Soviet-Norwegian Relations since 1945

• DOI: 10.1177/106591296401700405
• Published date: 01 December 1964
• Author: Victor Braden Moon
• Date: 01 December 1964
• Subject Matter: Articles

659

SOVIET-NORWEGIAN

RELATIONS

SINCE

1945

VICTOR

BRADEN

MOON

University

of

Washington

N

THE

PERIOD

following

World

War

II,

Soviet-Norwegian

relations

can

be

divided

into

two

general

categories,

defense

and

economic

cooperation.

Nor-

way’s

strategic

position

on

the

perimeter

of

the Soviet

Union

forces

the

Soviet

government

to

keep

a

continual

watch

on

Norwegian

foreign

policy.

Since

the

war

Soviet-Norwegian

relations

concerning

defense

have

centered

around

three

basic

issues - the

status

of

Spitzbergen

( Svalbord) ,

the

Atlantic

Defense

Pact,

and

air

flights

over

the

Soviet

Union

by

foreign

powers.

All

three

areas

are

closely

related,

but

for

the

purpose

of

clarification

a

somewhat

artificial

separation

of

basic

issues

has

been

used

in

this

study.

In

the

light

of

the

cold

war,

the

economic

considerations

are

secondary,

though

not

wholly

unimportant.

It

must

be

remembered

that

Soviet-

Norwegian

relations

do

not

occur

in

a

vacuum;

and

this

limited

case

study

must

be

understood

as

one

tile

in

the

mosaic

of

East-West

relations.

Norway

was

able

to

maintain

her

isolationist

policy

during

World

War

I

and

the

interwar

period.

In

1940

Norway

declared

that

this

policy

would

be

continued,

but

the

declaration

of

neutrality

was

no

barrier

to

the

Nazi

troops.

Hitler’s

army

invaded

Norway

on

April

9,

1940,

and

encountered

little

organized

resistance.

Lack

of

preparation

for

any

defense,

futile

as

it

must

have

been,

was

a

natural

result

of

neutrality.

Following

the

war,

the

general

attitude

of

Norwegian

decision-makers

was

one

of

renewed

isolation

from

world

politics.

Norway

thought

herself

a

&dquo;bridge

builder&dquo;

between

East

and

West,

and

as

the

cold

war

set

in,

Norway

thought

that

her

position

was,

due

to

its

relative

neutrality,

safe

from

both

sides.

After

the

govemment-in-

exile

returned

to

Norway

in

1945,

friendship

with

the

West

was

continued

and

an

idealistic

romance

with

the

Soviet

Union

was

pursued

with

equal

fervor.

In

the

period

from

1946

through

early

1948,

most

Norwegians

thought

that

their

active

neutrality

could

keep

the

two

great

powers

in

contact

and

thus

keep

the

trend

towards

international

tension

in

tow.

As

time

passed

many

Norwegians

began

to

doubt

the

validity

of

the

&dquo;bridge-

building&dquo;

thesis.

The

Soviet

Union’s

action

in

Eastern

Europe

was

not

encouraging

and

the

final

blow

to

the

Norwegian

policy

came

from

this

area

rather

than

from

the

West.

The

coup

d’itat

in

Czechoslovakia

in

February,

1948,

proved

that

the

fears

of

some

were

correct;

Norway’s

position

changed

and

her

foreign

policy

makers

began

to

put

out

feelers

for

some

sort

of

Scandinavian

defense

alliance.

Czechoslo-

vakia

had

been

a

&dquo;bridge

builder,&dquo;

too,

and

the

failure

of

a

nation

so

near

the

Soviet

Union

to

succeed

with

this

policy

was

a

sure

sign

to

the

Norwegian

government

that

its

policy

was

based

on an

overly

rosy

view

of

the

international

situation

and

the

ruthless

tactics

of

the

Red

Army.

The

Czechoslovakian

coup

was

the

final

blow

to

&dquo;bridge

building&dquo;

policy.

But

there

was

also

a

growing

dissatisfaction

with

the

record

of

negativism

the

Soviet

Union

had

built

up

in

the

United

Nations.

The

Norwegian

government

had

more