START again.

• Author: Boldrick, Michael R.

In 1988, Les Aspin, then chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, chided the Reagan administration for not including adequate safeguards against cheating in its negotiating strategy for the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. Aspin's objections were ignored by the White House, and three years later the Senate approved START I by an overwhelming 93-6 vote. The Senate is now reviewing START II, which requires even greater reductions in the strategic nuclear arsenals of both former Cold War adversaries. The few remaining arms-control opponents are as concerned about the verification issues as Aspin was in 1988.

Aspin warned that, because U.S. negotiators had not pursued adequate verification procedures, there was a danger of breakout--a sudden deployment of significant numbers of weapons above treaty ceilings. "Verification is an enormously difficult problem," he observed, "but verification doesn't even touch the chief element of Soviet breakout potential, the legal spare and test missiles." Aspin was referring to stockpiles of missiles, not counted in arms-control agreements, used for frequent flight tests and to verify performance of missile modifications and upgrades. With the addition of nuclear warheads, they can be quickly converted from test missiles to operational weapons.

As secretary of defense, Aspin is not likely to repeat his earlier objections to START when testifying before the Senate. The Clinton administration fully supports the treaty, even though it was negotiated during the Reagan-Bush years. The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) believes START Il will sail through the Senate with an even larger majority than START I had. Before the Foreign Relations Committee releases the treaty for a full Senate vote, expected in late July or after the August recess, two other Senate committees will conduct independent reviews. The Intelligence Committee will report on verification issues, and the Armed Services Committee will assess the treaty's impact on U.S. national security.

Most Americans no longer view the former Soviet Union as a threat. Consequently, there is little public pressure to scrutinize the basic tenets of START II or raise serious concerns about the long-term consequences of the most far-reaching arms-control agreement yet negotiated. For these reasons, at least six myths about START Il will not be exposed by the Clinton administration, senators ratifying the accord, or the mainstream press.

Myth 1: START II eliminates land-based MIRVs (multiple-warhead missiles). This was the initial U.S position until the Russians balked. To get the stalled talks moving again, Secretary of State James Baker wrote to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrey Kozyrev on June 17, 1992, conceding that "there is no requirement to replace the reentry platform...no matter how many warheads are removed."

The reentry platform is functionally similar to the cylinder on a gunfighter's Colt .45, only it dispenses nuclear warheads instead of bullets. It is the one piece of equipment that distinguishes a multiple-warhead missile from the single-shot kind. In effect, Baker's concession allows either side to retain the "cylinder" if they agree to load only one chamber.

The United States, on its only affected missile...