State Autonomy in Germany and the United States

• Author: Daniel Halberstam,Roderick M. Hills
• Published date: 01 March 2001
• Date: 01 March 2001
• DOI: 10.1177/000271620157400113
• Subject Matter: Articles

173

State

Autonomy

in

Germany

and

the

United

States

By

DANIEL

HALBERSTAM

and

RODERICK

M.

HILLS,

JR.

Daniel

Halberstam

is

assistant

professor

of law

at

the

University

of Michigan

Law

School,

specializing

in

U.S.

constitutional

law

and

European

Union

law.

He

clerked for

Justice

David

H.

Souter

of the

U.S.

Supreme

Court

and

Judge

Patricia

M.

Wald

of

the

Court

of Appeals for

the

D.

C.

Circuit,

served

as judicial

fellow

to

Judge

Peter

Jann

of the

European

Court

of Justice,

and

was

attorney

advisor

in

the

Office

of Legal

Counsel

at

the

U.S.

Department

of Justice.

Roderick

M.

Hills,

Jr.,

is

professor

of law

at

the

University

of Michigan

Law

School,

specializing

in

U.S.

constitutional

law,

local

government

law,

the

law

of federalism

and

intergovernmental

relations,

and

land-use

regulation.

Prior

to

joining

the

Michigan

faculty,

he

clerked for

Judge

Patrick

Higginbotham

of the

U.S.

Court

of Appeals

for

the

Fifth

Circuit

and

practiced

law

in

Colorado.

ABSTRACT:

Both

the

United

States

and

the

Federal

Republic

of

Ger-

many

have

mechanisms

by

which

their

component

jurisdictions—

states

or

Länder—

can

either

implement

federal

law

or

resist

such

im-

plementation.

The

authors

describe

the

different

constitutional

mechanisms

by

which

the

two

federal

regimes

induce

state

coopera-

tion

and

protect

state

autonomy.

They

then

offer

some

speculations

as

to

how

such

constitutional

rules

might

affect

cooperative

federal-

ism

in

the

two

nations,

arguing

that

the

German

system

provides

more

categorical

and

therefore

more

secure

protection

of

the

Länder,

whereas

the

U.S.

system

provides

for

a

more

flexible

system

of

cooper-

ative

federalism.

This

flexibility

of

the

U.S.

system,

the

authors

sug-

gest,

allows

for

vertical

competition

between

the

federal

government

and

the

states,

which

may

provide

a

valuable

tool

to

combat

ineffi-

ciency

in

policy

implementation.