Strategic command and control, redefining the nuclear threat.

• Author: Grier, Peter

An actual button, of course, does not exist. There is no single switch in the White House that allows a president of send a jolt of electricity 3,000 miles cross-country, instantly launching Minetumen from the missile fields of the Great Plains. In reality, control of U.S. nuclear forces is a complicated affair involving, among other things, a book of war plans called "the football," multi-digit codes, two-man silo crews, a command post under a mountain, and planes towing mile-long radio antennas.

This system may in fact be quite tenuous. A mere handful of Soviet warheads--perhaps as few as 250--might effectively destroy U.S. nuclear command and control. Now that controversy over the so-called "window of vulnerability" of American ICBMs has abated, defense experts are focusing increasingly on command structure as the real Achilles heel of strategic forces. Zbigniew Brzezinski, for instance, cites communications fragility when arguing that a limited "Star Wars" missile defense may be a good thing.

As happens with any hot policy topic, there is now a rush to create a literature. A series of command and control studies has appeared in recent months, with these two the latest in the genre. Both are thorough and illuminating. They...