Social Networks and the Targeting of Vote Buying

• Author: Cesi Cruz
• DOI: 10.1177/0010414018784062
• Published date: 01 March 2019
• Date: 01 March 2019

https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414018784062

Comparative Political Studies

2019, Vol. 52(3) 382 –411

© The Author(s) 2018

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DOI: 10.1177/0010414018784062

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Article

Social Networks

and the Targeting

of Vote Buying

Cesi Cruz1

Abstract

The social networks of voters have been shown to facilitate political

cooperation and information transmission in established democracies. These

same social networks, however, can also make it easier for politicians in new

democracies to engage in clientelistic electoral strategies. Using survey data

from the Philippines, this article demonstrates that individuals with more

friend and family ties are disproportionately targeted for vote buying. This

is consistent with the importance of other social factors identified in the

literature such as reciprocity, direct ties to politicians, and individual social

influence. In addition, this article presents evidence supporting an additional

mechanism linking voter social networks to the targeting of vote buying: social

network–based monitoring. Voters with larger networks are both more

sensitive to the ramifications of reneging on vote buying agreements and are

primarily targeted for vote buying in contexts where monitoring is necessary.

Keywords

vote buying, clientelism, social networks, political economy, elections, and

voting behavior

Illegal electoral strategies are prevalent in many consolidating democracies.

Among these strategies is vote buying, a form of political exchange in which

politicians give gifts or money to individuals in exchange for electoral support

1The University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada

Corresponding Author:

Cesi Cruz, Department of Political Science, Vancouver School of Economics, The University

of British Columbia, 1866 Main Mall, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada V6T 1Z1.

Email: cesi.cruz@ubc.ca

784062CPSXXX10.1177/0010414018784062Comparative Political StudiesCruz

research-article2018

Cruz 383

(Hicken, 2011).1 In the context of a secret ballot, vote buying hinges on the

ability of politicians and brokers to ensure that voters are keeping their end of

the agreement. Consequently, a key consideration for politicians engaging in

vote buying is to target voters who are either easily monitored or do not need

to be monitored at all.2

This article uses unique survey data from the Philippines to show that

voter social networks have important features for facilitating compliance

with vote buying agreements. Consequently, individuals with larger social

networks (more friend and family ties) are disproportionately targeted for

vote buying. Furthermore, these networks of voters exercise an effect inde-

pendent of other social aspects of political exchange. The relationship

between voter social networks and the targeting of vote buying persists even

when accounting for other social or cultural factors identified in the litera-

ture: reciprocity (Finan & Schechter, 2012; Lawson & Greene, 2014), voter

ties to politicians or brokers (Auyero, 2000; Brusco, Nazareno, & Stokes,

2004; Fafchamps & Labonne, 2013; Stokes, Dunning, Nazareno, & Brusco,

2013), and individual political influence (J. Schaffer & Baker, 2015).

This article also suggests an additional mechanism to those previously

identified in the literature: social network–based monitoring. Voter social

networks facilitate political exchange in two related and complementary

ways: by providing politicians with additional means of monitoring voters in

groups and fostering additional group-level incentives for voters to comply

with vote buying agreements.

First, even though the individual vote may be secret, politicians can more

easily infer the vote choices of voters embedded in social groups, especially to

the extent that these groups overlap with precincts or readily identifiable con-

stituencies. Larreguy, Marshall, and Querubín (2016) demonstrate the impor-

tance of aggregate monitoring capability for politicians to extract greater

effort from brokers, resulting in higher turnout and votes.3 Similarly, Rueda

(2017) shows that precincts and polling stations with fewer voters are more

attractive for politicians buying votes because the smaller groups of voters

facilitate aggregate monitoring. In countries like the Philippines, voter social

networks can similarly allow politicians to engage in group-level monitoring.

Second, having a large social network can also change individual percep-

tions regarding the decision to renege on vote buying agreements, because of

potential group-level ramifications of falling out of favor with politicians

(Smith, Bueno de Mesquita, & LaGatta, 2011). While consistent with the

literature on reciprocity, this mechanism relies only on the assumption that

individuals perceive a sense of obligation within their social circle, creating

incentives to comply with vote buying agreements even if only to avoid

potential reprisals for the group.