Lockyer v. Andrade: California three strikes law survives challenge based on federal law that is anything but "clearly established".

• Author: Horn, Doyle

Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003)

1. INTRODUCTION

   In Lockyer v. Andrade, the United States Supreme Court held the California Court of Appeal did not err in its interpretation of Court precedent. (1) That court held that sentencing a convict under the California three strikes law to fifty years to life in prison for two counts of petty theft (2) was not "contrary to" or "an unreasonable application of" Supreme Court jurisprudence. (3) The defendant, Leandro Andrade, had challenged his sentence under the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. (4)

   This Note examines the opinions in Lockyer and concludes that the law of the Supreme Court in the area of the Eighth Amendment's application to a term-of-years sentence was ambiguous at best. This ambiguity led the Supreme Court to correctly conclude that the California Court of Appeal did not unreasonably apply Federal law when it reviewed Andrade's Eight Amendment claim. The majority opinion authored by Justice O'Connor provides clarity in this area by showing substantial deference to the laws of the States. Lockyer demonstrates the Court's reluctance to interfere with States' administration of their criminal justice systems. Additionally, the majority opinion comports with congressional goals of limiting the abuse of Federal habeas corpus to review by state prisoners. Justice Souter's dissenting opinion is mistaken because it relied entirely on only one case. Moreover, if applied, the dissent's analysis would result in a flood of prisoner litigation aimed at rendering their sentences null under their respective State sentencing schemes, and thus does not respect the State's right to determine its own penological system. Finally, the dissent fails to recognize that the proper body for changing the California sentencing scheme is not the Supreme Court, but rather the legislature of the State of California.

2. BACKGROUND

   1. CALIFORNIA'S THREE STRIKES LAW

      In June 1992, eighteen-year-old Kimber Reynolds came home to Fresno for a friend's wedding. (5) Two parolees passed by her riding on a motorcycle and tried to grab her purse. (6) When Kimber fought back, the driver shot her in the head with a .357 caliber handgun. (7) She died two days later. (8) The driver was killed by police in a shootout. (9) The accomplice received a nine year sentence, and was eligible for parole again after he served half his term. (10) Kimber's death began a crusade by her father to strengthen criminal sentencing laws in California, and he authored the "three strikes" concept. (11) In April 1993, Reynold's idea received a cold reception from the California legislature, which killed his bill in committee. (12) He believed the only way to toughen sentencing was through submission of a proposition directly to the people of California. (13) He faced an uphill battle, with no political support and no money to finance a voter awareness campaign. (14)

      Later that year twelve-year-old Polly Klaas was kidnapped from her bedroom in her Petaluma home. (15) The search for Polly garnered national media attention and ended with the discovery of her body in December. (16)

      The kidnapper, Richard Allen Davis, led police to the body. (17) Davis's record showed chronic disrespect for the law, including multiple kidnappings, sexual assault, burglary, drug possession, and assault. (18) The media concentrated on Davis's despicable record as they covered the Klass story. (19) Public outrage erupted when Davis's record became known. (20) Reynolds was able to tap into that outrage, and a ground swell of public support for his "three strikes" campaign emerged. (21) The legislature passed the bill, and Governor Pete Wilson signed "three strikes" into law in March 1994. (22) Even though the state had enacted the bill, Reynolds continued to campaign for the ballot initiative, titled Proposition 184. (23) Reynolds pursued the ratification of Proposition 184 because he wanted to place the recidivist mechanism beyond legislative amending power. (24) The ballot initiative passed in November 1994 garnering seventy-two percent of the vote. (25)

      Proposition 184 is codified in California Penal Code section 1170.12. (26) The sister provision passed by the legislature is California Penal Code section 667. (27) Two primary features to note exist in section 1170.12. First, subsection 1170.12(c)(1) mandates a sentence enhancement that doubles the punishment for a convicted felon's second felony conviction. (28) Second, subsection 1170.12(c)(2)(A) requires a felony sentencing court to sentence defendants that have two or more prior felony convictions to the greater of (i) three times the mandatory punishment, (ii) twenty-five years, or (iii) a court imposed term with other appropriate sentence enhancement. (29) Effectively, the provision sets a mandatory minimum twenty-five year sentence for third time felony offenders. (30)

      The statute operates on past felonies that are "serious" or "violent" under California law. (31) Representative violent felonies include murder, rape, kidnapping, and felonies committed with a firearm. (32) Serious felonies include such offenses as selling illegal drugs to minors, first degree burglary, witness intimidation, and armed assault. (33) However, subsection 1170.12(c)(2)(A) does not limit the type of felony considered a third strike. (34) The statute specifies only that it governs the term for the current felony. (35) Thus, any felony conviction can trigger application of the three strike sentence enhancement. (36)

      Other provisions in the statute are designed to ensure its intent to incarcerate multiple offenders is not frustrated. (37) Several such provisions are implicated in Andrade's case. (38) For instance, the statute allows all prior felonies to be counted against a defendant because it has no time limitation after which a felony could not be used as a potential strike. (39) Also, the statute mandates consecutive sentencing for felonies not committed on the same occasion that do not arise from the same operative facts. (40) In other words, a felon with two prior strikes and two current felony counts can face two separate invocations of the three strikes law at sentencing. (41) However, the statute does not completely remove all sentencing discretion. Indeed, the statute allows prosecutors to move to dismiss a prior felony conviction so that it will not be counted as a strike. (42) Additionally, the California Supreme Court granted trial courts the power to dismiss a prior felony from the strike count sua sponte if dismissal serves the interests of justice. (43)

      Application of the California three strikes provision has generated much wailing and gnashing of academic teeth. (44) Many writers take exception to the application and overall merit of the three strikes law, and their arguments are not without virtue. For example, the validity of the statute would be questionable should it fail to reduce crime. (45) The law should be revamped if it catches and incarcerates criminals as they near the age when they cease criminal activity. (46) Disproportionate application based on race also implicates the basic fairness of the statute. (47) Economic costs of increased incarceration may threaten State budget vitality. (48)

      Some statistics, however, demonstrate the success of the law. (49) According to a report published in 1999 by Bill Jones, the California Secretary of State at the time, the four year period following passage of three strikes saw a massive drop in crime. (50) For example, 1994 to 1998 comparisons showed a 51.5% drop in homicide, an 18.7% drop in rape, and a 48.6% drop in robbery. (51) The report pegs societal economic saving from crime reduction over the same period to be between $8.2 billion and $21.7 billion. (52) These statistics, while compelling, are not immune to criticism, primarily driven by the notion that the strong economy affected crime in that time period. (53)

   2. THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT AND THE PROPORTIONALITY PRINCIPLE

      The Eighth Amendment forbids the imposition of "cruel and unusual punishment." (54) Three areas of jurisprudence have evolved in cases dealing with what is cruel and unusual punishment. First, the Eighth Amendment forbids punishment in some instances. (55) Second, the Eighth Amendment restricts the use of certain kinds of punishment. (56) Finally, the Eighth Amendment contains a requirement that punishment imposed not be grossly disproportionate to the crime committed. (57)

      The text of the Eighth Amendment comes verbatim from the English Bill of Rights. (58) The first Congress adopted the Eighth Amendment as part of the Bill of Rights, including the "cruel and unusual punishment" clause, in 1791. (59) Most of the early commentaries surrounding the clause, and state court decisions interpreting their constitutions' respective similar clauses, indicate it forbade the imposition of certain types of punishment. (60)

      Much debate exists over whether the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment applies to prison terms. (61) The proportionality principle asserts that a term-of-years punishment may not be grossly disproportionate to the underlying offense. (62) In other words, the proportionality principle assesses "the relationship between the nature and number of offenses committed and the severity of the punishment imposed." (63) The concept of proportionality entered Eighth Amendment Supreme Court jurisprudence in a dissent by Justice Field in O'Neil v. Vermont. (64) Twelve years later, the Court overturned the conviction of an American coast guardsman that resulted in a sentence of fifteen years at hard labor in chains, and a fine. (65) Weems was convicted in a Philippine court of falsifying a document in the Philippine jurisdiction, which at the time was an American administered territory. (66) The Philippine court relied on Spanish law, which did not require amens rea, when it convicted Weems...