Strategic Uncertainty and Elite Defections in Electoral Autocracies: A Cross-National Analysis

• Author: Adrián del Río
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/00104140221074273
• Published date: 01 November 2022
• Date: 01 November 2022
• Subject Matter: Articles

Article

Comparative Political Studies

2022, Vol. 55(13) 2250–2282

© The Author(s) 2022

Article reuse guidelines:

sagepub.com/journals-permissions

DOI: 10.1177/00104140221074273

journals.sagepub.com/home/cps

Strategic Uncertainty

and Elite Defections in

Electoral Autocracies: A

Cross-National Analysis

Adri´

an del R´

ıo

1



Abstract

Defections within the ruling elite often endanger authoritarian rule, em-

boldening opposition groups and paving the way for regime breakdown. Yet,

the consequences of elite defections are better understood than their causes.

Why do some authoritarian regimes experience more defections to the

opposition than others? This paper develops a theory of the origins of elite

defection and tests it using a novel dataset based on the political careers of

15,013 legislative deputies and ministers in 12 electoral autocracies. The

theory predicts that regime elites defect when there are greater opportunities

to capitalize on the discontent of other regime elites and voters. Regimes with

weak party mechanisms that are also supported by many factions experience

more defections. Finally, defections increase during economic downturns and

when the government’s control of mass media declines, which helps potential

defectors coordinate with anti-regime voters.

Keywords

authoritarianism, democratization, elite defection, regime change, ruling

party, co-optation, opposition

1

Centre for East European and International Studies, Berlin, Germany

Corresponding Author:

Adri´

an del R´

ıo, Humboldt Postdoctoral Fellow, Centre for East European and International

Studies, Mohrenstraße 60, Berlin 10117, Germany.

Email: adrian.delRioRodriguez@eui.eu

Introduction

In most dictatorships, the leader needs elite support. Elites are important for

regime survival because they have the resources, skills, and followers to assist

the leader with governing tasks. Elite allies can help the regime control mass

unrest, win elections, and administer territories. Yet, when elite coalitions fall

apart, they represent one of the main threats to authoritarian rule and often

pave the way for regime change (Djuve et al., 2019;Svolik, 2012).

Much of the literature on the breakdown of elite coalitions centers on coups

and defections led by the armed forces or repressive agents (Moore, 2011;

Nebodeapstad, 2013;Belkin & Schofer, 2003;Bodea et al., 2017). However,

this type of coalition breakdown has become rare in the post-cold war era,

while the defection of regime politicians has played a central role in many

recent studies of regime instability, and, particularly, in dictatorships holding

multiparty elections, known as electoral autocracies (Levitsky & Way, 2010;

Morse, 2018;Schedler, 2016).

1

Regime politicians may not have the guns to subdue dictators, but they

have the resources to advance policies and mobilize mass support. When these

elites defect, they deprive the dictator of access to political machinery and the

policymaking expertise needed to rule effectively (Hale, 2015). Elite de-

fections divide the regime’s vote share and improve the opposition’s electoral

prospects, sometimes allowing them to win elections (Howard & Roessler,

2006). Even if defectors do not run for elections, they might signal the re-

gime’s vulnerability, emboldening potential rivals or helping the opposition

rally the masses and elites against the regime (O’Donnell & Schmitter, 1986;

Greene, 2010).

Given the potential implications of elite defections, studying this phe-

nomenon is key to understanding the strains and disruptions within author-

itarian governments that make them more likely to collapse. Yet, a puzzle

remains. Alignments with the authoritarian regime offer elites signif‌icant

advantages, such as access to state resources, illicit rents, and career op-

portunities. These benef‌its increase the costs of defection as potential de-

fectors risk losing some or all of their privileges and may even face repression.

So why would elites f‌lirt with opposition groups when the ruling coalition can

threaten their lives or offer signif‌icant rewards?

Recent studies show that elites are more likely to defect when they can

capitalize upon economic downturns (Haggard & Kaufman, 1995;Reuter &

Gandhi, 2011), and problems exist in distributing spoils among regime in-

siders (Reuter & Szakonyi, 2019). In addition, other factors related to political

institutions matter. These include liberalization in the political environment—

especially greater electoral contestation (Langston, 2006)—the strength of the

ruling party’s institutional bonds (Brownlee, 2007;Levitsky & Way, 2012),

and elite recruitment (Greene, 2007;Langston, 2017). Finally, other factors

del R´

ıo2251

that reduce exit costs stem from contextual strategies (Khisa, 2016) and

citizens’democratic attitudes (Andrews & Honing, 2019).

While many studies aim to explain defections, two issues loom large. First,

there has been a shortfall of cross-national research that examines the

magnitude of elite defections. Existing scholarship focuses on the incidence

(rather than scale) of high-level defections and, by default, gives similar

analytical weight to single and mass defections. This matters since a central

goal of the ruler is preventing defections from escalating: numerous defections

can make the regime’s fragility a self-fulf‌illing prophecy and help rivals

coordinate strategies to induce regime change (Magaloni, 2006;Przeworski,

1991). Second, existing theories have taken a rational, cost-benef‌it approach

to understand the factors motivating individual elites to defect. However, such

theories do not explicitly discuss regime elites’coordination problems when

contemplating defection. Coordination problems are an important part of

elites’calculations, even if defection is not a strategy carried out to depose a

leader (Junisbai, 2012). Hence, explaining cross-national variation in the

number of defections represents an opportunity for theory development.

This paper develops a new theory of elite defection and tests it using the

f‌irst cross-national dataset on defections by regime deputies and ministers—

henceforth regime elites—across 12 prominent electoral autocracies.

2

It ar-

gues that, even if regime change is unlikely, regime elites defect when they

perceive that joining the opposition will signif‌icantly boost their chances of

meeting multiple political goals. These goals may include certain policy

reforms, becoming a “big f‌ish”in a smaller opposition party, obtaining illicit

rents, or even avoiding the costs of implementing ruler policies that damage

their own standing. However, regime elites are generally uncertain as to

whether or not defection will bring the expected benef‌its. This uncertainty

over outcomes stems from a lack of credible information concerning the “true”

state of other elites’and voters’loyalties—known as strategic uncertainty.

Therefore, defection is costly because of the opaque nature of authoritarian

politics, combined with regime strategies of shoring up mass and elite support

(Schedler & Hoffman, 2016;Bunce & Wolchik, 2011).

Clarifying regime elites’perceptions is crucial because the decision to

defect is, in essence, a two-fold coordination problem with imperfect in-

formation (Casper & Tyson, 2014;Ramsay, 2017). Regime elites f‌irst need to

know whether other ruling elites will join or accede to their attempts to express

discontent against the regime. When regime elites expect much discontent,

defections can be carried out to threaten an incumbent who wants to prevent

intra-coalition conf‌licts from escalating. Even if electoral confrontation with

the incumbent is unlikely, defectors may still stand to gain if the government

responds to their actions with concessions (Brownlee, 2007). However, lack

of information and uncertainty over the “true preferences”and relative

electoral strengths of political actors can hinder the process of forming

2252 Comparative Political Studies 55(13)