Spinoza’s Liberal Republicanism and the Challenge of Revealed Religion

Published date01 June 2014
Date01 June 2014
DOI10.1177/1065912913510065
Subject MatterArticles
Political Research Quarterly
2014, Vol. 67(2) 239 –252
© 2013 University of Utah
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DOI: 10.1177/1065912913510065
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Article
Among scholars of intellectual history and political phi-
losophy, recent decades have witnessed a surge of inter-
est in Spinoza (Balibar 2008; Den Uyl 2008; Hampshire
2005; Smith 1997, 2003, 2005; Verbeek 2003). In par-
ticular, when considering questions of religious freedom
and the separation of church and state, scholars dissatis-
fied with Locke have begun to look to Spinoza, and espe-
cially to the Theologico-Political Treatise, for an original
articulation of the pluralist vision of toleration that char-
acterizes liberalism today (Israel 2001, esp. 265–70,
2006, esp. 42, 135–63; Laursen 1996). As the Treatise
joins a defense of freedom of speech and thought to a
critique of traditional revealed religion (Bagley 2008;
Gildin 1980; Nadler 2011; Strauss 1965), it is increas-
ingly being cited by civil libertarians and secularist cham-
pions of the Enlightenment (cf. Nadler 2012), as well as
by those seeking to uncover the connections between lib-
eral democracy and liberal Christianity (Bagley 1998;
Yaffe 1997, 2004, 267).
But while Spinoza’s thought is being rediscovered for
its lessons about how our politics operates today, a great
part of its appeal may have to do with a desire to under-
stand not what we are, but what we could be—for, among
the classical liberal thinkers, Spinoza stands out for his
attempt to unite individual freedom and the pursuit of
self-interest to a republican teaching that fosters commu-
nity.1 Ever since Rawls’ A Theory of Justice, political
theory has been marked by an uneasy acceptance of the
tenets of liberalism. On one hand, we remain deeply
attached to the principles of human rights and individual
autonomy that have been bequeathed to us by the liberal
Enlightenment. On the other hand, however, there is
growing around us a recognition that those principles by
themselves may do insufficient justice to the range of our
moral and political experiences. More and more, thinkers
across the political spectrum have warned that liberal-
ism’s exclusive reliance on the language of rights has left
it incapable of comprehending the place of duty or obli-
gation in human life. On the Right, this concern has
focused on the proliferation of new rights that are held to
hasten the breakdown of the obligations of faith and fam-
ily (Kraynak 2001, 169–71; Neuhaus 1984, 105). On the
Left, the triumph of rights over duties has been linked to
the greed, inequality, and dependence of capitalism
(Viroli 2002, 11–12), to environmental destruction
(Babcock 2009; Cannavò 2010), as well as to liberalism’s
tendency to foster a weak tolerance instead of a true
respect for diversity (Sandel 1996, 14, 116).
In the wake of this perceived moral and spiritual defi-
cit, a growing number of scholars have begun to look to a
longstanding but latent republican tradition which, they
claim, provides an alternative to rights-based liberalism
(e.g., Arendt 1958; Kloppenberg 1998; Pettit 1997;
Sandel 1996, 1998; Viroli 2002). Appealing to Aristotle,
Machiavelli, Tocqueville, and the Anti-Federalists,
510065PRQXXX10.1177/1065912913510065Political Research QuarterlyHerold
research-article2013
1University of Richmond, Richmond, VA, USA
Corresponding Author:
Aaron L. Herold, Jepson School of Leadership Studies, University of
Richmond, 28 Westhampton Way, Jepson Hall, Richmond,
VA 23173, USA.
Email: aherold2@richmond.edu
Spinoza’s Liberal Republicanism and the
Challenge of Revealed Religion
Aaron L. Herold1
Abstract
Spinoza’s Theologico-Political Treatise is a foundational liberal work whose republican teaching also anticipates today’s
communitarian critiques. Those critiques reopen the Treatise’s guiding question of whether politics must be grounded
in a religious teaching, and they compel us to reconsider Spinoza’s claim that civic dedication can be rooted in an
attachment to intellectual freedom. I assess Spinoza’s liberal republicanism by examining how it emerges from a
critique of the Bible. I conclude that Spinoza’s attempt to reconcile individual liberty with civic dedication clarifies
liberalism’s moral power and ultimate vulnerabilities—vulnerabilities which help explain why revealed religion has
reemerged to challenge it.
Keywords
Spinoza, religion, republicanism, communitarianism, freedom of speech and thought

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