Specific Applications Democracy and People Over Profit

SPECIFIC APPLICATIONS

Democracy and People over Prof‌it

JAMES R. OTTESON*

ABSTRACT

A principle of equal moral agency undergirds much support for democratic

political institutions. This same principle, however, undermines one central

argument against a market economy—namely, the “People Over Prof‌it”

demand—while at the same time providing perhaps surprisingly strong reason

to support a market economy. Moreover, several other arguments often adduced

in favor of democracy seem, on examination, to support market economies at

least as much as they support democracy. If any of these arguments are compel-

ling, or even plausible, in marshaling support for democracy, then they support

market economies as well. Many supporters of democracy might therefore f‌ind

expression of at least some of their moral aims in market economies. I argue

that on the basis of their own arguments, many supporters of democracy should

be supporters of the market.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871

I. PEOPLE OVER PROFIT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872

II. PEOPLE OVER VOTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880

III. MARKETS OVER VOTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882

CONCLUSION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887

INTRODUCTION

One central argument for democracy is based on a premise of moral equality.

All human beings are equal moral agents and thus should be accorded the same

respect and dignity—as well as rights, liberties, and privileges—in light of this

agency.

1

Some critics have argued that, in practice, democracy does not actually

* James R. Otteson is John T. Ryan Jr. Professor of Business Ethics at the University of Notre Dame.

© 2021, James R. Otteson.

1. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE (2000); Thomas Christiano, The Authority of

Democracy, 12 J. POL PHIL. 266 (2004); Thomas Christiano, An Egalitarian Argument for a Human

871

respect this premise of equal moral agency,

2

but I propose to set that worry aside

and pursue a different line of thought. Since at least Rawls,

3

one aspect of demo-

cratic advocacy has been a concern for fairness, and this has been applied by its

advocates not only to conceptions of justice and the basic political institutions of

a democratic society but also to their economic institutions.

4

Thus, some aspects

of a market economy have been criticized on the grounds that markets allow peo-

ple to capitalize on lucky circumstances of birth, family, or schooling—for which

they can claim no credit—while others suffer from bad luck due to adverse cir-

cumstances. Similar criticisms are based on the claim that the market does not

treat all with dignity and respect and are therefore unfair.

5

In this essay, I argue that one particular criticism of market economies—

captured by the slogan “people over prof‌its”—is mistaken because it violates a

foundational moral principle of equal moral agency. I will propose that the princi-

ple of equal moral agency that some deploy to defend the fairness of democratic

political procedures seems, in fact, more clearly at work in market economies,

and therefore one plausible way to instantiate and respect this principle is to have

a properly functioning market economy. In sum, my argument will be: if the, or

a, reason one advocates for democracy is because one believes it fulf‌ills the prin-

ciple of equal moral agency that underpins fairness, then one should reject a “peo-

ple over prof‌its” objection to market economies and should support a market

economy.

I. PEOPLE OVER PROFIT

Before addressing democracy directly, let us consider market economies and

some of the objections people raise to them. In particular, consider the criticism

of some activities in market economies that is captured by the slogan “people

over prof‌it.” What does it mean to advocate “people over prof‌it”? According to

its advocates, it entails placing a higher value on the people affected by decisions

about how to allocate resources than on the search for prof‌it.

6

When a f‌irm

decides to downsize, lay workers off, relocate, or otherwise shift its resources, or

decides not to pay its workers more or give them more generous benef‌its, a person

demanding “people over prof‌it” is implying that the f‌irm’s decision ref‌lects that it

Right to Democracy, in HUMAN RIGHTS: THE HARD QUESTIONS 301–26 (Cindy Holder & David Reidy

eds., 2013).

2. See, e.g., JASON BRENNAN, AGAINST DEMOCRACY (2016).

3. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).

4. See, e.g., JOHN TOMASI, FREE MARKET FAIRNESS (2012).

5. See, e.g., John Rawls, A Kantian Conception of Equality, 96 CAMBRIDGE REV. 94 (1975); JOSEPH

E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (1994); DEBRA SATZ, WHY SOME THINGS SHOULD

NOT BE FOR SALE: THE MORAL LIMITS OF MARKETS (2010); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S

DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY (1996).

6. As, for example, the nonprof‌it People Over Prof‌its puts it, “We must put the interests of working

people ahead of quarterly prof‌its, shareholder dividends, and stock buybacks.” PEOPLE OVER PROFITS

https://thepeopleoverprof‌its.org [https://perma.cc/M97E-TBX4] (last visited March 14, 2019). See also

NOAM CHOMSKY, PROFIT OVER PEOPLE: NEOLIBERALISM AND GLOBAL ORDER (1999).

872 THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 18:871