State Policy Control and Local Deviation: The Case of Immigration

• Author: Brittany Blizzard,Jocelyn M. Johnston
• Published date: 01 December 2020
• Date: 01 December 2020
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/0160323X211000807
• Subject Matter: Special Issue 2020

Special Issue 2020

State Policy Control

and Local Deviation:

The Case of Immigration

Brittany Blizzard

1

and Jocelyn M. Johnston

1

Abstract

State preemption of local government discretion is examined through the lenses of county coop-

eration with federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and “immigration federalism.”

Through a mixed-method approach, we examine why counties collaborate with ICE as well as how

and why they deviate from state preemptions on local support for immigration. Analysis of a sample

restricted to Georgia and Texas, states with especially robust preemptive anti-immigrant laws,

suggests that special interests—those related to immigrant-dependent industries important to

county economies—have significant influence over county decisions to minimize cooperation

with ICE.

Keywords

state preemption, local authority, immigration policy, sanctuary policy

The recent expansion of state policy control

over local governments—“preemption” of

local authority—is well documented (Bowman

and Kearney 2012; Fisk 2016; Langan and

McFarland 2017; Riverstone-Newell 2017).

Somewhat unusual in the mix of preemptions

is local immigration activity. In this case, the

policy is technically in the federal domain. But,

Congressional inaction has created a void and a

new “immigration federalism” through which

states and local governments have become

assertive in expressing and implementing their

own policy preferences (Briffault 2018; Chavez

and Provine 2009; Farris and Holman 2017).

This paper concerns itself with two ques-

tions: 1. In states that have adopted formal or

informal immigration policies, what explains

county divergence from state directives? And

2. If counties deviate from state policies, how

do they do so? Our analysis is based on a mixed

methods approach. Drawing from scholarship

on government policy choices and dynamics

specific to immigration policy, we model

whether and why counties limit cooperation

with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforce-

ment (ICE). We focus on counties in two

states—Georgia and Texas—with particularly

robust preemption laws. In addition, we con-

ducted interviews with officials from nonpro-

fits and local governments in Georgia and

Texas, focusing on organizations in counties

1

Department of Public Administration and Policy,

American University, Washington, DC, USA

Corresponding Author:

Brittany Blizzard, Department of Public Administration and

Policy, American University, 4400 Massachusetts Avenue

NW, Washington, DC 20016, USA.

Email: bb3685a@american.edu

State and Local GovernmentReview

2020, Vol. 52(4) 309-320

ªThe Author(s) 2021

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DOI: 10.1177/0160323X211000807

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