"like Wolves in Sheep's Clothing": Combating Racial Bias in Washington State's Criminal Justice System
Publication year | 2012 |
I. Introduction
Racial bias in the United States' criminal justice system is a serious problem,(fn1) and Washington State is no exception.(fn2) The groundbreaking
Among nine potential causes of racial disparity identified and addressed in the
In April 2006, a man was shot four times following a confrontation between multiple individuals in downtown Seattle,(fn9) and he succumbed to his wounds upon arrival at a nearby hospital.(fn10) Two others shot during the attack survived.(fn11) A video camera close to the scene of the shooting captured an image of a man in a "distinctive, long red shirt" drawing a pistol and firing the gunshots that struck all three victims.(fn12) Though many witnesses gave inconsistent accounts of the incident and were reluctant to cooperate with police, two witnesses identified defendant Kevin L. Monday, Jr. as the shooter.(fn13) Police arrested Monday three weeks later while he was wearing a red shirt and hat that were "strikingly similar" to the clothing worn by the shooter in the video.(fn14) During subsequent police questioning, Monday confirmed that he was the man wearing the red shirt in the video, and he confessed shortly thereafter that he was the shooter.(fn15) Officers later recovered bullet cartridges from Monday's home that were identical to those used in the shooting.(fn16)
Prosecutors charged Monday with first-degree murder and two counts of first-degree assault, and the case proceeded to trial.(fn17) During the testimony of one witness who previously identified Monday as the shooter, the prosecutor frequently pronounced the word "police" as "po-leese."(fn18) The prosecutor also referenced a code of conduct that certain people do not talk to the police about criminal matters.(fn19) He returned to the theme during closing argument where he made the racial implications of his theme explicit:
The Washington State Supreme Court disagreed and held that the prosecutor's improper conduct constituted reversible error.(fn25) The court found that "[t]he prosecutor's misconduct tainted nearly every lay witness's testimony. It planted the seed in the jury's mind that most of the witnesses were, at best, shading the truth to benefit the defendant."(fn26) Based on this improper conduct, the court determined that it could not "say beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdicts," and thus held that a new trial was required.(fn27) In so holding, the court radically reshaped the long-used analysis for prosecutorial misconduct and signaled a new intolerance toward racial bias in criminal proceedings.
But the court did not unanimously fashion a single test for use in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct involving racial bias, which prompted an ensuing debate within Washington's legal community.(fn28) The tests articulated in
First, the opinions differ regarding the source of law that should be applied when an existing legal framework proves inadequate to address a social problem. Following
Third, the opinions differ in the amount of judicial discretion they afford courts to identify racial bias, which is of particular importance because many appeals to racial bias are subtle or unconscious.(fn29) But questions persist regarding the criteria that should be used to decide whether racial bias is present in the courtroom. Finally, the three opinions do not conclusively define how much weight courts should afford competing interests in determining an appropriate judicial response to racial bias. Whether victims' rights and the legitimacy of the criminal justice system as a whole should be considered remains unresolved.
Despite their differences, both the majority and concurring opinions in
II. When the Existing Legal Framework Falls Short: Traditional Analysis for Prosecutorial Misconduct
The majority and concurring opinions in
In contrast to the traditional prosecutorial misconduct analysis, courts apply a heightened harmless error standard in Washington when an error during trial implicates a constitutional right.(fn34) If the appellant shows that a constitutional error occurred, "the State bears the burden of proving that the error was harmless" because the error is presumptively prejudicial.(fn35) "A constitutional error is harmless if the appellate court is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that any reasonable jury would have reached the same result in the absence of the error."(fn36) Thus, the primary features of this constitutional harmless error standard are that it (1) shifts the burden of proof to the State and (2) requires a showing of harmless error beyond a...
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