Some conceptual difficulties in the theory of social conflict
| Author | Clinton F. Fink |
| Published date | 01 December 1968 |
| Date | 01 December 1968 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/002200276801200402 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Some
conceptual
difficulties
in
the
theory
of
social
conflict
1
CLINTON
F.
FINK
Center
for
Research
on
Conflict
Resolution,
University
of
Michigan
I.
THE
CASE
FOR
A
GENERALIST
APPROACH
TO
THE
STUDY
OF
CONFLICT
The
quest
for
scientific
knowledge
about
social
conflict
has
a
long
and
complex
history,
closely
interwoven
with
the
entire
history
of
social
science.
In
many
disciplines
and
from
many
viewpoints,
great
bodies
of
data
have
been
collected,
and
countless
generalizations,
hypotheses,
and
theories
have been
constructed
to
account
for
social
conflict
phenomena.
During
the
past
dozen
years,
the
problem
of
integrating
this
knowl-
edge
has
received
considerable
attention,
especially
in
the
pages
of
new
multidis-
ciplinary
journals
(Journal
of
Conflict
Re-
solution,
1957-;
Journal
a f
Peace
Research,
1964-),
multidisciplinary
symposia
(Inter-
national
Sociological
Association,
1957;
Kahn
and
Boulding,
1964;
McNeil,
1965;
Ciba
Foundation,
1966;
Stagner,
1967),
and
numerous
theoretical
works
by
represen-
tatives
of
several
disciplines.
Since
theory
is
the
principal
means
of
integrating
scien-
tific
knowledge,
the
construction
of
a
gen-
eral
theory
of
social
conflict
is
considered
by
some
writers
to
be
a
desirable
step.
A
typical
argument
in
favor
of
general
theory
was
offered
in
the
first
issue
of
the
Journal
of
Conflict
Resolution:
If
intellectual
progress
is
to
be
made
in
...
the
study
of
international
relations
[it]
must
be
made
an
interdisciplinary
enterprise,
drawing
its
discourse
from
all
the
social
sciences,
and
even
further....
Our
belief
in
the
fruitfulness
of
an
interdisciplinary
approach
in
this
area
is
based
on
the
conviction
that
the
behavior
and
interactions
of
nations
are
not
an
isolated
and
self-contained
area
of
empirical
material,
but
part
of
a
much
wider
field
of
behavior
and
interaction....
Conflict,
which
is
perhaps
the
key
concept
in
international
relations, ...
is
a
phenomenon
studied
in
many
different
fields:
by
sociologists,
psychologists,
psychiatrists,
economists,
and
by
political
scientists.
It
occurs
in
many
different
situations:
among
members
of
a
family,
between
labor
and
management,
between
political
parties,
and
even
within
a
single
mind,
as
well
as
among
nations.
Many
of
the
patterns
and
processes
which
characterize
conflict
in
one
area
also
characterize
it
in
others....
It
is
not
too
much
to
claim
that
out
of
the
contributions
of
many
fields
a
general
1
This
study
is
part
of
the
author’s
research
program
on
"Effects
of
Social
Conflict,"
sup-
ported
by
research
grants
GS-697
and
GS-1464
from
the
National
Science
Foundation.
The
present
text
contains
the
first
two
chapters
of
a
projected
longer
work
which
will
examine
in
detail
the
problems
of
classifying
and
describing
social
conflicts
for
scientific
purposes,
problems
which
must
be
solved
by
any
general
theory
of
conflict.
For
numerous
stimulating
discussions
about
these
problems,
and
for
helpful
comments
on
earlier
drafts,
I
am
especially
indebted
to
Jacques
Bude,
Elizabeth
Converse,
Lucille
Doke,
Ronald
Edmonds,
Mary
Ellin
Fink,
H.
Merrill
Jackson,
Martin
Patchen,
and
Kendall
O.
Price.
413
theory
of
conflict
is
emerging.
The
isolation
of
these
various
fields,
however,
has
prevented
the
building
of
these
contributions
into
an
integrated
whole....
We
welcome
insights,
theoretical
models,
and
confirmatory
tests
from
all
spheres
of
conflict
resolution;
for
we
believe
that
only
as
all
such
areas
are
drawn
on,
can
we
devise
an
intellectual
engine
of
sufficient
power
to
move
the
greatest
problem
of
our
time
-the
prevention
of
war.
This
same
engine
will
move
us
toward
greater
knowledge
and
greater
power
in
all
areas
of
conflict-in
the
personality,
in
the
home,
in
industrial
relations,
and
so
on
[Editorial,
JCR,
March
1-2].
This
passage
contains
two
main
argu-
ments.
The
first
is
the
argument
for
a
multidisciplinary
approach,
based
on
the
assumption
that
no
existing
social
science
discipline,
by
itself,
contains
sufficient
in-
tellectual
resources
to
achieve
an
adequate
theory
of
international
conflict
(nor,
by
implication,
of
any
other
kind
of
conflict).
The
second
is
the
argument
for
a
generalist
approach,
apparently
based
on
the
assump-
tion
that
even
if
it
is
multidisciplinary,
direct
study
of
a
given
kind
of
conflict
(e.g.,
international
conflict)
cannot,
by
itself,
pro-
vide
sufficient
information
on
which
to
build
an
adequate
theory
covering
that
class
of
phenomena.
The
following
discussion
is
concerned
primarily
with
the
generalist
argument.
This
argument
says,
in
effect,
that
spe-
cialized
concentration
on
a
given
type
of
conflict will
lead
to
the
neglect
of
certain
facts
or
principles
which
are
essential
to
an
adequate
understanding
of
that
kind
of
conflict.
This
implies
that
a
special
theory
(for
example
a
theory
of
interpersonal,
marital,
intraorganizational,
community,
in-
terethnic,
class,
or
international
conflict)
will
be
inadequate
to
the
extent
that
it
is
not
informed
by
comparison
with
the
other
types
or
not
imbedded
in
a
more
general
theory
of
conflict.
The
scientific
value
of
a
general
theory
thus
lies
in
its
ability
to
provide
greater
understanding
of
each
par-
ticular
kind
of
conflict
than
can
be
provided
by
the relevant
special
theory,
and
con-
sequently
to
provide
a
better
account
of
the
entire
domain
of
conflict
phenomena
than
could
be
provided
by
the
total
set
of
special
theories.
Objections
to
a
General
Theory
SPECIALIST
AND
IDIOGRAPHIC
ARGUMENTS
The
generalist
view
is
disputed
by
some
writers,
who
question
both
the
necessity
and
the
desirability
of
treating
several
kinds
of
conflict
as
a
single
empirical
domain,
on
grounds
that
crucial
aspects
of
each
par-
ticular
kind
of
conflict
are
inevitably
over-
looked
by
theories
of
greater
generality.
For
example,
Hager et
al.
(1956)
argue
that
the
effort
to
understand
religious
conflicts
in
the
same
framework
as
ethnic
and
racial
conflicts,
as
recommended
by
Williams
(1947),
had
failed
because
of
certain
fundamental
peculiarities
of
religion
and
religious
groups.
Similarly,
Janowitz
(1957)
argues
that
the
effort
to
subsume
the
phenomena
of
war
under
a
general
theory
of
conflict
would
probably
fail,
because
several
unique
properties
of
nation-states
and
their
military
institutions
require
a
detailed
analysis
not
provided
by
general
theories
of
conflict.
Directly
contradicting
the
generalist
argument,
these
writers
assert
that
a
special
theory
for
a
given
kind
of
conflict
can
provide
greater
understanding
of
the
relevant
phenomena
than
could
be
provided
by
a
more
general
theory.
These
specialist
arguments
imply
that
true
knowl-
edge
of
war
or
of
religious
conflict
consists
in
fully
understanding
the
unique
properties
peculiar
to
each
class
of
phenomena,
rather
than
in
subsuming
them
under
more
general
principles.
If
taken
to
the
extreme,
emphasis
on
the
uniqueness
of
special
cases
becomes
indis-
414
tinguishable
from
an
idiographic
approach
to
knowledge,
which
holds
that
&dquo;true
knowl-
edge
is
of
particulars&dquo;
(K.
Singer,
1949a).
Aron
(1957)
comes
close
to
this
position
when
he
argues
that
war
is
best
studied
by
historical
sociology,
rather
than
by
theo-
retical
sociology,
on
grounds
that
each
war
is
a
unique
configuration
of
diverse
and
not
necessarily
repeatable
elements.
Applied
to
other
domains,
such
idiographic
arguments
would
rule
out
not
only
general
theories
of
conflict
but
also
special
theories
of
war,
of
religious
conflict,
or
of
any
other
class
of
conflict
phenomena.
Not
only
each
war,
but
each
instance
of
conflict
would
have
to be
analyzed
in
its
own
right
from
a
historical
or
clinical
viewpoint.
Granting
the
validity
of
an
idiographic
approach
for
certain
purposes,
its
emphasis
on
the
peculiarities
of
the
single
case
is
justifiable
and
self-consistent.
However,
once
one
admits
the
possibility
of
a
special
theory
for
one
class
of
conflict
phenomena,
the
entire
discussion
is
shifted
into
a
nom-
othetic
framework,
since
even
the
most
limited
special
theory
aims
to
generalize
about
properties
shared
by
all
instances
of
a
given
type.
In
that
framework,
it
becomes
difficult
to
set
arbitrary
limits
on
how
far
one
may
fruitfully
and
validly
generalize.
If
the
uniqueness
of
the
single
case
poses
no
inherent
obstacle
to
a
special
theory
which
generalizes
about
a
limited
set
of
such
cases,
then
why
should
the
uniqueness
of
a
single
class
of
phenomena
pose
any
greater
obstacle
to
a
more
general
theory
covering
several
such
classes?
The
idio-
graphic
and
specialist
objections
express
a
belief
that
moving
to
higher
levels
of
gen-
erality
necessitates
loss
of
information
and
thus
less
valid
knowledge.
In
principle,
such
objections
can
be
overcome
by
con-
structing
theories
which
treat
the
unique
properties
of
each
case
or
of
each
subclass
as
specific
values
of
theoretical
variables,
or
as
parameters
defining
the
limits
of
special
subtheories.
If
such
a
theory
provides
a
satisfactory
account
of
both
the
similarities
and
the
differences
among
the
phenomena
in
its
empirical
domain,
then
it
can
be
judged
adequate,
no
matter
how
general
it
happens
to
be.
THE
GRADUALIST
ARGUMENT
Idiographic
objections
to
a
general
theory
of
conflict
raise
the
issue
of
whether
the
kind
of
knowledge
embodied
in
such
a
theory
is
desirable
or
even
possible.
A
second
kind
of
objection
takes
for
granted
the
desirability
and
attainability
of
gen-
eralized
knowledge
about
conflicts,
but
raises
the
issue
of
whether
the
immediate
construction
of
a
general
theory
is
the
best
strategy
for
attaining
it.
For
example,
Dahrendorf
(1958)
argues
that
a
general
theory
of
conflict
is
a
necessary
component
of
a
comprehensive
theory
of
society,
but
that
the
sociological
theory
of
conflict
&dquo;would
do
well
to
confine
itself
for
the
time
being
to
an
explanation
of
the
frictions
between
the
rulers
and
the
ruled
in
given
social
structural
organizations,&dquo;
i.e.,
to
build-
ing
a
theory
of
class
conflict
(p.
173).
He
bases
this
position
on
Merton’s
(1957,
1967)
view
that
empirically
testable
&dquo;theo-
ries
of
the
middle
range&dquo;
are
the
immediate
task
of
sociological
research,
together
with
the
assertion
that
a
theory
of
class
conflict
is
a
middle
range
theory
(Dahrendorf,
1959,
p.
x).
Merton’s
case
for
middle
range
theory
is
based
on
a
broadly
inductivist
image
of
scientific
progress,
in
which
successively
more
general
levels
of
theoretical
integration
are
achieved
gradually,
each
higher
level
theory
representing
a
consolidation
of
sev-
eral
empirically
well-grounded
lower
level
theories.
In
this
view,
the
ultimate
goal
of
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