Social movements and the state's construction of identity: The case of Muslims in France

• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1108/S1059-4337(2011)0000054006
• Date: 22 February 2011
• Pages: 45-75
• Published date: 22 February 2011
• Author: Jennifer Fredette

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND

THE STATE’S CONSTRUCTION

OF IDENTITY: THE CASE OF

MUSLIMS IN FRANCE

Jennifer Fredette

ABSTRACT

In this chapter, I argue that the activism of Muslims in France is complex

and diverse and illustrates the equally diverse politics and life experiences

of these Muslims. For all the disagreement among French activists who

are Muslim, they are united in their opposition to an elite frame of failed

citizenship and their efforts to project a new image of French Muslims

that is thoroughly French. In this sense, we cannot understand French

Muslim activism without considering French elites, particularly the

government, and their role in shaping Muslim identity in France.

What is French Muslim identity? It is dangerous, it is un-French, and it is –

most importantly – a construct produced by elites rather than by France’s

Muslims themselves. There is little consensus among France’s Muslims about

what it means to be Muslim, what political goals to pursue, or even how to

pursue them. Where we do see agreement among French Muslims is in their

rejection of this elite discourse about Muslims. Given the political, religious,

Special Issue: Social Movements/Legal Possibilities

Studies in Law, Politics, and Society, Volume 54, 45–75

Copyright r2011 by Emerald Group Publishing Limited

All rights of reproduction in any form reserved

ISSN: 1059-4337/doi:10.1108/S1059-4337(2011)0000054006

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and socioeconomic diversity among the Muslim population in France, it is

unlikely that Muslims would form a ‘‘social movement’’ in the sense of a

relatively cohesive group with an appreciation of its own commonality and

shared purpose. This is contrary to what French elites today suggest, stoking

fires about ‘‘communalist’’ Muslims and their desire for an identity-based

politics. If therewere any chance for a coordinated politicalmovement among

France’s Muslims, it would be based on this refusal of elite discourse, and yet

still rife with what Zald and McCarthy (1987) call ‘‘dissensus’’ (p. 82).

In this chapter, I argue that the activism of Muslims in France is complex

and diverse and illustrates the equally diverse politics and socioeconomic

experiences of these Muslims. For all the disagreement among French

activists who are Muslim, they are united in their opposition to this frame

of failed citizenship and their efforts to project a new image of French

Muslims that is thoroughly French. In this sense, we cannot understand

French Muslim activism without considering French elites, particularly the

government, and their role in shaping Muslim identity in France. Muslim

activists in France are increasingly challenging the elite view of Muslim

identity, but on a more abstract level, the diversity of their activism and the

rather traditional French political methods they use also challenge the elite

depiction of Muslims as monolithic and un-French.

French elites are correct that the terms of citizenship are being renegotiated

in France, but not exactly in the way they suggest. French Muslims are

not rejecting France. Some of them are calling for a reconsideration of

purely difference-blind republicanism, but they still embrace the values of the

republic, even the ideas behind laı¨cite

´.

1

Moreover, most of France’s Muslims

are, contrary to elite fears,united in their call for Frenchelites to stop rejecting

them. This particular case encourages sociolegal scholars to remain mindful of

the nonlegalways in which governmentexercises social controland stigmatizes

populations. In France today, government institutions and the discourse

of politicians (along with assistance from the media and intellectuals) set the

terms of public debate about Muslims and Islam. French Muslim activists are

not only concerned with law on the books or even law in action but also with

these nonlegislative moves to define and control a ‘‘Muslim problem.’’

IMAGINING AND CONSTRUCTING A MUSLIM

IDENTITY: ELITE DISCOURSE AND

GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTIONS

It is true that there are laws that affect Muslims in France – for example, the

2004 law on secularity and conspicuous religious symbols in public schools,

JENNIFER FREDETTE46