Some Problems of Representation in State Legislatures

• Published date: 01 June 1949
• DOI: 10.1177/106591294900200207
• Author: Lashley G. Harvey
• Date: 01 June 1949
• Subject Matter: Articles

SOME PROBLEMS OF REPRESENTATION IN
STATE LEGISLATURES
LASHLEY G. HARVEY
Boston University
I
HE
PROBLEMS of representation in our state legislatures stem
t
largely from the practice of allowing political expediency to domi-
nate all other considerations. Lip service is given the principle of
majority rule and its accompanying consideration for minorities. Diffi-
culties arising out of the application of this principle to the institution of
a popularly elected executive, who must share with an elected legislature
in the enactment of law, have not been squarely met. This failure is
partially due to the historical evolution of our pattern of government
and the growth of the political party as the agency that bridges separa-
tion of powers and serves as a connecting link with the electorate.
When the American states developed their constitutions, a few tried
to accomplish a unification of the executive with the legislative branch.
Pennsylvania and Vermont made such provision in their first constitu-
tions but abandoned it for complete separation of executive from legis-
lative organization with separate elections according to the New York
model, which proved universally acceptable.
1
In the beginning states recognized the &dquo;propertied interest&dquo; as the
dominant one in legislation. Except in Vermont, property ownership was
a prerequisite for candidacy for the legislature. &dquo;Propertied legislators&dquo;
were elected by other property owners with lower minimum ownership
requirements, but with a sufficient stake in the community to assure a
safe choice. Bicameralism was adopted by all the states except for a
brief period of experimentation with unicameralism by Georgia, Penn-
sylvania, and Vermont. Some radical adjustments in the model supplied
by the British mother of parliaments were made to fit the American
scene.
Senators were usually elected from districts consisting of counties-
the principal administrative subdivision of the state; representatives were
elected either from some existing local unit such as a town, plantation,
or parish, or from some artificial district created for the purpose. Em-
phasis was not placed on the representation of numbers so much as upon
communities. In New England a member of the lower chamber repre-
sented a town in its corporate capacity. The organized bodies of free-
men of the towns with the lower chamber of the state legislature as the
1
Walter F. Dodd, State Government (2d ed.; New York: Century, 1928), p. 233.
265

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266
communitas communitatum merged local and special needs with the
broader state community interest.2 Some recognition was given to larger
towns by permitting an increase in number of representatives based on
qualified voters or rateable polls according to a formula, but forbidding
towns to be split into separate electoral districts. The practice of allowing
sparsely populated districts to be represented by one legislator and more
populous districts by several was generally accepted by all states prior
to 1820. Not all states compensated legislators from state funds, but some
expected local units to supply stipends if it were necessary. In Massa-
chusetts it was optional for a town to send a representative, and at times
few of the smaller towns were represented.3
3
The nineteenth century saw the development of an American pat-
tern of party control of state governments which broke with the British
model. In the first place, the party served as an agency of control over
both the legislative and executive branches, frequently bridging the gap
of separation of power. Secondly, parties fostered the extension of suf-
frage from those who owned property to those who paid taxes, and, ulti-
mately, to manhood suffrage.4
4
Before the extension of suffrage party
organization concerned itself only with those few who had a stake in the
community. It posed as an agency to which the newly enfranchised voter,
too busy to bother with details, might turn to effect control over his
government. As the agent of the voter it stood between him and his
chosen representative. The voter did not have to take an oath to support
the party or finance it through membership dues, and no formal duties
were required.5 To entrench itself in the system the political party pro-
ceeded to manage the government and to restrict the control of the elec-
torate to the channels it provided through its organization. The legislative
caucus gave way to the state convention and the direct primary.
What Ostrogorski wrote in 1902 about the new position of the
American political party in...