withdrawn. Therefore, Crim.P. 32(d) does not authorize withdrawal of Espino-Paez’s plea. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ judgment.

2017 CO 62. No. 15SC511. Zafro-Guillen v. People.

Criminal Law—Withdrawal of Guilty Plea—Crim.P. 32(d)—Guilty Pleas—Ineffective Assistance of Counsel—Deferred Judgment.

Edgar Zafiro-Guillen pleaded guilty to possession of one gram or less of a schedule II controlled substance in exchange for a two-year deferred judgment. In 2009, upon successful completion of the terms of the deferred judgment, the district court withdrew Zafro-Guillen’s guilty plea and dismissed the case with prejudice. In 2013, Zafro-Guillen fled a motion to withdraw his guilty plea pursuant to Crim.P. 32(d). Te district court denied the motion, holding it lacked jurisdiction. Te Court of Appeals affirmed. For the reasons discussed in the lead companion case, People v. Corrales-Castro, 2017 CO 60, ___ P.3d ___, announced the same day, the Supreme Court held that the plain terms of Rule 32(d) require a plea to exist for it to be withdrawn. Therefore, Crim.P. 32(d) does not authorize withdrawal of Zafiro-Guillen’s plea. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ judgment.

2017 CO 63. No. 15SC568. People v. Roman.

Criminal Law—Withdrawal of Guilty Plea— Crim.P. 32(d)—Guilty Pleas—Ineffective Assistance of Counsel—Deferred Judgment.

Eloisa Roman pleaded guilty to criminal impersonation and received a two-year deferred judgment. She successfully completed her deferred judgment, and her plea was withdrawn and the case was dismissed. In 2013, she fled a motion under Crim.P. 32(d) seeking to withdraw her plea. Te trial court denied her motion, and the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Rule 32(d) authorized the district court to withdraw Roman’s previously withdrawn plea. For the reasons discussed in the lead companion case, People v. Corrales-Castro, 2017 CO 60, ___ P.3d ___, announced the same day, the Supreme Court held that the plain terms of Rule 32(d) require a plea to exist for it to be withdrawn. Therefore, Crim.P. 32(d) does not authorize withdrawal of Roman’s plea. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ judgment.

2017 CO 64. No. 15SC901. Flores-Heredia v. People.

Criminal Law—Withdrawal of Guilty...

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