May 4, 2017
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
2017 COA 56. No. 09CA2784. People v. Thompson.
Child Abuse Resulting in Death—Sixth Amendment—Right to Counsel—Public Defender—Indigent—Ancillary Services—CJD 04-04—Statute of Limitations—False Reporting—Conspiracy— Out-of-Court Statements—Hearsay—Expert Witnesses—Credibility—Consecutive Sentences.
Defendant was charged with multiple crimes related to child abuse. After he was indicted, he appeared before the court with attorney Lane, who had represented defendant for about two years as “retained counsel.” Lane stated that defendant was indigent, and although Lane was willing to continue to represent defendant as “retained counsel,” defendant could not pay for ancillary services, such as investigators or experts. Lane stated that the Constitution required the court to provide ancillary services to indigent defendants at state expense. Relying on a U.S. Supreme Court case, United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, Lane contended that the court should allow him to continue to represent defendant and also agree to pay state funds for ancillary services. Lane asserted that Gonzalez-Lopez is in conflict with the Colorado Supreme Court case People v. Cardenas, under which defendant was being forced to choose between two constitutional rights: the right to counsel of choice and the right to receive ancillary services at state expense. The trial court declined to overrule Cardenas and appointed public defenders to represent defendant, and Lane’s connection with the case ended. Defendant was convicted of multiple charges, including child abuse resulting in death, child abuse, assault, false reporting, concealing a child’s death, contributing to the delinquency of a minor, and conspiracy. The trial court sentenced defendant to 12 years in jail to be followed by 102 years in prison.
On appeal, defendant asserted that the trial court denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel of his choice when it did not authorize Lane to receive state-funded ancillary services for defendant’s representation. Indigent defendants do not have a constitutional right to use state funds to pay for attorneys or for ancillary services of their choosing. Defendant only had a right to state-funded ancillary services if the public defender or court-appointed alternate defense counsel represented him. Therefore, the trial court did not wrongfully deny defendant’s constitutional right to counsel of choice when it appointed public defenders to represent him. However, Chief Justice Directive 04-04 (CJD 04-04), Appointment of State-Funded Counsel in Criminal Cases and for Contempt of Court, would have allowed the trial court to pay for support services for a defendant who is represented by private counsel. The trial court did not consider the Directive when it decided to appoint the public defenders, and defendant’s private counsel did not ask the court to do so. Any error in not considering CJD 04-04 was harmless in this case.
Defendant also contended that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for judgment of acquittal on the false reporting and conspiracy to commit false reporting counts because they were barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The record contains sufficient evidence to support these convictions based on conduct that had occurred within 18 months of when the grand jury indicted defendant on those charges. Therefore, these convictions were not barred by the statute of limitations.
Defendant further contended that the trial court erroneously admitted the out-of-court statements of defendant’s girlfriend and children who lived with them. As to the girlfriend’s statements, some were admissible as statements against interest; others were admissible as co-conspirator statements; and though the Court of Appeals could not determine the trustworthiness of one statement, it concluded its admission was harmless error. The children’s statements were variously admissible as non-hearsay, or under the child hearsay statute, or under the residual hearsay exception.
Defendant additionally contended that two expert witnesses improperly vouched for the children’s credibility. However, the experts did not vouch for the children’s veracity, either directly or indirectly; rather, their testimony concerned the typical demeanor and traits of abused children.
Defendant also asserted that the trial court erred when it admitted certain financial evidence, contending that it was only relevant to show that defendant and his girlfriend were “sponges on society.” However, this evidence was relevant and its relevancy was not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
Defendant also argued that the court admitted evidence he described as cumulative. The Court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
Finally, the trial court did not abuse its discretions when it imposed consecutive sentences on the misdemeanor child abuse counts.
The judgment was affirmed.
2017 COA 40M. No. 14CA0842. People v. Davis.
Wiretapping—Conspiracy—Habitual Criminal— Unanimity Instruction—Single Transaction— Limiting Instruction—Prior Conviction—Jury.
After an investigation that entailed wiretapping defendant’s telephones, defendant was charged with one count of conspiracy to distribute a schedule II controlled substance (methamphetamine) and several habitual criminal counts. A jury convicted defendant of the conspiracy charge, and the district court, after finding that defendant was a habitual criminal, sentenced him to 48 years in the custody of the Department of Corrections.
On appeal, defendant contended that the district court erred in not requiring the prosecution to elect the overt act on which it was relying to prove the conspiracy charge. When the People charge a defendant with crimes occurring in a single transaction, they do not have to elect among the acts that constitute the crime, and a special unanimity instruction need not be given. A defendant can participate in a number of crimes or events to accomplish a single conspiracy. Here, the actions occurred in a relatively short time frame, evidence of defendant’s phone conversations with one person primarily established the conspiracy, and all the overt acts on which the jury could have relied w ere done in furtherance of the same unlawful objective. Therefore, the evidence presented in this case showed one criminal episode, and hence one conspiracy. Further, though the prosecution alleged numerous overt acts in furtherance of the single conspiracy, that did not require unanimous agreement by the jurors as to the precise overt act defendant committed. Therefore, the district court did not err, much less plainly err, in failing to require an election or to give the jury a special unanimity instruction.
Defendant also contended that the district court erred in not providing a limiting instruction to preclude the jury from considering witnesses’ guilty pleas or desires to plead guilty as evidence of his guilt. Here, defendant did not request a limiting instruction, and a trial court’s failure to give a limiting instruction sua sponte does not constitute plain error.
Lastly, defendant contended that his rights to a trial by a jury and to due process of law were violated when the judge, instead of a jury, found that he had been convicted of three prior felonies. The fact of a prior conviction is expressly excepted from the jury trial requirement for aggravated sentencing. Therefore, there was no error.
The judgment was affirmed.
2017 COA 57. No. 15CA0128. People v. Higgins.
Crim. P. 35(c)—Notice—Public Defender.
Higgins pleaded guilty to felony menacing, and the court sentenced him to 18 months in prison. Higgins thereafter fled a Crim. P. 35(c) motion and requested counsel to represent him on his motion. The district court sent a copy of Higgins’s motion to the prosecution and, after receiving the prosecution’s response, denied the motion without a hearing and without hearing from the public defender’s office.
On appeal, Higgins contended that the district court erred by departing from the procedure outlined in Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(IV) and (V) and that the court’s error required reversal. The court has the authority to summarily deny a Crim. P. 35(c) motion without a hearing if the motion, files, and the record clearly show the defendant is not entitled to relief. However, if the court does not summarily deny the motion, the court is required to send a copy of the motion to the prosecutor and, if defendant has requested counsel, to the public defender’s office, who are given an opportunity to respond to the motion. Here, the court failed to send a copy of...