A Call for Judicial Restraint: Federal Taxpayer Grievances Challenging Executive Action
Publication year | 2007 |
I. Introduction
Article III of the Constitution describes the judicial power of the United States as extending to "cases" and "controversies."(fn1) The plain meaning of these words, however, offers little insight into what the Framers intended should be the proper scope of the federal judicial power.(fn2) To discern the Framers' intent, the Supreme Court has looked to common understandings about what activities are appropriately resolved through the judicial process.(fn3) Based upon those understandings, the Court has developed a set of rules-standing, mootness, and ripeness, among others-through which it defines the limits of the Judiciary's power in relation to the powers of the coordinate branches of government.(fn4)
It is important to limit the Judiciary because its power is uniquely susceptible to abuse: the Judiciary is the only branch of government that is not elected and the only branch that can define the limits of its own power.(fn5) Therefore, it is critical that the Judiciary applies its own rules of limitation fairly and consistently. Otherwise, if the Judiciary inconsistently interprets its own rules or capriciously expands its power, it imperils not only its own integrity, but one of the Constitutional foundations of our government: separation of powers.
The law of standing, which is one dimension of the case-and-controversy requirement, addresses the important question of whether a party who brings a claim in federal court is a proper party to invoke federal court jurisdiction.(fn6) To have standing to litigate a cause of action under modern standing doctrine, a party must allege that he or she has actually suffered or will imminently suffer a concrete and particular injury caused by the defendant.(fn7) Nothing less will satisfy the Constitution.(fn8) The alleged injury must be actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.(fn9)
Requiring plaintiffs to allege an injury serves two primary concerns. First, it frames the legal question sought to be adjudicated in a factual context within which a court is capable of making decisions.(fn10) Unlike the Legislative Branch, the Judiciary does not have the ability to call hearings, make reports, conduct investigations, or otherwise make an exploratory record.(fn11) Rather, the courts completely depend on the parties in each case to present the relevant facts and the claims sought to be adjudicated.(fn12) Second, the concrete injury requirement insures the framing of relief no broader than required by the precise facts, which is especially important when adjudication would produce a confrontation with one of the coordinate branches of government.(fn13) Thus, the concrete injury requirement serves to prevent the Judiciary from invading the province of the other branches of government unless necessary under the particular circumstances of a case.(fn14) These dual concerns, i.e., the limited competency of the Judiciary and the idea of separation of powers, provide strong justifications for the concrete injury requirement in standing law.
The two Constitutional concerns just outlined-the limited competency of the Judiciary and separation of powers-strongly justify requiring all parties to allege a concrete injury in order to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Despite this strong Constitutional justification, the courts have carved out an exception to the concrete injury requirement when the plaintiff is a taxpayer challenging congressional spending. The resulting doctrine of
Generally speaking, taxpayers have no standing because a taxpayer's grievance about the government's allocation of its largesse is generally abstract and ideological in nature.(fn16) In such a case, the taxpayer does not suffer from the actual or imminent concrete injury that is so essential to the Judiciary's ability to render legal decisions.
It makes sense, therefore, that for most of the twentieth century, taxpayers had no special standing.(fn17) The Supreme Court considered but rejected a special taxpayer standing doctrine in the famous 1923 case of
However, in
To be sure, the Supreme Court has since applied the
Recently, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit again propelled the issue of taxpayer standing into the forefront of federal jurisprudence, paving a doctrinal crossroads of sorts for the Supreme Court.(fn28) In
In holding that the plaintiffs had standing, the
Authored by Judge Posner, the watershed majority opinion in
This Article calls upon the Supreme Court to stay the Judiciary's hand in taxpayer grievances concerning purely executive action. Parts II and III of the Article provide the relevant background material for an understanding of the subject matter. Specifically, Part II recounts the evolution of taxpayer standing, taking the reader from the Supreme Court's decision in
Parts V and VI posit that even assuming arguendo that
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