Security in the Strait of Malacca and the Regional Maritime Security Initiative: Responses to the US Proposal

• Author: Yann-huei Song
• Position: Research Fellow, Academia Sinica, Taiwan
• Pages: 97-156

VII

Security in the Strait of Malacca and the

Regional Maritime Security Initiative:

Responses to the US Proposal

Yann-huei Song*

Introduction

TheRegional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI), proposed in 2004 by Admiral

Thomas B. Fargo, former commander ofthe US Pacific Command, is one of

the American maritime security programs and initiatives designed to promote re-

gional cooperation and improve maritime security in the East Asia and Pacific re-

gion, especially in the straits of Malacca and Singapore. 1The main goal of RMSI is

to develop apartnership of willing nations, working together under international

and domestic law, to identify, monitor and intercept transnational maritime

threats, in particular piracy, armed robbery and terrorist attacks at sea. 2This initia-

tive is now coordinated jointly by the US Pacific Command and the US Depart-

ment of State. 3

The Strait of Malacca, six hundred miles long and only one and ahalf miles

wide at its narrowest point, is aconfined stretch ofwater between Peninsular Ma-

laysia and the Indonesian island of Sumatra. From an economic and strategic

perspective, it is one of the most important shipping lanes in the world, the

equivalent of the Suez Canal or Panama Canal. The Strait of Malacca forms the

*Research Fellow, Academia Sinica, Taiwan. Fulbright Visiting Scholar, the Asia-Pacific

Research Center, Stanford University.

Security in the Strait ofMalacca and Regional Responses to the US Proposal

seaway connecting the Indian Ocean with the South China Sea and the Pacific

Ocean, linking three of the world's most populous nations: India, Indonesia and

China. Annually, approximately fifty thousand large vessels, and daily, an average

of forty-five oil tankers, pass through the strait. 4Daily, about six hundred cargo

vessels carrying everything from Japanese nuclear waste bound for reprocessing fa-

cilities in Europe to raw materials for China's booming economy traverse the Strait

of Malacca. 5It is estimated that two-thirds of the world's liquefied natural gas

(LNG);6between one-fifth and one-quarter of the world's sea trade; half of the

global oil shipments carried by sea; and over 80 percent of the oil and gas imports

of China, Japan, Taiwan and South Korea come through the Strait of Malacca. The

number of ships passing through the strait is projected to increase due to the rapid

economic growth of the countries in the Asia-Pacific region. It has been estimated

that within the next twenty years two-thirds of China's petroleum imports will

flow from the Middle East, most probably through the Strait of Malacca.7While

two alternative waterways are available for international shipping (the Sunda Strait

and the Lombok and Makassar straits through Indonesian archipelagic waters), if

the Strait of Malacca was closed adetour through these alternative routes would

add asignificant amount of shipping time and cost.

In recent years the Strait of Malacca has increasingly become the target of piracy

and armed robbery against vessels. This upsurge in the violence directed against

shipping is not surprising given the high volume of transiting traffic, the geograph-

ical nature of the strait, the significant political and economic instability in the

area, and the lack of resources and weak maritime law enforcement capacity of the

littoral States. Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States,

increasing attention has been given to the threat of maritime terrorism, prolifera-

tion of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the security of the maritime

transport sector in general. As aresult of this changed strategic environment in the

Strait of Malacca area, there has also been agrowing conviction among the littoral

States of the need to establish aburden-sharing arrangement, based on Article 43

of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982 LOS Conven-

tion). 8Such an arrangement would be designed to help cover the gradually increas-

ing cost ofproviding essential maritime infrastructure in the Strait of Malacca and,

over the years, to keep the waters clear of pollution, safe for navigation, and free

from the threat of pirate and terrorist attacks.

User States, especially China, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, which are depen-

dent on the strait for the smooth and efficient transit of cargo, in particular energy

supplies, also raised concerns about the safety and security of their vessels and have

demanded that enhanced security measures be taken by the States that border the

Strait of Malacca.9Other user States that are among the major maritime powers,

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Yann-huei Song

such as the United States, also raised maritime security concerns regarding the po-

tential threat of transnational crimes, maritime terrorism and armed attacks

against their naval and commercial vessels traversing the strait. As aresult, the mar-

itime powers began to explore possible means ofbecoming involved more directly in

the management of security matters in the Strait of Malacca. These efforts, how-

ever, were regarded by the littoral States as an attempt to "internationalize" the

safety and security ofthe Strait of Malacca. In response, the littoral States reiterated

their positions that enhancing safety and security and managing environmental is-

sues in the strait are primarily their responsibility.

It is against this background that, when the idea of aRMSI was first introduced

in Admiral Fargo's speech to the US Congress on March 31, 2004, Indonesia and

Malaysia strongly rejected the idea of patrols by foreign powers in the Strait of

Malacca. The governments of these two nations also raised the concern that aUS

naval presence in the strait would actually attract terrorist attacks and bolster the

appeal of extremists. However, Singapore, with its economy heavily dependent on

global commercial traffic through the strait, sees piracy, armed robbery and mari-

time terrorism as major security threats, and therefore supported the RMSI, argu-

ing that it is an intensive and complex task to safeguard the waterways against

maritime terrorism and that no single State has the resources to deal effectively

with the maritime security threat in the Strait of Malacca.

In response to the serious concerns of Indonesia and Malaysia, the American se-

curity initiative was modified to delete the original proposal to deploy US forces to

conduct patrols in the strait. On the other hand, due in large measure to the pros-

pect of foreign intervention in safeguarding the security of the Strait of Malacca,

Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore agreed to carry out coordinated sea and air patrols

to curb piracy and armed robbery, and to increase maritime security. The decision

of the Joint War Committee (JWC) of Lloyd's Market Association in June 2005 to

declare the Strait of Malacca a"war-risk and terrorist zone" also prompted the

three littoral States to take aseries of unilateral, bilateral and trilateral cooperative

actions to improve the security environment of the Strait of Malacca.

Malaysia, for instance, announced that its armed police will be placed on board

selected tug boats and barges traversing the Strait of Malacca. In addition, an

escort service will be provided for vessels carrying valuable goods in the strait.

Malaysia also declared that it will begin twenty-four-hour surveillance of the

strait. 10 Anew Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA) was also estab-

lished and began patrolling the Strait ofMalacca in November 2005. Bilateral coor-

dinated patrols between Malaysia and Indonesia, and between Indonesia and

Singapore, have also been worked out to bring together their respective agencies

involved in anti-piracy and anti-robbery activities. In July 2004, Indonesia,

99