Street-Level Bias: Examining Factors Related to Street-Level Bureaucrats’ State or Citizen Favoritism
| Published date | 01 April 2023 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/02750740231167897 |
| Author | Sagi Gershgoren,Nissim Cohen |
| Date | 01 April 2023 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Street-Level Bias: Examining Factors
Related to Street-Level Bureaucrats’State
or Citizen Favoritism
Sagi Gershgoren
1
and Nissim Cohen
1
Abstract
Administration of street-level bureaucrats requires prior knowledge of what affects their use of discretion. However, there is
a lack of understanding as to what influences their decision-making when choosing between claims made by the state or by its
citizens. Without such knowledge, public administration at the street-level can sustain the perception that street-level bureau-
crats have a state-preference bias, lowering citizens’view of public service delivery by those perceived as the face of gover-
nance. This study focuses on decisions street-level bureaucrats make when resolving disputes between citizens and other state
officials. Using real-world resolutions made over three decades by lower-court judges in Israeli civil tax disputes, the findings
reveal a link between factors associated with street-level bureaucrats’common characteristics and state favoritism in their
resolutions. The findings also imply that policymakers who want to mitigate such outcomes can use citizen administrative par-
ticipation-based influencers to promote street-level bureaucrats’pro-citizen tendencies.
Keywords
street-level bureaucrats, discretion, procedural fairness, citizen administrative participation
Introduction
Street-level bureaucrats make decisions that impact the lives
and fates of many individuals (Brodkin, 2012; Hupe & Hill,
2007; Maynard-Moody & Portillo, 2010). Those working on
the frontlines of public administration, such as case workers,
police officers, social workers and lower-court judges, use
their discretion when granting public benefits and imposing
public sanctions (Lipsky, 2010). They reflect the administra-
tion to the citizens with whom they interact (Davidovitz &
Cohen, 2022), thereby affirming their critical role in policy
implementation (Evans & Harris, 2004; Hupe et al., 2014;
Portillo & Rudes, 2014).
The assumption that citizens would be treated fairly and
with dignity forms the basis of the social contract between
the public and the establishment (Rawls, 1971). In return
for their involvement in collective decision-making and
paying of taxes, citizens expect unbiased treatment from
the authorities (Beeri et al., 2021; Craven, 2021; Van
Ryzin, 2011). Some scholars consider bureaucratic neutrality
to be a myth (Portillo et al., 2020; Williams, 1985). Yet, pro-
cedural equity (that is, the notion that public service relations
should be objective) and procedural values, such as respect
and fairness, continue to be major drivers of public trust in
government (Mazepus & van Leeuwen, 2020; Mcloughlin,
2015; Moynihan et al., 2015). Thus, citizens who believe
that state officials treat them fairly are more likely to accept
administrative decisions (Kang, 2021) and develop trust in
governance by generalizing their positive personal experi-
ences (Davidovitz, 2022; Kumlin & Rothstein, 2005).
People encounter “Procedural Fairness”(i.e., processes
designed to reduce bias or favoritism in government
decision-making (Ruder & Woods, 2020)
1
through their
interactions with street-level bureaucrats (Edri-Peer &
Cohen, 2023; Raaphorst & Van de Walle, 2020) whom
they perceive to be the symbolic face of government
(Lipsky, 2010). It is therefore essential for decisions made
by street-level bureaucrats to be unbiased, particularly
when they resolve disputes between the state and its citizens.
In settling disputes between citizens and other state offi-
cials, the resolutions street-level bureaucrats make
(“Street-level resolutions”) can reveal their pro-citizen or
pro-state tendencies through their likelihood to support one
side over the other (Cohen & Gershgoren, 2016; Raaphorst,
2018). In addition to the specific claims of the disputing
parties, street-level bureaucrats’decision-making can be
1
Department of Public Administration and Policy in the School of Political
Sciences, University of Haifa, Haifa, Israel
Corresponding Author:
Sagi Gershgoren, Department of Public Administration and Policy in the
School of Political Sciences, University of Haifa, Haifa, Israel.
Email: sagitax@gmail.com
Article
American Review of Public Administration
2023, Vol. 53(3-4) 115–133
© The Author(s) 2023
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/02750740231167897
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influenced (in general) by environmental, organizational, and
personal influences (Jilke & Tummers, 2018). This study
investigates factors associated with common characteristics
of street-level bureaucrats, such as their expanded discretion-
ary space, their formal certification as state servants, and
their membership in public organizations (Gershgoren &
Cohen, 2022; 2023a) which may compel them to favor the
state in their resolutions. The study also examines citizen
administrative participation-based influencers that may rein-
force their pro-citizen tendencies by advancing the right to
internally appeal their resolutions and by promoting their
membership and joint resolution-making in mixed teams
with lay officials whose careers do not revolve around civil
service (Machura,2016), such as private contractors or volun-
teers (Gershgoren & Cohen, 2022; 2023b).
Adopting thescholarly view of lower-court judgesas street-
level bureaucrats (Biland & Steinmetz, 2017; Cowan &
Hitchings, 2007; Dallara & Lacchei, 2021; Jain, 2018;
Lipsky, 2010), this study explores whether state or citizen
favoritism existed in lower-court rulings that resolved Israeli
civil tax disputes under different conditions. The article pro-
ceeds as follows: first, a theoretical background is given
regarding pro-citizen tendencies in street-level resolutions,
detailing factors associated with common characteristics of
street-level bureaucrats that may bring state favoritism to
their decision-making and citizenadministrative participation-
based influencersthatmaypromotetheirpro-citizentenden-
cies. Four hypotheses follow, regarding the impact such
factors and influencers may have on street-level bureaucrats’
pro-state or pro-citizen tendencies. Next, the context and
method for testing these hypotheses are presented, using
lower-court rulings in Israeli civil tax disputes to test case
street-level resolutions and utilizing quantitative statistical
tools to assess the empirical data. The findings are presented
and discussed, and the article concludes with a discussion of
the study’s limitations and potential future directions.
Pro-Citizen or Pro-State Tendencies
in Street-Level Resolutions
Scholars have emphasized the significance of discretion to
the efforts of street-level bureaucrats (Evans, 2016;
Maynard-Moody & Portillo, 2010; Thomann et al., 2018).
Discretion is generally perceived as the freedom of choice
that can be exercised in a specific context (Evans, 2011).
This study examines the manifestation of such freedom of
choice in street-level resolutions, focusing on their pro-
citizen or pro-state tendencies.
The term “pro-citizen tendencies”refers to street-level
bureaucrats’preferences for citizens’claims over arguments
made by other state officials. In their pro-citizen resolutions,
street-level bureaucrats reject the arguments made by such
state officials and accept the citizens’counterclaims (and vice
versa in their pro-state resolutions). Public administration
theory is ambivalent regarding street-level bureaucrats’ante-
cedent tendencies to favor the state or the public. According
to the traditional distinction between politics and administration
bureaucrats are “state agents,”acting inherently in the state’s
favor (Prendergast, 2007; Rohr, 1987) and condemns their
deviations from public policy as “shirking”or “sabotage”
(Brehm and Gates, 1997). The self-descriptions of street-level
bureaucrats, however, are used by some scholars to argue
that they see themselves as “citizen agents,”using their discre-
tion to help those they consider worthy or punish those they
deem u nworthy (M aynard-Moody & Musheno, 2000;
Tummers, 2017).
2
Resolutions made by street-level bureaucrats
force them to choose between arguments made by state officials
and counterclaims made by citizens, exposing their pro-state or
pro-citizen biases.
‘Resolutions’refer to the settling of disputes between
parties (Burton, 1990). Citizens can bring their claims
against argumentsmade by state officials to a va riety of (inter-
nal and external) appeal agencies (Buck, 2004; Currie &
Goodman, 1975). In fact, many of those authorized to reject
or affirm such claims, such as mediators, arbitrators, special-
ized tribunals, and administrative adjudicators, are themselves
street-levelbureaucrats. They exercisediscretion when making
their resolutions, but which side will they favor?
The literature provides insights into the personal, organi-
zational, and environmental factors that affect street-level
bureaucrats’use of discretion (for a comprehensive descrip-
tion, see Cohen, 2018; 2021). Most studies focus on decision-
making regarding their own conduct. This study proceeds to
explore what factors and influencers affect their resolutions
that affirm or reject other state officials’arguments in view
of citizens’counterclaims.
Factors That Can Bring State Favoritism to
Street-Level Resolutions
The classical definition of street-level bureaucrats character-
izes them as having significant discretion, which they may
exercise in their frequent interactions with clients. (Lipsky,
2010). Furthermore, they are usually accredited with formal
certification that confirms their public role and are
members of public organizations in various administrative
bodies. How will such factors relate to pro-state or pro-citizen
tendencies in their resolutions?
Expanding Street-Level Bureaucrats’Discretionary Space
“Discretionary space,”in context, refers to the set of systemic
regulations and administrative standards that govern the use
of discretion by street-level bureaucrats (Evans & Harris,
2004). Such space limits their decision-making freedom
(Hupe & Hill, 2007; Thomann et al., 2018). Because they
can only use their discretion within its boundaries (Bovens
& Zouridis, 2002; Piore, 2011), their behavior outside of it
116 American Review of Public Administration 53(3-4)
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