Subnational Patterns of Participation: Compulsory Voting and the Conditional Impact of Institutional Design

Date01 December 2018
DOI10.1177/1065912918763746
Published date01 December 2018
Subject MatterArticles
/tmp/tmp-189e5eBRYAFLBI/input 763746PRQXXX10.1177/1065912918763746Political Research QuarterlyBarnes and Rangel
research-article2018
Article
Political Research Quarterly
2018, Vol. 71(4) 826 –841
Subnational Patterns of Participation:
© 2018 University of Utah
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Compulsory Voting and the Conditional
https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912918763746
DOI: 10.1177/1065912918763746
journals.sagepub.com/home/prq
Impact of Institutional Design
Tiffany D. Barnes1 and Gabriela Rangel2
Abstract
Cross-national studies of turnout find that compulsory voting has the strongest impact on participation, boosting
turnout by 10 to 18 percent. We argue that in the absence of compulsory voting, other institutional factors such
as small district size, strong electoral competition, and moderate candidate fragmentation may be similarly effective
at mobilizing turnout. Where voting is mandatory, these factors should instead primarily influence how people vote
once they are at the polls—diminishing levels of invalid voting, and consequently increasing effective turnout. We take
advantage of the abolition of compulsory voting in Chile to test our expectations immediately before and after reform,
in the exact same electoral districts. Using this unique subnational research design, we leverage data from more than
1,000 mayoral elections over the course of three electoral cycles and across 345 municipalities to examine patterns of
turnout and invalid voting. Results show that small district size, strong electoral competition, and moderate candidate
fragmentation are effective at reducing invalid voting when turnout is compulsory, and fostering higher levels of
turnout when voting is voluntary.
Keywords
compulsory voting, turnout, invalid voting, subnational institutions, election reform
Electoral participation is central to democracy, as it deter-
voting being abolished across all municipalities. Whereas
mines who wins elections and consequently which poli-
conventional wisdom suggests that electoral participation
cies are passed into law. For this reason, electoral
would decline on average across all districts, turnout actu-
institutions that influence turnout have attracted consid-
ally increased in about one-third of the districts. These pat-
erable attention from scholars and practitioners. terns suggest that other institutional features are equally
Institutions are among the clearest predictors of electoral
important predictors of electoral participation.
participation (Fornos, Power, and Garand 2004; Stein and
We argue that institutions influence two key aspects of
Vonnahme 2008; Vonnahme 2012), with compulsory vot-
electoral participation: (1) overall levels of turnout and
ing having the strongest impact (Blais 2006; Fowler
(2) levels of invalid voting. We first posit that conditional
2013; Jaitman 2013; Singh 2011). In addition, small dis-
on voluntary voting, mobilizing institutions will promote
trict size, strong electoral competition, and moderate lev-
higher levels of overall turnout. In compulsory systems,
els of candidate fragmentation—which we term by comparison, we should observe significantly less sys-
mobilizing institutions—promote voter turnout (Cancela
tematic variation in turnout across mobilizing institu-
and Geys 2016; Geys 2006). Yet, extant research has not
tions—given that turnout is mandatory—but mobilizing
considered how compulsory voting laws condition the
institutions should instead have stronger influence on lev-
relationship between mobilizing institutions and electoral
els of invalid voting. As compulsory voting laws do not
participation, which we contend is crucial to understand-
force individuals to cast a valid vote, invalid voting is
ing when and how institutions shape participation.
frequently considered a form of abstention when voting is
An election law reform that took place in Chile in 2011
presents a unique opportunity to investigate this relation-
1University of Kentucky, Lexington, USA
ship. Chile abandoned compulsory voting in 2011. In the
2Virginia Military Institute, Lexington, USA
subsequent election, overall turnout dropped by 17 percent-
age points. But, a closer look into subnational patterns
Corresponding Author:
Tiffany D. Barnes, Department of Political Science, University of
revealed significant variation in the change in the levels of
Kentucky, 1615 Patterson Office Tower, Lexington, KY 40506, USA.
electoral participation within districts—despite compulsory
Email: tiffanydbarnes@uky.edu

Barnes and Rangel
827
mandatory (Gray and Caul 2000). Therefore, although
Compulsory Voting and Electoral
mobilizing institutions should have a stronger influence
Participation
on overall levels of turnout when voting is voluntary, they
are more likely to affect effective turnout (i.e., valid vot-
Electoral institutions are among the strongest predictors
ing) under compulsory voting. Although this may seem
of turnout (Blais 2006; Cancela and Geys 2016).
intuitive, previous research has not considered how polit-
Compulsory voting laws in particular have the strongest
ical institutions influence participation differently in
and most consistent impact on electoral participation,
compulsory and voluntary systems (Blais 2006; Cancela
especially when penalties on those who abstain are strict
and Geys 2016; Singh 2011). As a result, cross-national
and enforced (Panagopoulos 2008; Singh 2011). Even in
analyses of turnout have likely underestimated the impor-
the absence of enforcement mechanisms, for those who
tance of mobilizing institutions for promoting turnout.
want to be perceived as law-abiding citizens, getting
Our analyses show that mobilizing institutions are effec-
caught disobeying the law may impose social costs on
tive at fostering higher levels of turnout when voting is
citizens (Funk 2007; Geys 2006). Studies have shown
voluntary, and reducing invalid voting when turnout is
that the relationship between compulsory voting and
obligatory.
turnout is robust in magnitude; countries where voting is
This research makes several contributions to the exist-
mandatory display turnout rates that are anywhere
ing literature on political institutions. First, we develop
between 10 and 18 percentage points higher than their
hypotheses about the conditional relationship between
voluntary counterparts (Bechtel, Hangartner, and Schmid
institutions and participation, expanding beyond the
2016; Jaitman 2013; Singh 2011).
plethora of research that examines the direct effect of
When the Netherlands abandoned compulsory voting
compulsory or voluntary laws on participation while sim-
in 1970, overall turnout decreased from 94.6 to 74.1 per-
ply controlling for other institutional features. Second,
cent (Irwin 1974). The abolition of compulsory voting in
we consider electoral participation to be a broader con-
Chile was also associated with a significant decline in
cept that includes not only turnout but also invalid voting,
overall turnout rates (Barnes and Rangel 2014). Because
allowing us to distinguish between overall turnout and
election law reform is rare, others have used public opin-
effective turnout. Our research thus contributes to the
ion polls in an attempt to estimate the consequences of a
bourgeoning body of work on the determinants of invalid
reform in countries with mandatory voting. When asked
voting (Hill and Rutledge-Prior 2016; Katz and Levin,
whether they would turn out to the polls if voting became
forthcoming), as well as literature that argues invalid
voluntary, citizens in Belgium (Hooghe and Pelleriaux
votes provide important information about citizens’ dis-
1998) and Brazil (Elkins 2000) indicated a lower willing-
satisfaction with politics (Driscoll and Nelson 2014;
ness to vote.
Uggla 2008).
Mandatory voting, however, is also known to increase
Finally, the data limitations imposed on this question
the level of invalid votes (McAllister and Makkai 1993;
until now have only allowed scholars to compare elec-
Uggla 2008). When going to the polls, citizens are given
toral participation in countries employing compulsory
the option to either cast a valid vote, vote “blank,” or to
voting (half of which are in Latin America) with coun-
(intentionally or unintentionally) “spoil” their ballot
tries that do not use compulsory voting.1 The reform in
resulting in a null vote. In a compulsory system, voting
Chile provides a unique opportunity to investigate this
blank or null is often equated with abstention (Gray and
question at the subnational level (Barnes and Rangel
Caul 2000). This is because although invalid voting might
2014; Rangel 2017). In contrast to cross-national analy-
also be an option in countries with voluntary voting, citi-
ses, a major advantage of subnational research designs is
zens who do not wish to cast a valid vote will likely
that they enable us to test our expectations immediately
abstain from turning out altogether.
before and after reform in the exact same electoral dis-
In sum, an abundance of research has examined the
tricts (e.g., Barnes, Tchintian, and Alles 2017; Hinojosa
direct effect of compulsory voting on electoral participa-
and Franceschet 2012) across a larger number of observa-
tion. Yet, research has not considered how compulsory
tions than is possible in cross-national analyses while
voting conditions the relationship between other institu-
...

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