Successful Land Conservation: Neither Zero-Sum Nor Win-Win

• Author: Jessica Owley
• Pages: 173-191

173

Chapter 8

Successful Land Conservation:

Neither Zero-Sum Nor Win-Win

Jessica Owley

I. Introduction

Policymakers and economists have found game theory helpful in decision-

making regarding natural resources and other practical problems.1 Not

only do policymakers draw upon some of the underlying economic theo-

ries, but they also adopt language and framing from economics. In some

cases, such framing can be helpful. In many situations, however, policy-

makers and others adopt the terms and general guidelines of game theory

without fully understanding the assumptions underlying the concepts and

neglecting an evaluation of whether the terms t the circumstance. ey

take terms developed in simplied scenarios with few players and minimal

external forces and use the concepts when constructing policy with many

players and intersecting forces. Such is the case with the terms zero-sum

and win-win.

is chapter examines the use of the concept of a zero-sum approach in

land conservation, outlining some examples of where the zero-sum concept

appears both in the context of game theory and as a rhetorical device. I

highlight some examples of where and how the concept is used and then

provide examples of why I think it is generally a mischaracterization of land

conservation strategies and decisionmaking. In a direct contrast to zero-sum

scenarios, conservationists and others have suggested we craft land conser-

vation eforts as win-win projects. us, after discussing zero-sum and its

failures, this chapter explores the win-win framing of conservation strate-

gies. e overly simplistic framing of both strategies ts poorly in the land

conservation context and is not helpful in policymaking. Such phrases may

1. See Takashi Maeda, On Characterization of Equilibrium Strategy for Two-Person Zero-Sum Games With

Fuzzy Payos, 139 F S  S 283, 283 (2002).

Author’s Note:Many thanks to Matt Dimick, Sarah Krako, Melissa Powers, and

Jonathan Rosenbloom.

174 Beyond Zero-Sum Environmentalism

sound good in speeches but the world is a much more complex place than

these simple sound bites would have us believe.

II. Meanings of Zero-Sum

inking about zero-su m approaches to land conservat ion requires articu-

lating the denition of zero-sum. e concept of zero-sum as developed

in game theory diers from the rhetoric of zero-sum, which diverges from

the straight mathematical game theory use of the term. I discuss each in

turn below.

A. Game Theory

A mathematician, John von Neumann, and an economist, Oskar Morgen-

stern, developed the theory of zero-sum games in 1944.2 It usually applies to

two-player games like chess, poker, or ipping coins, although multiplayer

games may also be zero-sum.3 e marked characterist ic of a zero-sum ga me

is that the wins of one player exactly oset t he losses of another.4 is means

in a zero-sum game, the amount at stake does not change throughout the

game. It is a xed amount, and it is never shared. In zero-sum games, there

are no advantages to cooperation because even when working together, the

players will not be able to improve their outcomes without directly harming

the other players.5

e use of zero-sum analy sis, however, is not that helpful for ana lyzing real-

world environmental problems. Economists and others readily agree that a

zero-sum ga me situation rarely exists.6 e world is composed of much more

complicated multiplayer games, played simultaneously, where cooperation

improves outcomes and harms rarely exactly counterbalance. As one com-

menter explained: “[Z]ero-sum thinking is not much use to an economist.”7

2. J  N  O M, T  G  E B (revised

in 1953). Zero-sum games may also be labeled constant-sum games. K L-B  Y

S, E  G T: A C, M I 5 (2008).

While this phrase appears in game theory texts, it does not appear in rhetorical zero-sum discussions

in the next section.

3. Michael Bacharach, Zero-Sum Games, inT N P G T 253, 253 (John Eatwell

et al. eds., 1989).

4. Id. at 254-55.

5. is works in contrast to a prisoner’s dilemma, where there are gains to be had by cooperation. Anatol

Rapoport, Prisoner’s Dilemma, in T N P G T, supra note 3, at 199, 200.

6. See, e.g., Tim Harford, Trump, Bannon, and the Lure of Zero-Sum inking, E, Aug. 25,

2017 (“[i]t is surprisingly hard to nd a zero-sum game in the real world. Most commercial transac-

tions oer benets to both sides, otherwise why would they take place at all”).

7. Id.