Sovereignty: an introduction and brief history.

AuthorPhilpott, Daniel
PositionTranscending National Boundaries

Most citizens of most states recall, in eulogy or in censure, a founding moment when battles, heroes, speeches, debates and compromises brought about a new constitution, an enduring new orthodoxy of political authority and principles. They speak of 1776, 1789 and 1917, of preserving the spirit of the revolution and the intentions of its founders. Rarely, though, do such sentiments apply to international relations. Occasionally scholars write of our "Westphalian system," but only cooly to categorize and chronicle not to pronounce or polemicize. Why the reticence? It probably has much to do with the dominance of the realist tradition, according to which the history of international relations is an endless competition between armies and economies; rules, constitutions and notions of political authority, then, are only deceptive, forgettable surface reflections. I will argue for the reality of these reflections. International relations, too, has something akin to a constitution, embodied in what I will call "norms of sovereignty," and this constitution is formed through revolutions: Tumult yields novel orthodoxy.

Today sovereignty is again the issue. There is evidence that another revolution is afoot. Against the spirit of "the end of history," new actors are claiming new forms of authority. The European Union and the United Nations endorse the right to independence of secessionist Yugoslavian republics; the U.N. and its proxy armies intervene in Somalia, Iraq and Rwanda for humanitarian reasons and apply sanctions on Haiti on behalf of democracy, all without the consent of local parties; legal scholars note an "emerging right to democratic governance" which makes domestic government a matter of international concern; and E.U. states make new progress toward the "pooling" of authority in a common institution.[2] These trends are still partial; whether they will become durable norms in the new world order is not yet certain. But if they do, together they will amount to one of the rare international revolutions in sovereignty since medieval times.

If the current relevance of the state is our question, then these emerging norms of sovereignty are noteworthy. They are not, however, all that is important to the state. Increased flows of trade, money, information and armaments, and changes in laws governing ownership and citizenship dramatically alter the state's functions and efficacy, but have little to do with sovereignty, which itself is purely a matter of legitimate authority. Although revolutions in norms of sovereignty are only part of important political change, they are an inestimably important part, and we ought to know something about their nature and history. I seek, then, to introduce sovereignty in two stages. First, I offer a sorely needed definition and explore some of its variations. I then offer a brief history of its crucial historical junctures and founding moments.

International lawyers have so thoroughly delineated, demarcated, explicated, qualified and categorized sovereignty that the term's continued useful precision is open to question.[3] Yet, because sovereignty has so often been appealed to or claimed, in both polemics and preambles, by statespeople, diplomats and members of parliament concerned about the integrity of their authority, and because it comprises the struts and joists without which statecraft would not exist, it cannot be scuttled.

But sovereignty needs definition. Precisely because of its complex historical evolution, finding a definition encompassing every usage since the 13th century is a pipe dream.[4] However, there is a broad concept - not a definition, but a wide philosophical category - which unites most of sovereignty's past, and with which we can begin: authority. Authority is "the right to command and correlatively, the right to be obeyed."[5] It is legitimate when it is rooted in law, tradition, consent or divine command, and when those living under it generally endorse this notion. Legitimate authority is crucially different from power, which is raw, pure, physical and direct. Power, according to Steven Lukes, is exercised "when A affects B in a manner contrary to B's real interests."[6] Even at its most monarchical and dictatorial, even in the case of the absolute law-giving monarch of Jean Bodin or Thomas Hobbes, sovereignty is conferred by some notion of right which provides a basis for assent other than coercion.[7]

This is not to deny that sovereignty and power are related. If sovereignty is not mere power, neither is it mere legitimacy; it must not only have a basis in right, but also be practiced. A king or president must be able to carry out the essential duties of his office. A sovereign state must have uncontested control of its religion and its army, its economy and justice. When Shakespeare's Bolingbroke forced Richard II to abdicate, Richard had to admit the loss of sovereignty, the erosion of his divine royal mandate: "I find myself a traitor with the rest:/For I have given here my soul's consent/Tundeck the pompous body of a king;/Made glory base; and sovereignty, a slave."[8] And although the Holy Roman Empire still existed and claimed prerogatives over states' internal policies after 1648, its authority was little more than parchment. Sovereign authority requires power to back up its legitimate claims. The obverse, it should be noted, is also true: Legitimacy, evoking allegiance and respect, can itself lend force to sovereign claims.

A sizable portion of a ruler's power, however, derives not from sovereignty's legitimacy, but from coarser factors. Due to both fate and ability, different U.S. presidents with precisely the same constitutional prerogatives have varied greatly in their power to pass laws through Congress, assert their will against the various U.S. states and make war on foreign countries. Internationally, one can imagine two small, equally sovereign states: one a "holder of the balance" arbitrating great powers' contests; the other uninfluential and buffeted in the world economy. While sovereignty is inestimably significant, the scope of power is much wider.

If sovereignty is not the same as power, neither is it synomymous with law. To Bodin and Hobbes, modem sovereignty's first systematic articulators, the legitimate sovereign was not only above human law, but the source of it. However, since the 18th century, this has changed. At first in the constitutionally advanced Western states, now virtually everywhere, human lawgivers are no longer legitimately sovereign. Instead, constitutions and international legal agreements define the scope of all rulers' and citizens' legitimate authority.

At this point, the definition is still too broad. A police chief, priest and corporate executive all have legitimate authority; rarely are they called sovereign. Sovereignty has always involved another ingredient: supremacy. In the chain of authority by which I look to a higher authority, who in turn looks to a higher one, the holder of sovereignty is highest. No one may question it or legitimately oppose it. Supremacy is certainly what Bodin and Hobbes had in mind, and it is at the heart of most subsequent definitions. A final necessary ingredient is territoriality. Sovereignty is authority within a discrete land, bounded by borders. Territoriality accompanies supremacy; and authority would not be supreme if there were challengers within its realm. As I discuss below, during the Middle Ages, when there was no sovereignty, every ruler both endured limits within his own territory and enjoyed some claims over the internal prerogatives of other rulers within Christendom. Territoriality is modern; it defines international relations.[9]

We have reached the limits of specificity: Sovereignty is supreme legitimate authority within a territory. All particular historical uses of the term have meant a particular form of supreme legitimate authority, reflecting one or another philosophy in a given epoch; sovereignty is never without an adjective. Three kinds of adjectives are relevant to understanding sovereignty's variants. The first describes holders of sovereignty, who may be diverse. Sovereignty need not lie in a single individual, but could also reside in a triumvirate, a Committee of Public Safety, the people (in Rousseau's version) or a body of law. In most modern states, a constitution prescribing the authority of political offices is sovereign, while over some matters, international law or E.U. law may also be sovereign. The legitimate holders of sovereignty have, of course, changed over time. Indeed, on one reading, modern political philosophy has been a debate about who holds sovereignty.

Another relevant pair of adjectives is "internal" and "external," which are...

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