(Sub)national Principals, Legislative Agents

• Author: Yann P. Kerevel
• DOI: 10.1177/0010414015574878
• Published date: 01 July 2015
• Date: 01 July 2015
• Subject Matter: Articles

Comparative Political Studies

2015, Vol. 48(8) 1020 –1050

© The Author(s) 2015

Reprints and permissions:

sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav

DOI: 10.1177/0010414015574878

cps.sagepub.com

Article

(Sub)national Principals,

Legislative Agents:

Patronage and Political

Careers in Mexico

Yann P. Kerevel1

Abstract

To what extent do external actors control the careers of national legislators

in federal systems? Although previous research has demonstrated that

multiple principals shape legislative behavior in federal systems, prior studies

have been much less successful at demonstrating the relative power of each

of these actors over the careers of federal legislators. Using an original data

set on the career paths of Mexican federal legislators, this study seeks to

determine the relative importance of governors, presidents, and other party

elites in shaping the future career choices of national legislators in federal

systems. I find that legislators who share partisanship with the president or

their governor are more likely to obtain patronage positions, while party

leaders predominantly control access to the ballot. The findings also suggest

that while governors and presidents can influence a subset of legislators, the

large majority of legislators pursue future positions over which party leaders

control access.

Keywords

corruption and patronage, federalism, Latin American politics, legislative

studies, subnational politics

1Lewis University, Romeoville, IL, USA

Corresponding Author:

Yann P. Kerevel, Lewis University, 1 University Pkwy, Unit 1023, Romeoville, IL 60435, USA.

Email: kerevely@gmail.com

574878CPSXXX10.1177/0010414015574878Comparative Political StudiesKerevel

research-article2015

Kerevel 1021

To what extent do external actors exert control over national legislators in

federal systems? Previous research highlights that national legislative

“agents” are subject to the influence of multiple, competing principals that

shape their behavior (Carey, 2007). These principals in federal systems may

be co-partisan governors, presidents, or other party leaders who are able to

influence legislative behavior through their control over legislative careers

(Jones, Saiegh, Spiller, & Tommasi, 2002; Raile, Pereira, & Power, 2011;

Rosas & Langston, 2011). Although previous research has demonstrated that

multiple principals shape legislative behavior in federal systems by acting as

gatekeepers to future office, prior studies have been much less successful at

demonstrating the relative power each of these actors has over the careers of

federal legislators. Using an original data set on the career paths of Mexican

federal legislators, this study seeks to determine the relative importance of

governors, presidents, and other party elites in shaping the future career

choices of national legislators in federal systems.

By examining the full range of future career choices made by national

legislators, scholars of comparative federalism can begin to understand the

relative importance of various external actors in the policymaking process.

This study also provides an initial approach for other scholars interested in

studying the relative power of external principals over federal legislators in

other federal systems. Understanding the ways in which federal legislators

are connected to external principals also has implications for party cohesion,

democratic representation, the nature of party systems, and the distribution of

political power in federal systems.

Specifically, this study examines the extent to which term-limited depu-

ties1 from Mexico’s Chamber of Deputies obtain bureaucratic appointments

and ballot access after leaving the Chamber based on partisan congruence

between deputies, governors, and presidents. I find the large majority of

Mexican federal deputies seek future elected positions over which party lead-

ers control access, suggesting governors, and even presidents, are weaker

external principals. However, I find governors of opposition parties in the

Mexican Chamber of Deputies tend to exert relatively greater influence over

federal deputies compared to governors from the national governing party,

while presidents possess a large number of career resources to shape the

political careers of co-partisan deputies.

The findings suggest executives largely exert their control through prom-

ises of future patronage. Previous explanations that highlight gubernatorial

influence in the candidate selection process are overstated (Cantú &

Desposato, 2012; Langston, 2010; Rosas & Langston, 2011), suggesting at a

minimum that multiple principals influence the candidate selection process.

While empirically establishing the extent to which governors influence