Stonewalling and Suspicion during Presidential Scandals

• Author: Brandon Rottinghaus,Scott J. Basinger
• Published date: 01 June 2012
• Date: 01 June 2012
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/1065912911401416
• Subject Matter: Articles

401416PRQ65210.1177/1065912911401416
Basinger and RottinghausPolitical Research Quarterly
Political Research Quarterly
65(2) 290 –302
Stonewalling and Suspicion during
© 2012 University of Utah
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Presidential Scandals
DOI: 10.1177/1065912911401416
http://prq.sagepub.com
Scott J. Basinger1 and Brandon Rottinghaus1
Abstract
Scholars possess little theoretical understanding of how presidents behave during scandals. Existing presidential
scholarship has focused on “offensive” communication, aimed at achieving legislative or policy goals, whereas the authors’
interest is in “defensive” communication. Using a game-theoretic signaling model of the president–media relationship,
the authors identify conditions affecting White House stonewalling and media feeding frenzies. The president’s optimal
behavior changes depending on circumstances, particularly the level of presidential involvement in the alleged misdeeds.
The authors illustrate this with a case study of the Iran-Contra scandals and an empirical analysis of scandals from the
Nixon through the Bush administrations.
Keywords
presidency, communications, game theory, scandals
All modern presidents must endure scandals within their
Barrett 2005), budget proposals (Kernell 2007; Canes-Wrone
administration. In the short term, a scandal can sink the
2006), agency appropriations (Canes-Wrone 2001), fund-
president’s approval rating (Zaller 1999; Andolina and
ing for foreign policy initiatives (Canes-Wrone 2006),
Wilcox 2000). A scandal can prime public opinion on
and veto threats (Cameron 2000). In each case, the moti-
related issues, as occurred with Central America policy
vation for going public is “inciting” or “arousing” or
after the Iran-Contra disclosures (Krosnick and Kinder
“persuading” the public. A president might be deterred
1990). In the long term, scandals play a central role
from communicating if the president’s position represents
in determining presidents’ legacies, and scandals can
a minority position (Canes-Wrone 2001) and when
undermine public trust (Miller 1999). Scholars have docu-
speaking may damage popularity (Brace and Hinckley
mented consequences of presidents lying (Alterman
1993) or if “staying private” would improve chances of
2004) and of presidents perpetuating secrecy (Graubard
winning legislative concessions (Covington 1987). Our
2004), but these accounts neither draw from nor contribute
interest in this article is in presidential “defensive” communi-
to scientific scholarship on the president as a rational public
cation strategies when the White House is under attack.
actor. According to Cameron (2002, 655), “If scandal
This article proceeds in four parts. First, we define
seeking and scandal mongering are normal political tac-
presidential scandal and outline our assumptions about
tics . . . then political scientists need to learn their logic.”
president–media interactions during a scandal. Second,
Several works have addressed presidents’ use of public
we present a formal model of stonewalling, treating scandal
opinion polling during scandals (Heith 1998, 2004;
politics as a signaling game.1 We derive postulates about
Rottinghaus and Bereznikova 2006) and rhetorical strategies
the factors that affect presidential stonewalling. The model
for recovery after scandals (Quirk 1998; Dunn 2000;
can incorporate a wide range of factors, but we focus on
Blaney and Benoit 2001; Hacker, Giles, and Guerrero 2003).
the effect of suspicion about the president’s involvement
However, we find no studies of the president’s most impor-
in the scandal or its cover-up. We examine presidential
tant decision: whether to stonewall when allegations ini-
behavior in the Iran-Contra scandal, which presents a
tially surface. Essentially, stonewalling is the choice not
unique natural experiment because of President Reagan’s
to communicate with the public. This alternative is absent
from existing scholarship on presidential communication,
which emphasizes “offensive” communication strategies,
1University of Houston, Houston, TX, USA
aimed at achieving legislative and policy goals (Cohen
1995, 1999; Edwards and Wood 1999; Edwards 2003).
Corresponding Author:
Scott Basinger, University of Houston, Department of Political Science,
Scholars have rigorously researched presidents’ public
447 Philip G. Hoffman Hall, Houston, TX 77204-3011
appeals on behalf of legislation (Rivers and Rose 1985;
Email: sjbasinger@uh.edu

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Basinger and Rottinghaus
291
varying level of involvement in different aspects of the
December 2006 fits our definition of scandal, even though
scandal. Finally, we provide a simple empirical analysis
Justice Department officials chose not to press criminal
of presidential scandals from the Nixon through the Bush
charges. The definition clarifies what events or actions
administrations.
are excluded, particularly instances of negative publicity,
such as when Vice President Dick Cheney accidentally
Scandals as Interactions
shot a hunting partner. This definition excludes unpopular
policy decisions and any instances of sheer incompetence,
All presidents experience scandals, but not all instances
such as FEMA’s response to Hurricane Katrina (see Adut
of presidential deception become scandals. Pfiffner (2004,
2008). We also exclude any unsubstantiated allegations,
18) contends, “Just as most people lie, so do most presi-
rumors, innuendo, and gossip (see Schultz 2000). These
dents.” A president might deceive to “prevent embarrass-
limits allow us to avoid (as much as possible) so-called
ment and preserve political viability,” such as President
scandals that are partisan-based charges with little or no
Kennedy hiding his Addison’s disease (see Dallek
merit (Ginsburg and Shefter 2002).
2010). A president also might deceive for reasons of
Second, our definition is specific in terms of the class
national security. When a U-2 spy plane was downed in
of actors whose misbehavior can generate a presidential
Russian airspace in February 1960, President Eisenhower
scandal. Actors must be part of the executive branch or a
claimed it was a weather research plane; he and his staff
nominee, but must also be placed high enough—or close
agreed that lying was the best option to save his effec-
enough to the president—that the scandal is relevant to
tiveness during a summit meeting (Pfiffner 2004, 41).
the president’s image or administration. Even a “lightning
When Premier Khrushchev produced the aircraft’s rem-
rod,” who absorbs political damage on the president’s
nants and pilot, Francis Gary Powers, the administration
behalf (see Ellis 1994), can result in some deprivation to
was forced to admit that Eisenhower had authorized the
the administration. Third, our definition is specific about
intelligence-gathering missions (Pach and Richardson 1991,
when misbehavior occurred and when it is revealed for it
218). These episodes of deception could have affected
to have an impact on the current president. Misbehavior
our views of each president, could have undermined
by persons who left an administration and revelations of
policy goals, and could have led to official scrutiny, legal
a former president’s misbehavior (e.g., Warren Harding’s
fights over executive privilege, and termination or resigna-
or John Kennedy’s affairs) would not directly affect the
tion of key staff. What makes a scandal distinct from
current president, unless the current president was some-
deception is how it is reported and whether public disap-
how allegedly involved. Misbehavior by presidential and
probation becomes part of the story.
vice presidential candidates, especially those who withdrew
We define a presidential scandal as allegations of illegal,
(e.g., Gary Hart) or lost the election (e.g., John Edwards),
unethical, or immoral behavior by the president, a senior
might also be scandalous but would not count as presi-
administration official,2 or a nominee that comes to light
dential scandals. The clarity this definition provides per-
during the president’s term in office and that occurred
mits consistent measurement over time. It also permits one
before or while the individual occupied office.3 While
to distinguish between—and therefore to study the causal
other definitions might be conceivable, our definition is
linkage between—scandals and negative media coverage.
consistent with the sense that scandals involve a “trans-
Our primary interest is in the president’s public actions
gression” (Thompson 2000) or an act contrary to conven-
once a presidential scandal initially comes to light. Our
tional morality or “a set of shared values” (Garment 1992),
assumption is that “the buck stops” with the president.5
but it is also more specific. President Kennedy’s secrecy
Discussions of how to cope with a scandal can reach the
about his health and Eisenhower’s secrecy about spy
Oval Office even if the president is not responsible for the
planes do not fit our definition because scandal is not
alleged misbehavior. According to one veteran of scandal
equivalent to deception.
battles, there are “two different pathways of handling a
Our definition adds specificity to past definitions in
scandal crisis once it breaks out, by getting the truth out
three ways. First, regarding the class of actions that can
yourself—‘tell it all, tell it...