Specific Intent
Jurisdiction | Maryland |
III. Specific intent
Specific intent is the highest, most complex, and most subjective mental state. It is the only mental state that is so complex that (a) in 17 jurisdictions, including Maryland, an intoxicated person; and (b) in some jurisdictions, but not including Maryland, a diminished capacity person, might not be able to form the requisite mental state. See Wieland, 101 Md. App. at 39-40. Specific intent is, in essence, a two-part mental state, requiring (a) the general intent to do the prohibited conduct; and (b) the specific intent to produce a specific resulting consequence. Chow v. State, 393 Md. 431, 464-65 (2006). In Smith, the Court of Special Appeals stated:
A specific intent is not simply the intent to do the immediate act but embraces the requirement that the mind be conscious of a more remote purpose or design which shall eventuate the doing of the immediate act. Though assault implies only a general intent to strike the blow, assault with intent to murder, rob, rape or maim requires a fully formed and conscious purpose that those further consequences shall flow from the doing of the immediate act. To break and enter requires a mere general intent but to commit burglary requires the additional specific intent of committing a felony after the entry has been made. A trespassory taking requires a mere general intent but larceny (or robbery) requires the specific animus furandi or deliberate purpose of depriving the owner permanently of the stolen goods.
Smith, 41 Md. App. at 305.
A. The required specific intent is different for each specific intent offense
There are many different specific intents and, in a sense, there is no such thing as merely a specific intent offense. Instead, for each specific intent offense, the mental state is a specific intent to __________, and the blank must be filled in. For example, to break and enter requires a mere general intent, but to commit burglary requires the additional element of a specific intent to commit a felony (or, at least, a crime) at the time of the entry. Id.
B. Inferring specific intent
Specific intent is almost always established based on permissible inferences of fact arising from the defendant's conduct, the defendant's knowledge, and/or the surrounding circumstances. In State v. Earp, 319 Md. 156 (1990), the Court of Appeals stated: "[S]ince intent is subjective and, without the cooperation of the accused, cannot be directly and objectively proven, its presence must be shown by established facts which permit a proper inference of its existence." Id. at 167.
It is permissible to infer that a person intends the natural and probable consequences of any act voluntarily undertaken. For example, it is permissible to infer an intent to kill from the use of a deadly weapon directed toward a vital part of the human body. State v. Raines, 326 Md. 582, 591 (1992). Intent to kill may be inferred from pulling the trigger that results in nothing more than a "click." Sometimes, it is permissible to infer specific intent from knowledge. Id. at 594. For example, it is permissible to infer intent to defraud from attempting to pass, as genuine, a check known to be forged.
C. Statutory inferences
Legislatures enact statutory inferences to establish a mental state, but sometimes incorrectly label the inference as a presumption of law. For example, in the bad check statute, the defendant is presumed to have intended or believed that the check would be dishonored if the defendant had no account or had an account with insufficient funds. Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 8-104(b). To save the statutory presumptions from a constitutional attack, courts often interpret such presumptions to mean a permissible inference of fact.
For example, based on a statutory inference of fact, it is permissible to infer knowledge that the goods are stolen, under Maryland's theft offense statute, if the defendant is in the business of buying or selling goods of that nature, and the goods were acquired for consideration far below fair market value. Id. § 7-104(c)(2)(iii).
D. Transferring specific intent mens rea
Transferred intent is a concept under which the specific intent to kill that the Defendant has against intended victim A is transferred, as a matter of law, to unintended victim B, even if the defendant had no specific intent to kill B. Poe v. State, 103 Md. App. 136, 147 (1995). The result is the unintended, unanticipated consequence of the intended harm.
1. Homicide cases
Maryland first recognized transferred intent in Gladden v. State, 273 Md. 383, 405 (1974). In Maryland, transferred intent applies only in homicide cases, i.e., murder and manslaughter. If an unintended victim is killed, when there is a specific intent to kill or specific intent to do serious bodily harm to the intended victim, there is transferred intent, regardless of what happens to the intended victim. Transferred intent applies to the murder of the unintended victim whether the intended victim is not harmed, id., is wounded, Poe v. State, 341 Md. 523 (1996), or is also murdered. Henry v. State, 419 Md. 588, 601 (2011). In State v. Bircher, 446 Md. 458 (2016), the Court of Appeals held that the doctrine of transferred intent applies even if the defendant fires a gun into a crowd of people, killing one of them, and argues he did not have any intent to kill anyone in the crowd and was acting in self defense.
2. Inchoate homicide cases
Transferred intent does not apply in inchoate homicide cases, i.e., attempted murder, attempted manslaughter, assault. In State v. Brady, 393 Md. 502, 523 (2006), the Court of Appeals held that, if the defendant intends to kill a specific victim but, instead, wounds an unintended victim, the defendant can be convicted only of the attempted murder of the intended victim and assault of the unintended victim. See Garrett v. State, 394 Md. 217, 225 (2006); Harrison v. State, 382 Md. 477, 506 (2004); Pettigrew v. State, 175 Md. App. 296, 308 (2007).
3. Malice
Transferred intent applies to both the "front end" of malice, i.e., specific intent to kill and specific intent to do serious bodily harm, and the "back end" of malice, i.e., lack of justification, lack of excuse, or lack of mitigation, e.g., perfect and imperfect self-defense. Harrison, 382 Md. at 491 & 498-508.
E. Concurrent intent
Although transferred intent applies only when the unintended victim dies, concurrent intent is broader and may apply both when the unintended victim dies and when the unintended victim lives. With concurrent intent, the defendant has a specific intent to kill the intended victim. To effectuate the specific intent to kill the intended victim, the defendant attempts to kill multiple people in the vicinity of the intended victim by creating a "zone of harm" around the intended victim. For example, the defendant shoots into a crowd containing the intended victim, intending to kill the intended victim, but instead killing or harming one or more others in that...
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