Strategic Lobbying and the Pressure to Compromise Member Interests

• Author: Thomas T. Holyoke
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/10659129211061730
• Published date: 01 December 2022
• Date: 01 December 2022

Article

PoliticalResearchQuarterly

2022,Vol.75(4)1255–1270

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DOI:10.1177/10659129211061730

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StrategicLobbyingandthePressureto

CompromiseMemberInterests

ThomasT.Holyoke

1



Abstract

Dolobbyistsalwaysadvocatefortheinterestsofthemembersorclientsemployingthem,or,undercompeting

pressures,dotheysometimestakepositionsonbillsreflectingtheinterestsoflawmakersorotherlobbyists?Dothey,in

fact,lobbystrategicallybymakingchoicesthatbalancecompetingpressuresinpursuitofgoalslikefurtheringtheir

careers?Mostlobbyingresearchassumesthatinterestgroupsandlobbyistsarethesame,butIarguethattheinterestsof

lobbyistsmaybedifferentfromthosetheyrepresent,whichItestwithamodelofstrategiclobbyingusingdataon

positionslobbyiststookonbillsinCongressfrom2006to2017madeavailablebyMapLight.Ifindthatlobbyists

sometimesdotakepositionsatoddswithmemberinterestsunderpressurefromlegislators,otherlobbyists,andthe

president,thoughsomegroupscanconstraintheirlobbyists.Iconcludebyspeculatingonwhatthismeansforlobbyingas

aformofrepresentation.

Keywords

lobbying,interestgroup,Congress,lobbyist,strategy,representation

Journalists,scholars,andevenmanypoliticianstendto

assumethatlobbyiststakepublicpositionsonissues

reflectingthewants,needs,anddesiresofthepeoplethey

arepaidtorepresent,oratleastmostofthem.Lobbying,

afterall,issupposedtobeaformofrepresentationandis

thereforeonlylegitimatewhentheseprofessionaladvo-

catesaccuratelyarticulatetheinterestsofthosethey

represent.Perhapsthisiswhyscholarstendtocombine

lobbyistsandthegroupsorcorporationsforwhichthey

lobbyintothesameunitofanalysis.Yetwhythen,when

theCOVIDreliefbillpassedCongressin2021,were

membersoftheAmericanFederationofTeachersupsetto

readintheNewYorkTimesthattheirleaders,apparently

underpressurefromSenateMajorityLeaderChuck

Schumer(D-NY),hadadvocatedforfederalmoneyfor

privateschoolsinNewYorkCity,violatingtheorgani-

zation’slongstandingpositionagainstsuchfunding

(Green2021)?Wasthisunique,ordolobbyistsoftentake

positionsthatare,tosomedegree,inconsistentwiththe

policypreferencesofthemembersorclientstheyrep-

resent?Ifthelatter,isitbecausepowerfullegislators

pressurethemintoit,andtheysimplyhopethatmembers

willnotnotice?Arethereotherpressuresalsocapableof

pushinglobbyiststogoagainstthepeopletheyrepresent?

Ifso,whatarethey,andwhosegoalsarelobbyistsreally

pursuing?

Iexplorethesequestionsinthispaper.Usingdataon

thepositionstakenbylobbyistsonbillsfrom2007to2016

intheUSCongress,alongwithavarietyofmeasures

regardingtheorganizationsandmemberstheyrepresent,

thelawmakerssupportingthebillsandamendmentson

whichtheylobby,andthechoicesofotherlobbyists,I

developandtestamodeloflobbyingthatisstrategicinthe

sensethatlobbyistsmakedecisionsunderconflicting

pressurestoachievegoals.Ifindthatlobbyistsaresubject

tosignificantpressuresfromlegislatorsandotherlob-

byists,whichsometimesleadsthemtocompromise

memberinterests,thoughadvocacygroupswithactive

membershipscanconstrainthem.Thishassignificant

ramificationsfordiscussionsaboutwhylobbyingistol-

eratedinrepresentativepoliticalsystemsliketheUnited

States,aswellaslobbyingethics.

1

DepartmentofPoliticalScience,CaliforniaStateUniversity,Fresno,CA,

USA

CorrespondingAuthor:

ThomasT.Holyoke,DepartmentofPoliticalScience,CaliforniaState

University,2225EastSanRamon,M/SMF19,Fresno,CA93740-8029,

USA.

Email:tholyoke@csufresno.edu

LobbyingandRepresentation

Lobbying,whetheronbehalfofpeopleorganizedasin-

terestgroupsorforcorporationswithstakesinpolicy-

making,hasneverbeenpopularwiththepublic,andmany

wouldlimitorbantheprofessioniftheycould.

1

Atleastin

theUnitedStates,though,theycannot.Influencedbythe

ideasofthephilosopherDavidHume,JamesMadisonand

otherauthorsoftheConstitutionbelieveditwaswrongto

preventpeoplefrompursuingtheirownself-interests,

eventhoughitmeantpoliciesmightonlyreflectbal-

ancesofpowerbetweenintenselymotivatedfactions

pursuingtheirinterestsratherthanthepublicinterest

(todaythisiscalledinterestgrouppluralism).Madison

thereforeprotectedbothcollectiveactionandtherightto

advocatewiththeFirstAmendment’sfreedomsofas-

semblyandgovernmentpetitioningclauses(Lawsonand

Seidman1999;Thomas1993).Sincepetitioningistyp-

icallydonetodaybylobbyists,theFirstAmendmentthus

legitimizeslobbyingintheUS.

Yetthisalsomeanstheseprofessionaladvocatesonly

enjoyconstitutionalprotectioniftheyadvocatefor

nothingotherthanthedesiresanddemandsofthepeople

employingthem.Inthelanguageofprincipal-agentthe-

ory,lobbyistsarenottheirownmasterspushingtheirown

policypreferences,butagentstaskedwithadvocatingthe

preferencesofothersregardlessofpersonaldesires.

Perhapsthisiswhyfordecadesscholarsusedsimple

modelsoflobbyingthatassumedtherewasnodifference

betweeninterestgroupsandtheirlobbyists;theybecomea

singleunitofanalysis.Whetherchoosingtolobbyparty

leaders,committeemembers,orhome-statelegislatorsin

Congress(HallandWayman1990),orwhethertolobby

friendsorfoes(Austen-SmithandWright1994;Hojnacki

andKimball1998),lobbyistswereassumedtojustbe

advocatingthepolicydesiresoftheirgroupmembersor

corporateclients.

Someanecdotalandempiricalevidence,however,

suggeststhisdoesnotalwayshappen,thatlobbyistsare

notalwaysfaithfulagentssimplyrepresentingtheinter-

estsofthepeopleororganizationspayingthem.Inhis

workonhealthcarepolicy,Kersh(2000;2002)found

lobbyistsfrequentlyalteringtheirpositionsonlegislation

toaccommodatethedemandsoflawmakerswithlittleor

noclientconsultation.AfterrevelationsthatlobbyistJack

Abramoffripped-offclientstoadvancehispersonalin-

terests(e.g.,LoweryandMarchetti2012),scholarsgrew

concernedthattherateatwhichlegislatorsandstaffwere

leavingCongressthroughthe“revolvingdoor”toexploit

theirconnectionsaslobbyistsforprofitmightleadtomore

ofthesame(LaPiraandThomas2017).Researchersalso

foundevidenceoflobbyistsover-chargingtheircorporate

clients(Schiffetal.2015)oradvocatingbillpositionsat

oddswithmemberpreferences(atleastwhenmeasured

withordinalscalesinHolyoke2011).Unethicallobbyists

mightbegettingawaywiththisbehavior,scholarsfeared,

becauseofsevereinformationasymmetryintheir

principal-agentrelationshipswithmembersorclients.Not

onlydomembersdependonlobbyiststoadvocatetheir

interests,butalsototellthemhowtheydoit(Schlozman

andTierney1986),makingitpossibleforlobbyiststo

compromisememberinterestswithoutgettingcaught

(StephensonandJackson2010).

Thisdoesnotmeanalllobbyistsarerogueagents

pursuingtheirownpolicygoalsattheexpenseoftheir

membersorclients.Mostareprobablyquiteethical,but

therearetheoreticalreasonstobelievetheyhaveincen-

tivestosupportpolicypositionsotherthanthosefavored

bytheirmembersorclients.Thesearerootedin

Salisbury’s(1969)argumentthatwhilemembersjoin

interestgroupstogetprivatematerialbenefitsunavailable

outsideofmembership,lobbyists(andotherorganiza-

tionalleaders)start-upsuchorganizationssotheycan

lobbyforthepoliciestheydesire.NotonlydidSalisbury

analyticallyseparatelobbyistsfromthosetheyrepresent,

healsoattributedtothemfundamentallydifferentmo-

tives.AinsworthandSened(1993)tookthisastepfurther,

arguingthatevenwhengroupmembersareintensely

interestedinpolicy,theircollectivepositionsoftendonot

alignwiththoseofthelegislatorsonwhomtheirlobbyist

dependsforaccesstothelawmakingprocess.Because

theyaredependent,lobbyistsmaybepushedtomodify

theirmembers’orclients’positionsonbillstoreflectthose

oftheirpatronlegislators,andexpectedtosellthechanges

totheirmemberssolegislatorsgetthecredittheyneedfor

re-election.Positionsarethusfungible,andthepeople

lobbyistsarepressuredtosupportmaynotbetheones

payingthemforrepresentation.

Whatresearchershavenotyetdoneissystematically

looktoseewhetherlobbyistsoftenadvocatepositionson

legislationinconsistentwith,andperhapsdirectlyop-

posedto,memberinterests,orclearlyexplainedwhythey

woulddoso.Modelsoflobbyingarestartingtomovein

thisdirectionbyexploringstrategy,meaninggoal-

directedresponsestoconflictingpressures,butonly

veryrecentlyhavescholarstriedassemblingcoherent

modelsofstrategiclobbying,andnonehavetriedtouseit

toexplainanythinglikelobbyingagainstmemberorclient

interests.Usingtheirinsights,Iattempttooutlineandtest

suchamodel.

StrategicLobbyingUnder

CompetingPressures

Modelsofstrategicbehaviorpresumethatactorspursue

relativelywell-definedgoalsincomplexenvironments,

whichforlobbyists,someargue,meansbalancingpres-

suresfrommultiplesourcestopursuelongandlucrative

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