A Standing

• Library: Illinois Decisions on Search and Seizure (2017 Ed.)

A. Standing

1. Autos

United States v. Padilla, 508 U.S. 77 (1993) (holding that there is no "co-conspirator exception" to standing requirement; only a defendant who "demonstrates that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the challenged search or seizure" has standing to make the challenge. Where alleged co-conspirators moved to suppress all cocaine discovered in vehicle, even though they were not present at the time of the investigatory stop, it is necessary to remand the case to determine if any of the co-conspirator's had a reasonable expectation of privacy or a property interest in the vehicle).

Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) (holding that the Fourth Amendment protects only those places in which the defendant personally had a reasonable expectation of privacy. While property rights in the location searched or items seized may be important, they are only one of many factors taken into account in determining whether there is a legitimate expectation of privacy in the location searched; "targets" of searches have no standing if there is no privacy expectation in the searched area; and no claims of "vicarious" standing claims are recognized. Merely because one is the "target" of illegal police action does not alone provide standing. The "legitimately on the premises" test is no longer the measure to determine Fourth Amendment rights. Here, defendants' own rights were not violated because they had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the car that was searched, since it was not owned by either of them, and in which neither of them had claimed any property or possessory interest in the items seized).

People v. Johnson, 237 Ill. 2d 81, 927 N.E.2d 1179 (2010) (An officer responded to a call about a shooting. Upon arrival, he saw the defendant and a second individual get into the second individual's car. The car was parked across the alley from the location of the reported shooting. The car drove off, and the officer followed the car for a few blocks until it parked in a parking lot. After both men exited the car, the officer approached them and asked questions about the shooting. The defendant and second individual/driver provided identification and consented to searches of their person. The driver refused to consent to search of his car, but the officer's supervisor, who had arrived a few minutes after the officer, directed the officer to carry out the warrantless search anyway, because he believed probable cause existed. The defendant and the driver were handcuffed and put into the back of a squad car during the search. The officer found a handgun under the front passenger seat. The defendant was arrested and later admitted to shooting the victim. The defendant was convicted of aggravated battery, aggravated unlawful use of a weapon and UUW by felon. The defendant filed a motion to quash the arrest and to suppress the evidence claiming, among other things, that the by placing the two individuals in handcuffs in their squad car, the officers' actions amounted to an arrest unsupported by probable cause. The trial court denied the motion. HELD: First, the defendant could not challenge the search of the vehicle because he has no legitimate expectation of privacy in the driver's vehicle. The defendant was merely a passenger who provided no evidence of ownership or possessory interest, that he had previously used the vehicle, that he could control other's use of the vehicle or that he had a subjective expectation of privacy in the vehicle. Second, the handgun seized from the car was not obtained as a result of the arrest. When the police supervisor ordered the officer to search the car after the driver refused consent, "only then, as the search began," was the defendant placed in the squad car "to facilitate the search." Regardless of whether that police action amounted to an illegal arrest, the "alleged arrest did not lead to the search." As such, the alleged unlawful arrest could not have tainted the seizure of the gun. Third, the defendant's incriminating statements about the shooting were admissible because they were sufficiently attenuated from the alleged illegal arrest to remove any taint. Attenuation existed because the finding of the gun created intervening probable cause, there was no evidence of any flagrant police misconduct, and the defendant was read his Miranda rights).

People v. Rosenberg, 213 Ill. 2d 69, 820 N.E.2d 440 (2004) (Although the defendant was not present in the vehicle when officers pulled over his alleged accomplice for a traffic violation in a vehicle rented by the defendant, the accomplice consented to the search of the vehicle. While the search revealed nothing in the passenger compartment of the vehicle, the cautionary label on the controlled substance discovered in the trunk, via access from the backseat, provided sufficient reason for the officers to seize the evidence and conduct a more thorough investigation. The issue revolves around the establishment of the defendant's standing to suppress the evidence seized in relation to the search and seizure of the car and boxes. HELD: It was not necessary in this case for the accomplice to testify at the suppression hearing to establish the defendant's ability to assert Fourth Amendment standing or a legitimate expectation of privacy. The defendant's counsel had previously admitted that the defendant lacked any standing on this issue and that the accomplice had the authority to consent to the search of this vehicle, effectively waiving his right to challenge this search. Regarding the search and subsequent seizure of the boxes, because the defendant had available to him other options through which to establish his standing to claim a fourth amendment violation in this case, it is unnecessary for the court to address the questions of whether the prosecution deprived the defendant of due process by refusing to grant the accomplice use immunity at the suppression hearing in order to testify that the defendant owned the controlled substance and the boxes. That the defendant is barred from committing perjury, through inconsistent statements at the suppression hearing and at trial, is not a justification that denies the option of the defendant testifying about the ownership of the seized goods at the suppression hearing).

People v. Johnson, 114 Ill. 2d 170, 499 N.E.2d 1355 (1986) (Rakas' "legitimate expectation of privacy" test is applicable to searches of vehicles belonging to others. Defendant's driving vehicle six months prior to search failed to show a reasonable expectation of privacy in stepfather's vehicle. Also, lack of possession of the truck at time of search undercut defendant's claim of privacy. Finally, defendant's failure to claim any property interest in truck while it was stored, or show that he had stored personal property in it, denied defendant a reasonable expectation of privacy necessary to establish standing).

People v. Neal, 109 Ill. 2d 216, 486 N.E.2d 898 (1985) (Trooper was suspected of issuing false traffic citations for the Illinois State Police. His patrol car was searched and 12 to 13 unofficial citations were discovered in his raincoat pouch which was in the automobile. HELD: defendant did not have standing under Katz. Although he had a subjective expectation of privacy concerning the patrol car, the expectation was objectively unreasonable. The car and the raincoat were State owned. The items were subject to periodic inspection by superiors with or without notice. He was aware that his superiors would inspect cars in the presence or out of the presence of the assigned officer).

People v. Ferris, 2014 IL App (4th) 130657, 9 N.E.3d 1126 (Defendant provided a friend a ride from Paris, Illinois, to Decatur, Illinois in another's automobile. Besides defendant's friend, in the vehicle were defendant, the vehicle owner and a third individual, the eventual driver. Upon their arrival in Decatur, they dropped off the friend. While in Decatur, defendant drove the car on at least one occasion when the vehicle owner was not present in the vehicle. Also, the vehicle owner knew that defendant's clothing and other personal belongings, including his book bag, were in the trunk of the car. When the three - defendant, the owner and the third individual -- began driving back to Paris, at first, defendant was the driver, but his eyes became dry and itchy, whereupon he requested the third individual to take over driving, even though he knew she lacked a valid driver's license. At 11:30 p.m., a police officer stopped the vehicle for speeding. The stop occurred on a blacktop road, to the right of which was a shoulder 10 or 15 feet wide. After determining the driver was driving with a revoked driver's license, the officer arrested the driver, handcuffed her and placed her in his police car. The officer then asked the defendant and the vehicle owner for permission to search the car, but both refused. After requesting defendant submit to field sobriety tests to determine if he was fit to drive, the officer concluded that defendant was not fit to drive and warned defendant he would be arrested if he tried to drive. At this point, the police officer conducted an inventory search of the car before it was towed, removed a purse from the car belonging to the driver and put it in the squad car, even though defendant and the arrested driver insisted he leave the purse in the car. During this encounter, realizing that neither he nor the owner were able to drive the car, defendant told the officer, "We're going to have [the car] towed." After the inventory search, the officer informed defendant and the vehicle owner that they would have to come to the sheriff's office and wait for someone to pick them up at the sheriff's office. A tow truck arrived and towed the car. The defendant and car owner were later picked up around dawn. In the meantime, at 1:51 a.m. the driver's purse was inventoried at the jail and methamphetamine-related...