Strategy and Techniques of Influence in Soviet-Finnish Relations
| Author | Kalevi J. Holsti |
| Published date | 01 March 1964 |
| Date | 01 March 1964 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/106591296401700107 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
63
STRATEGY
AND
TECHNIQUES
OF
INFLUENCE
IN
SOVIET-FINNISH
RELATIONS
KALEVI
J.
HOLSTI
University
of
British
Columbia
N
OCTOBER
30,
1961,
the
Finnish
ambassador
in
Moscow
received
a
note
from
the
Soviet
foreign
ministry
requesting
the
commencement
of
military
discussions
between
the
Soviet
and
Finnish
governments
to
prepare
for
the
possibility
of
a
West
German
attack
on
the
Soviet
Union
through
the
Baltic
area
and
Finland.
The
note
pointed
to
a
number
of
German,
Danish,
and
Norwegian
mili-
tary
preparations
under
NATO
auspices
which,
according
to
the
Soviet
government,
would
turn
the
Baltic
area
into
a
potential
focus
of
armed
conflict.
Specifically
the
note
mentioned
the
creation
of
West
German
military
depots
in
Denmark
and
Nor-
way,
the
shifting
of
German
naval
headquarters
from
the
North
Sea
coast
to
Flens-
burg
on
the
Baltic,
and
the
proposed
establishment
of
a
German-Danish
naval
com-
mand.
Even
the
neutral
Swedes,
the
note
maintained,
were
beginning
to
underesti-
mate
the
growth
of
West
German
military
influence
in
northern
Europe
and
the
Baltic
area.
The
Soviet
foreign
ministry
suggested
that
these
activities
constituted
a
direct
threat
not
only
to
Soviet
security,
but
to
the
security
of
Finland
as
well,
and
in
response
the
governments
should
begin
military
consultations
as
provided
for
in
the
1948
Agreement
of
Friendship,
Cooperation,
and
Mutual
Assistance
between
Finland
and
the Soviet
Union.&dquo;
Publication
of
this
note
immediately
elicited
world-wide
speculation
over
Soviet
motives
in
Scandinavia
and
particularly
over
the future
of
Finland
as
an
inde-
pendent
nation.
Observers
and
diplomats
were
reminded
of
the
Soviet
demands
to
Finland
for
military
discussions
and
territorial
adjustments
in
1939,
demands
which
ultimately
led
to
the
Winter War.
Most
of
the
Western
and
Scandinavian
press
was
pessimistic;
British
diplomats
surmised
that
the
objective
of
the
Soviet
pressure
on
Finland
was
to
put
it
in
the
communist
bloc,
to
end
the
postwar
situa-
tion
whereby
Finland
was
allowed
to
have
a
foot
in
both
camps,
and
possibly
even
to
extend
Russian
military
bases
or
an
early
warning
radar
system
into
Finland.
British
diplomatic
reports
stated
that
in
Stockholm
conservative
politicians
and
newspapers
were
proposing
a
review
of
Sweden’s
traditional
neutrality
in
view
of
the
Soviet
note.2
Mr.
Hanson
Baldwin
of
the
New
York
Times
analyzed
the
note
in
terms
of
Soviet
reactions
to
the
strengthening
of
NATO
in
northern
Europe:
its
objectives,
he
believed,
was
to
increase
the
psychological
and
political
cleavages
between
West
Germany
and
the
Scandinavian
NATO
members
so
that
Denmark
and
Norway
would
be
discouraged
from
establishing
effective
military
control
over
the
Skagerrak
and
Kattegat
straits,
the
strategically
important
connection
between
the
Baltic
and
North
Seas.3
French
observers
considered
the
note
as
the
beginning
of
a
Soviet
cam-
paign
to
obtain
the
recognition
of
East
German
sovereignty
by
the
European
neu-
trals,
or
as
a
warning
to
President
Kennedy
that
providing
atom
arms
to
West
Ger-
1
The
text
of
the
note
is
in
the
New
York
Times,
October
31,
1961.
2
Ibid.,
November
2,
1961.
3
Ibid.,
November
6,
1961.
64
many,
even
under
American
control,
would
create
a
bad
reaction
in
Moscow
against
NATO’s
Scandinavian
members.4
With
the
exception
of
Mr.
Baldwin’s
analysis,
these
views
have
proved
to
be
incorrect.
Although
there
was
a
surface
similarity
between
Soviet
diplomatic
be-
havior
toward
Finland
in
1939
and
1961,
the
belief
that
Finland’s
independence
was
endangered
because
of
the
Soviet
note
was
based
on
a
misunderstanding
of
Soviet
objectives
in
Scandinavia
and
of
Soviet-Finnish
relations.
This
paper
first
will
ana-
lyze
traditional
and
contemporary
Soviet
strategic
and
political
objectives
in
Finland
-
the
Soviet
&dquo;image&dquo;
of
Finland
-
and
will
indicate
how
Finnish
policy-makers
have
accommodated
their
diplomacy
and
foreign
policy
to
this
&dquo;image.&dquo;
This
discus-
sion
will
reveal
two
major
techniques
that
the
Soviet
government
has
used
to
achieve
its
objectives
in
Finland.
Finally,
the
note
of
October
30
will
be
discussed
in
rela-
tion
to
these
techniques
to
demonstrate
that
recent
Soviet
diplomatic
activity
in
Scandinavia
and
Finland
has
not
changed
from
the
established
postwar
pattern
but
has
sought
to
maintain
the
status
quo
in
this
area.
FINLAND
IN
RUSSIAN
MILITARY
DOCTRINE
The
political
objectives
of
the
Tsarist
and
Soviet
governments
in
northern
Europe
have
been
and
are
based
primarily
on
military
and
strategic
considerations
although
the
Russians
usually
describe
Finnish-Soviet
relations
in
terms
of
the
&dquo;friendly
relations
between
the
Finnish
and
Soviet
peoples.&dquo;
5 Therefore,
under-
standing
of the
Soviet
image
of
Finland
today
requires
a
brief
outline
of
traditional
Russian
strategic
interests
in
this
area.
Finland’s
geopolitical
and
strategic
position
in
Soviet
military
planning
has
changed
very
little
since
the
advent
of
long-range
weapons.
Raymond
Garthoff
has
argued
that
Soviet
military
doctrine
has
accommodated
most
of
the
new
weapons
systems,
but
the
use
of
mass
land
armies,
the
reliance
on
infantry,
and
the
continuing
importance
of
Europe’s
long-standing
strategic
areas
are
traditional
themes
in
Rus-
sian
military
thought.6
Finland’s
position
in
Russian
military
thought
during
the
last
150
years
also
reveals
considerable
continuity.
Until
the
beginning
of
the
nineteenth
century,
Finland
had
been
the
traditional
battleground
for
the
frequent
wars
between
Sweden
and
Russia,
and
in
1809
Sweden
was
forced
to
cede
Finland
to
Russia
as
a
result
of
the
Napoleonic
wars.
The
main
objective
of
Alexander
I
in
detaching
Finland
from
Sweden
was
to
secure
the
safety
of
Russia’s
northwest
frontier
and
particularly
of
its
capital,
St.
Petersburg,
by
creat-
ing
in
Finland
a
strong
defense
against
the
other
Baltic
powers.7
7
4
France-Soir,
November
18,
1961.
5
As
expressed
by
Khrushchev
on
his
visit
to
Helsinki
in
September
1960
on
the
occasion
of
President
Kekkonen’s
sixtieth
birthday,
quoted
in
Uusi
Suomi,
September
4,
1960 ;
also
the
statements
by
the
Chairman
of
the
Presidium
of
the
Supreme
Soviet,
Leonid
Brezhnev,
on
his
visit
to
Finland
only
one
month
before
the
October
30
note:
"Our
meetings
with
[Finnish
officials]
were
filled
with
that
friendship
and
confidence
which
govern
the
rela-
tions
between
our
countries."
Quoted
in
Uusi
Suomi,
September
30,
1961.
Soviet
publi-
cations
on
Finnish-Soviet
relations
are
not
revealing
because
they
seldom
include
other
than
the
usual
clichés
concerning
"friendship
between
peoples"
and
"peaceful
coexist-
ence."
6
Raymond
Garthoff,
Soviet
Strategy
in
the
Nuclear
Age
(New
York,
1958),
esp.
chaps.
4
and
7.
7
Oskar
Seitkari,
"Venäjän
poliittiset
tavoitteet
Suomessa,"
in
Seitkari
et
al.,
Venäläinen
sorto-
kausi
Suomessa
(Helsinki,
1960),
pp.
20-26.
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