SUBNATIONAL DETERMINANTS OF KILLING IN RWANDA*

• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/1745-9125.12126
• Published date: 01 February 2017
• Author: HOLLIE NYSETH BREHM
• Date: 01 February 2017

SUBNATIONAL DETERMINANTS OF KILLING

IN RWANDA∗

HOLLIE NYSETH BREHM

Department of Sociology, The Ohio State University

KEYWORDS: genocide, violence, social disorganization, Rwanda

Nearly one million people were killed in the Rwandan genocide in 1994. Although

scholars have theorized why this violence occurred, we know comparatively less about

how it unfolded. Accordingly, this article assesses the determinants of subnational

levels of killing in 142 Rwandan communes by relying on data from the Rwandan Min-

istry of Local Administration and Community Development, the National University

of Rwanda, and the 1991 Rwandan census. Fixed effects analyses reveal that top-down

and bottom-up factors coalesced to influence violence across Rwanda. The state

orchestrated and implemented the violence, and more violence occurred near the ex-

tremist center of the country as well as where state actors met strong opposition. Local

conditions also shaped the violence, however, and indicators of low community co-

hesion and social control are associated with comparatively more violence. When put

together, a unique model is introduced that integrates state conflict theories and social

control theories of crime to explain subnational killing during the genocide in Rwanda.

In April 1994, Rwanda plunged into violence that took the lives of up to one million

people in just several months. The extreme number of individuals killed during such

a short period of time has remained a defining aspect of the genocide, and scholars

have suggested there were 333.3 killings per hour, or 5.5 killings per minute, throughout

the country (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004; Gourevitch, 1998). This powerful statistic

highlights the intensity of the violence, although it simultaneously obscures the sub-

national distribution of killings within Rwanda. Indeed, the genocide did not unfold

uniformly across Rwanda but was concentrated in certain parts of the country (Straus,

2006; Verpoorten, 2012).

This article analyzes the factors that influenced the number of people killed in Rwan-

dan municipalities, which each experienced between 100 and 55,000 deaths. Fixed effects

analyses reveal that the state-led targeting of Tutsis shaped the violence within munici-

palities. Areas near the center of the country and where state actors faced the strongest

threats also experienced comparatively more violence. Nevertheless, top-down factors

are not alone sufficient to explain subnational variation in killing. As hundreds of thou-

sands of civilians participated in the violence, the communities in which they lived also

shaped how the violence unfolded, and comparatively low rates of marriage, low formal

employment, and high levels of education were associated with significantly more killing.

∗Additional supporting information can be found in the listing for this article in the Wiley Online

Library at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/crim.2017.55.issue-1/issuetoc.

This research was funded by a National Science Foundation (NSF) Graduate Research Fellowship

and an NSF Dissertation Improvement Award.

Direct all correspondence to Hollie Nyseth Brehm, Department of Sociology, The Ohio State Uni-

versity, 238 Townshend Hall, 1885 Neil Ave., Columbus, OH 43210 (e-mail: brehm.84@osu.edu).

C2017 American Society of Criminology doi: 10.1111/1745-9125.12126

CRIMINOLOGY Volume 55 Number 1 5–31 2017 5

6 NYSETH BREHM

In what follows, I briefly review the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. I then pose and

assess hypotheses regarding the factors that may have influenced subnational levels of

violence in Rwanda. When taken together, my findings highlight that both top-down

and bottom-up processes are associated with how the genocide unfolded, indicating that

state conflict theories and social control theories of crime inform variation in genocidal

violence and suggesting that theories regarding subnational variation in crime can inform

understandings of violence in other contexts.

THE ROAD TO GENOCIDE IN RWANDA

Rwanda was named a German colony in 1884, although colonialism became partic-

ularly consequential when Belgium took over the country after World War I (see Des

Forges, 2011; Newbury, 1988; Vansina, 2005). Belgian officials established a policy of

indirect rule through the existing Rwandan monarchy, which governed Rwanda through

a system of chiefs and subchiefs. The new colonialists also mandated that Rwandans

carry identification cards that classified each citizen as belonging to one of three ethnic

groups: Hutu, Tutsi, or Twa. Although these ethnic groups existed prior to colonialism,

Belgian colonialists racialized existing identities by suggesting that Tutsis were taller

and had lighter skin than Hutus. They also enacted policies that benefited Tutsis,

who dominated positions of power despite comprising no more than 15 percent of the

population (Lemarchand, 1970; Mamdani, 2001; Newbury, 1978).

The Tutsi monarchy remained intact throughout the colonial period (Newbury, 1988).

During the early 1950s, however, Rwandan Hutus began to express discontent at years

of marginalization despite their numerical majority, and the colonial administration

shifted its support. A Hutu emancipation movement emerged, culminating in Rwandan

independence (1962) and the institution of a Hutu-led government. Violence and dis-

crimination against Tutsis became common, and tens of thousands of Tutsis fled Rwanda

(Des Forges, 1999; Hintjens, 1999; Reyntjens, 1996).

A 1973 coup brought President Habyarimana to power, and his Hutu-led regime

continued to discriminate against Tutsis. Meanwhile, some of the Tutsis who had fled the

country began forming an armed liberation movement known as the Rwandan Patriotic

Front (RPF) in neighboring Uganda. On October 1, 1990, this army attacked Rwanda’s

northern border. Propaganda against the RPF swept through the country’s radio stations

and newspapers, and soon all Tutsis were associated with the enemy (Straus, 2006). In

an effort to end the civil war, the Habyarimana government and the RPF signed several

peace protocols known as the Arusha Accords. Sporadic violence nonetheless continued

(Des Forges, 1999), and an economic downturn and the looming power-sharing deal

with the RPF threatened those in power (Guichaoua, 2010; Longman, 2011; Verwimp,

2013). Habyarimana’s political party, the MRND (National Revolutionary Movement for

Development), also lost its monopoly on politics, leading to the formation of numerous

opposition parties that placed additional pressure on the government (Des Forges,

1999).

Then, on April 6, 1994, President Habyarimana’s plane was shot down as it was landing

in the capital, killing all occupants on impact. This marked the beginning of the genocide,

and soon violence targeted Tutsis and moderate Hutus throughout Rwanda. The RPF

also reinitiated its war within Rwanda, and several months later, up to one million people

had been killed.