Structural Functionalism and Political Development

• DOI: 10.1177/106591297002300304
• Date: 01 September 1970
• Published date: 01 September 1970
• Author: Alexander J. Groth
• Subject Matter: Articles

STRUCTURAL FUNCTIONALISM AND POLITICAL
DEVELOPMENT: THREE PROBLEMS
ALEXANDER J. GROTH
University of California, Davis
MONG
the recent approaches to the study of politics one of the most stimu-
/~ lating as well as influential has been structural functionalism. Supported
A
by earlier works of Talcott Parsons, David Easton, and Marion Levy, Jr.,
among others, the formulae of structural functionalism first became genuinely popu-
larized by Gabriel Almond in 1960 in The Politics of the Deueloping Areas, and the
whole critical-analytical apparatus has been elaborated still further by Almond
and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., in their Comparative Politics: A Developmental
Approach of 1966.
Granted the considerable and apparently growing influence of the structural-
functional approach,’- particularly in the fields of comparative and developmental
politics, there is a need to reexamine some of its premises and aspirations in terms
which (1) are relevant for all attempts at rigorously scientific study of politics;
and (2) specifically illustrate the failure of the theory to assess political change in
a reasonably adequate or accurate fashion.
The fact is that the functional approach has, paradoxically in view of its
avowed claims to increased scientific objectivity and rigor,2 spawned a number of
confusions and illusions which are reminiscent of an age of primitivism in the
social sciences. To be sure, it is not lacking in merit as a pedagogical tool and as
a source of stimulating research hypotheses. It emphasizes the relatedness of &dquo;politi-
cal things&dquo; or -
in the Almond-Coleman and Almond-Powell versions -
the pro-
cesses relevant to authoritative allocations of values within societies. It can fit
many phenomena which at first sight appear quite disparate and unconnected into
one framework. It gives context for and hints at some degree of reciprocal influ-
ence among all sorts of things -
people, institutions and events. It also gives a
number of common denominators for comparisons among outwardly very different
polities: on the assumption that whatever their institutional trappings and cultural,
ideological, economic, and even chronological and spatial differences, all societies
share in the performance of a number of crucial political function.
3
We are
encouraged to see how the same political tasks are performed in somewhat different
ways in different societies, and invited, as it were, to fill in the terms in an equa-
tion, having presumably mastered the rudiments of political diagnosis by learning
what the equation is. The results of our filling-in can hopefully further refine
1

In its impact upon political science, structural functionalism seems to have attained those
heights of academic acceptance to which Gabriel Almond himself once referred some
twelve years ago: "... it may be said of new concepts as it was said of the salvation of
souls... ’there shall be weeping and gnashing of teeth, for many are called but few are
chosen’." "Comparative Political Systems," Journal of Politics, 18 (August 1956), 409.
2 On these claims see Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics:
A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966), pp. 6-9.
3
See, e.g., the comparison of the Inca Empire with the Tudor Monarchy, ibid., Chapter 9.
485

---

486
various specialized typologies of political systems, and also provide a basis for pre-
dicting the pattern of political development under various possible circumstances.
On the assumption that there is a core of significant political tasks, analogously
interrelated in all societies, it would seem that a truly comparative politics emerges.
Or at least it will emerge once sufhcient empirical data become available about the
performance of each task in every known type of political system. Given these
vistas, it is not surprising perhaps that the structural-functional approach has
gained widespread acceptance.
Several critiques of structural-functionalism have appeared in the recent litera-
ture of political science. Some have emphasized the difficulties of defining a
&dquo;system,&dquo; its boundaries and its general internal configurations. Some have de-
plored the political biases implicit in the entire approach insofar as it is perceived
to focus on equilibrium, stability, and survival as implicit values and goals of the
system -
identifying political health either with status quo maintenance or with its
gradual alterations, and radical, revolutionary changes with system pathology.4
The concern of this paper, however, is with three basic problems of structural
functionalism which also bedevil other attempts at making the study of politics
more rigorous. These problems are terminological ambiguity; indeterminacy of
relationships among &dquo;things political&dquo;; and confusions of facts with values.
In 1960 Gabriel Almond maintained that &dquo;the functional theory ... does
specify the elements of the polity in such a form as may ultimately make possible
statistical and perhaps mathematical formulation,&dquo; but he conceded that &dquo;... at
least at the present state of our knowledge and resources, we cannot establish quan-
titative values.... &dquo; 5
The position taken by Almond was that &dquo;[it] is ... possible to take the mono-
graphic literature on political and governmental institutions and code much of
their [sic.] content into statements of probability of performance of function by
structure.&dquo; ~
6
It would seem perfectly reasonable to await further empirical research in order
to sharpen probability predictions, and it is indeed possible that some of the litera-
4
See, e.g., Richard Sklar, "Political Science and National Integration: A Radical Approach,"
Journal of Modern African Studies, 5, No. 1 (1967), 4, 5. See also Herbert Spiro,
World Politics: A Global System (Glencoe: Dorsey Press, 1966), pp. 41-90; Peter
Nettle, "The Concept of System in Political Science," Political Studies, 45 (October
1966), 305-38; Eugene J. Meehan, The Theory and Method of Political Analysis
(Homewood: Dorsey Press, 1965), pp. 152-53. "The concept of ’system’ can be very
useful in political science as a guide to research and classification but it is not, strictly
speaking a theory." Ibid., p. 153. Cf. Karl W. Deutsch, The Nerves of Government
(Glencoe: Free Press, 1963), pp. 48-50. See also Oran R. Young, Systems of Political
Science (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1968), particularly pp. 28-37, and Kingsley
Davis, "The Myth of Functional Analysis in Sociology and Anthropology," American
Sociological Review, 24 (December 1959), 757-72. Most recent critiques include Mar-
tin Landau, "On the Use of Functional Analysis in American Political science," Social
Research, 35 (Spring 1968), 48-75. See also Chong-Do Hah and Jeanne Schneider,
"A Critique of Current Studies on Political Development and Modernization," ibid.,
pp. 130-58; and A. James Gregor, "Political Science and the Uses of Functional
Analysis," American Political Science Review, 62 ( June 1968), 425-39.
5
Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman (eds.), The Politics of the Developing Areas
(Princeton: Princeton U. Press, 1960), p. 59 and p. 61, respectively. Cf. Donald G.
Macrae, "Foundations for the Sociology of Politics," The Political Quarterly, 37 (July-
September 1966), 324-32.
6
Almond and Coleman, op. cit., p. 59. Italics mine.

---

487
ture of politics may be quantifiable in one context or another. But the difficulty of
structural-functionalism is that it provides neither the terms nor the relationships
which would make all this -
even ultimately -
possible.
Let us begin with the terminology, which, if one may borrow from it, is highly
diffuse. Much of the apparent usefulness of the approach -
its wide applicability
-
stems from a certain obvious &dquo;concession,&dquo; or retreat from the empirical world.
What the functional-system approach gains by way of extended generalization, it
loses by way of specificity. The seriousness of the resultant distortion or dilution in
terms of cross-cultural comparisons depends on one’s examples. &dquo;Aggregation of
interests&dquo; before an American party platform committee is a virtually observable
process. &dquo;Aggregation&dquo; in the mental processes of a Samoan tribal chieftain may
be no more than a theoretical contrivance of outside observers.
Structures, however unique, possess a degree of empirical concreteness. A
&dquo;legislature,&dquo; for example, can be generally found to have a legally-constitutionally
determined membership, and, in any case, will invariably possess the physical con-
creteness of its several hundred members, a locale, a de-facto organization, a group
life, and so forth. Some social and political actions such as &dquo;voting,&dquo; for example,
have sufficient specific observable aspects so that anyone can readily identify them.
In country X
we
can tell who votes (identifiable registered voters) and how (mark-
ing ballots, or pulling levers) and with what results. Certain conditions such as a
&dquo;balance of payments&dquo; can also be accounted for in tangible, universally observable
ways.
Functional terms such as &dquo;interest articulation,&dquo; &dquo;aggregation,&dquo; &dquo;communica-
tion,&dquo; &dquo;rule-making,&dquo; &dquo;rule-application&dquo; and &dquo;rule-adjudication,&dquo; &dquo;state building,&dquo;
or &dquo;political socialization&dquo; are inherently very loose. Several observers witnessing
the same phenomenon might either...