Communal strife in Lebanon: ancient animosities or state intervention?

• Author: Abu-Hamad, Ariz
• Position: Continuity and Transformation: The Modern Middle East - Interview

Communal Conflict: An Introduction

The current spate of communal violence - violence among groups that define themselves by differences in their respective religions, ethnicity, language or race - is one of today's paramount human rights problems. At this time, ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, the massacres in Rwanda and the murderous conflicts in former Soviet republics are examples of some of the outbreaks of such violence. Traditionally, the Middle East, the crossroads of Europe, Africa and Asia, contained many distinct communities that coexisted in relative peace for millenia despite their different ethnic, linguistic and religious backgrounds. It is only in modem times that violence directed by or at minorities has flared up in the region, in Lebanon, Iraq, Kuwait, Sudan, Mauritania and Turkey, among others. Research of the Lebanese civil war, as outlined in this paper, indicates that the current communal strife and the deplorable status of minorities in the Middle East are attributable to explicit government decisions that promote divisions, exploit differences and, in some cases, create minorities by government fiat.(2) Moreover, the course that post-war restructuring in Lebanon has followed so far indicates that prospects for a secular, equitable and stable society are bleak unless the government undertakes serious steps to reform the current political system, which currently is based on a division of power along religious lines, in favor of a system based on individual rights that provides full protection for minorities.

Sectarian violence is often perceived to be the product of deep-seated hatreds or ancient animosities. Governments promote this view since, if ancient animosities are perceived to be the cause of strife, then the inferior status of minorities takes on the appearance of a natural phenomenon that outsiders have no right to condemn and no hope of changing. While competition, ambivalence, animosity and friction between different groups certainly existed in the past, violent communal warfare has developed in association with the modem state structure, which attempts to supplant communal autonomy and to subsume affinity groups into a unified polity. However, in many places primordial relationships have been preserved, largely because they have served the important interests of local leaders, external powers or both. In such cases, membership in a community became a conduit of membership in the state. Fighting for ostensible communal interests became an acceptable means of preserving existing privileges or of improving the communal balance of power. Yet it is often not recognized that conflicts framed in ethnic or religious terms can actually be products of specific government policies, such as restricting individual rights, that have been calculated to serve the immediate interests of those in power. Denial of rights to members of majority groups is justified by those in power as necessary to safeguard the interests of society as a whole, while denial of rights to members of minority groups is presented as a temporary measure necessary to prevent radical elements within such groups from engaging in violent activities.

When communal violence breaks out, vulnerable communities can benefit from the protection of the international community, usually in the form of peacekeeping troops. Pressuring national governments to change divisive and discriminatory policies is, however, preferable to prevent such outbreaks before they take place. Given the governmental origins of much communal violence, early recognition and response by the international community, as well as support for non-polarizing policies and for efforts to defuse tensions, can have a crucial positive effect.

A government's role in fomenting communal strife can take several forms. In some cases, discrimination that favors a dominant group or marginalizes a minority from full participation in the society creates a climate of mutual suspicion and intolerance and thus the illusion that one group "deserves" more rights than another. The resulting differential in status can breed resentment on the one hand, while inciting, or being seen as excusing, more violent forms of repression on the other. Communal tensions also tend to arise when a government defines political rights in terms of communities rather than individuals.(3) While the granting of privileges to disadvantaged or minority communities can address inequities, representation that is based merely on communal identity, rather than on the free choice of individuals, gives community leaders excessive power and can lock them into perpetual communal competition, often with disastrous results.

Several examples in the Middle East illustrate the ways in which governments incite such violence. In Iraq, for instance, official rhetoric spurred jingoistic and ethnic animosities to justify anti-Kurdish policies.(4) Introduced initially as a counter-insurgency measure against the Kurds, a 1988 government campaign soon took on ominous genocidal dimensions. The populations of hundreds of villages were forcibly relocated, resulting in the death or disappearance of between 50,000 and 100,000 Kurdish citizens.(5) Similarly, while fighting the Shi'i uprising in the south, the government has used propaganda to exploit religious and cultural differences.(6) In Sudan, t6 cite another example, the state is directly fighting southern secessionists in the name of upholding the rights of the Muslim community in the north. In Egypt, the Christian community has become a target of elements in the Islamist opposition movement. While official Egyptian propaganda exploits these attacks to discredit the Islamist opposition as a whole, the government does little to protect the vulnerable members of the Christian community or to seriously address its religious and civic needs.(7) In Kuwait, the state played a clear role in defining the Bedoons as a minority and in their subsequent persecution. Through successive changes in citizenship laws, the Bedoons were disenfranchised politically and, later, economically. They have gone from being active participants in their society, to being used as a pool of cheap labor, to their current status of being hounded and persecuted after being declared illegal residents in the only country they have ever known.(8)

It is especially in the case of Lebanon's civil war, however, that the intricate links between state action and deep-seated religious differences are most evident. For the past 50 years, government positions and other benefits have been apportioned to officially recognized sects and distributed through sectarian leaders. In order to preserve the privileges the system brings them, sectarian leaders have spared no means. They have incited massive violence, committed large-scale violations of human rights and invited outside military intervention. This paper will analyze this tangled relationship in Lebanon.

Lebanon's Sectarian Strife

The Lebanese civil war, which lasted from 1975 to 1990 and claimed the lives of nearly 200,000 people, frequently has been portrayed as an example of communal conflict rooted in religious hatred. While acknowledging that most of the horrendous slaughter and destruction has been carried out by Lebanese, many object to religious characterizations of the violence and the use of the terms "civil war" or "communal warfare," maintaining that the conflict was imposed on Lebanon by outside parties. Many Lebanese blame Arab states, Israel, the Palestinians, Iran, the Soviet Union and the United States for the civil war, claiming that these competing powers exploited Lebanon's diversity and used the country - with its weak government and feeble army - as a battleground to settle accounts.

Both characterizations contain elements of truth. While much of the violence did erupt along religious lines, there is also ample evidence to suggest that outside powers played an active role in instigating and fueling the communal violence. Regional political dynamics, primarily the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, contributed to Lebanon's communal warfare. Economic disparities between religious groups also formed a key element. But perhaps the most significant force behind Lebanon's communal violence was the sectarian-based state structure, combined with the internal political maneuvering and the exploitation of sectarian differences required to maintain the system. An examination of Lebanon's history shows how the government has repeatedly used various means to preserve the system that has sanctioned the power and privileges of its key players.

Exploiting Sectarian Rivalries: the Ottomans and the French

Lebanon's civil war has fostered an impression that the Lebanese have always engaged in communal violence based on religious differences. In fact, during most of its history, Lebanon was a perceived haven for diversity and a refuge from religious persecution. While religion has always been an important characteristic of cultural identification in Lebanon, attempts to translate religious affiliation into a base of political power have been relatively recent. The use of religion as a mobilizing "resource," i.e., as a means of stimulating collective political action, directly led to competition along sectarian lines and to communal fighting. It is no coincidence that communal violence and modem state building occured concurently. In fact, strife can be attributed to competition between the political interests of the state, the personal interests of its chief actors, and the interests of the regional and colonial powers that have played a prominent role in Lebanon's history. Exploitation of religious diversity - Lebanon has 15 recognized sects - was an obvious method of gaining influence used by those vying for power.

Most historians date the origins of communal violence in Lebanon to 1860, when fighting broke out between Druze Muslims and Maronite Christians...