Social Preferences as an Individual Difference in Offender Decision-making

• Published date: 01 February 2019
• Date: 01 February 2019
• DOI: 10.1177/0022427818798684
• Subject Matter: Articles

Article

Social Preferences

as an Individual

Difference in Offender

Decision-making

Chae M. Jaynes

1

and Thomas A. Loughran

2

Abstract

Objectives: We examined the relationship between social preference game

behavior and offender status and tested whether this relationship was

attributed to genuine prosocial preferences or confounded by individual

differences in future orientation, sensation seeking, and risk-taking. Meth-

ods: Offender and nonoffender samples played the dictator and ultimatum

games. Ordered and generalized ordered logistic regression models were

used to test the hypothesis that when compared to nonoffenders, offenders

would demonstrate increased self-interest, while also considering compet-

ing theoretical mechanisms. Results: Offenders appeared to be more

self-interested as in dicated by smaller offer s in the dictator game. T his

relationship, however, was attributed to differences in future orientation

between the two groups rather than differences in social preferences. Net

of demographic controls and competing theoretical mechanisms, however,

offenders made smaller offers in the ultimatum game. We argue this finding

revealed differences in strategic decision-making between the two groups.

1

Department of Criminology, University of South Florida, Tampa, FL, USA

2

The Pennsylvania State University, State College, Pennsylvania, PA, USA

Corresponding Author:

Chae M. Jaynes, Department of Criminology, University of South Florida, 4202 E. Fowler Ave.,

SOC 107, Tampa, FL 33620, USA.

Email: jaynes@usf.edu

Journal of Research in Crime and

Delinquency

2019, Vol. 56(1) 129-169

ªThe Author(s) 2018

Article reuse guidelines:

sagepub.com/journals-permissions

DOI: 10.1177/0022427818798684

journals.sagepub.com/home/jrc

Conclusions: Results suggested that offenders were not distinguishable from

nonoffenders by individual differences in social preferences. While nonof-

fenders made larger offers in both games, this finding was attributed to

differences in temporal orientation and risk-taking rather than differences

in prosocial preferences. This supported the rational choice assumption of

self-interest and highlighted differences in strategic decision-making

between offenders and nonoffenders.

Keywords

rational choice, social preferences, future orientation, sensation seeking,

risk-taking

Criminologists have long sought to explain why some individuals commit

crime and others do not. To answer this question, rational choice theory

(RCT) assumes that individuals are naturally self-interested and decide to

commit crime if the perceived benefits outweigh the costs (Becker 1968;

Cornish and Clarke 1986). While RCT has traditionally focused on external

circumstances influencing the decision to offend, scholars have argued that

RCT can be enhanced through also considering internal and more enduring

“individual differences,” which influence cost–benefit considerations

(Nagin and Paternoster 1993; Piquero et al. 2011). An individual difference

perspective emphasizes that offenders and nonoffenders differ in their

decision-making calculus due to individual-level characteristics, which pre-

dispose them to crime such as differences in their self-control (Gottfredson

and Hirschi 1990; Nagin and Paternoster 1993, 1994; Wilson and Herrn-

stein 1985), IQ (Thomas, Loughran, and Piquero 2013), tendencies for risk

or sensation seeking (Horvath and Zuckerman 1993; Zuckerman 1994), and

decision-making competence (Paternoster and Pogarsky 2009; Paternoster,

Pogarsky, and Zimmerman 2011). Although RCT scholars have suggested

many individual differences influence the decision to offend, they have

rigidly maintained the theoretical assumption that individuals do not vary

in their level of self-interest.

The origin of the self-interest assumption within RCT is Smith’s ([1776]

2003) seminal work, The Wealth of Nations. Within this text, Smith ([1776]

2003) described self-interest and competition as the “invisible hand,” which

guides the economy—an assumption which became foundational for eco-

nomics. Becker (1968) then extended the traditional analyses of choice and

presumption of self-interest to the study of crime. Becker’s (1968) work

130 Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 56(1)

underscored individuals as self-serving when he theorized, “a person com-

mits an offense if the expected utility to him exceeds the utility he could get

by using his time and other resources at other activities” (p. 176, emphasis

not given in the original). Similarly, when Cornish and Clarke (1986:2)

constructed their policy-based rational choice perspective, they stated, “Its

starting point was an assumption that offenders seek to benefit themselves

by their criminal behavior.”

Others, however, have argued that RCT may be flawed in its overarching

assumption of homogenous self-interest. For instance, Sampson and Laub

(2005:38) criticized RCT for n ot including an explanation of “at titudes

towards others,” which may guide decision-making. Similarly, in his Amer-

ican Society of Criminology Presidential Address, Agnew (2014:1) urged

the field explore an “expanded view of human nature” and move beyond

pure self-interest as “perhaps the core assumption of criminology.” Beha-

vioral economists have also been critical of the self-interest assumption, as

for years they have demonstrated predictable ways in which behavior devi-

ates from traditional economic expectations and there appears to be evi-

dence of social preferences for altruistic or prosocial behavior (e.g., Fehr

and Fishbacher 2002; Kahneman, Knetsc h, and Thaler 1986). Although

social scientists have become increasingly discontent with the notion of

pure self-interest, there has been very little discussion within RCT regard-

ing potential heterogeneity in social preferences or empirical tests of an

association with offending.

This article sought to fill this theoreticalvoidbyrelaxingtheRCT

assumption of homogenous self-interest. In doing this, we proposed that

some individuals may have preferences for behaving more prosocially than

others, where prosocial behavior was defined as actions which increase the

welfare of others. Conversely, some individuals may have preferences for

behaving less prosocially, or even antisocially, acting in ways that decrease

the welfare of others. In this sense, we conceptually aligned “social pre-

ference” and “self-interest” such that they were inversely related—a very

self-interested individual has little concern for the welfare of others. Taken

a step further, we hypothesized that offenders may be distinguished from

nonoffenders by individual differences in their social preferences. We then

used an offender and nonoffender sample from the Delawar e Decision-

making Study (DDMS) to examine the relationship between offender status

and social preferences. Social preferences were measured through behavior

in the dictator and ultimatum games, two methods commonly employed

within behavioral economics to detect deviations from self-interest (For-

ythse et al. 1994; Gu

¨th, Schmittberger, and Schwarze 1982; Kahneman

Jaynes and Loughran 131