Social Justice, Economics, and the Implications of Nominalism.

• Author: Smith, R. Scott
• Position: Viewpoint essay

The social justice movement (SJM) is galvanizing attention to a number of issues, such as racism, discrimination based on sex or gender, environmental exploitation, and economic justice. In terms of the latter, one aspect that SJM proponents have targeted is disparities in the distribution of wealth, as reflected, for example, in the increasing gap between the wealthy and the poor, arguing that these disparities are due to discrimination of an immoral kind (Sowell 2018, 21). (1) Yet, interestingly, some key philosophical assumptions behind social justice as it is advocated in SJM have rarely been discussed, let alone assessed. These assumptions include critical theory (CT), with its commitments to materialism and historicism. In addition, CT is wed to nominalism, roughly the theory that only particular things exist; unlike in realism, in nominalism there are no universal, literally shareable qualities in reality.

With its emphasis upon justice, the SJM necessarily intersects with the field of ethics. Yet in the history of Western ethics since at least the sixteenth century there has also been a decidedly nominalist influence. Moreover, with its interest in just distributions of wealth, the SJM has major implications for economics. Yet economics also has been shaped by nominalism, at least in the way economics tries to operate as a science, for science has been deeply affected by nominalism through the Scientific Revolution.

Although it may seem to some that as a metaphysical theory nominalism may be irrelevant to the practice of economics and even to the recognition of injustices, nonetheless I argue that justice, economic practice, and the SJM actually presuppose a different view of what is real than nominalism. Nominalism undermines justice itself and even economic practice. Thus, ironically, because of its nominalist disposition the SJM actually cannot hope to give us social justice, including in economics.

To help accomplish this task, first I survey the philosophical assumptions in the SJM, with a focus on CT and its assumed nominalism. Second, I draw connections between the SJM's appeal to justice and how justice has been understood in light of the history of Western ethics since the time of Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679). In short, ethics (and thus justice) basically has been treated nominalistically, a move that reduces justice to power, as Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) foresaw. Third, I explore the importance of nominalism in economics, particularly in light of its influence upon science.

Then, fourth, I assess the impact of nominalism on social justice by examining how nominalism undermines justice. I also show how nominalism subverts economics. Thus, with its dependency upon nominalism, the SJM undercuts itself. However, I then explore a counterargument that even if my philosophical arguments are cogent, nonetheless we still can engage practically in economics and recognize injustices quite successfully. If so, then it seems my philosophical objections might be suited simply for abstract theorizing and ivory-tower disputes. As a concluding suggestion, social justice, including in economics, is not indifferent to ontology. There must be a different theory of what is real other than nominalism that can account for the reality of justice and the practice of economics, one that will constrain and shape the many cries for justice coming from the SJM.

Some Key Philosophical Assumptions of the SJM

One of the central theories informing the SJM is CT, which began in the Frankfurt School in Germany. The school brought together many German philosophers and social theorists working in the western European Marxist tradition, including Max Horkheimer (1895-1973) and Herbert Marcuse (1898-1979). CT draws upon the belief that disparities are due to immoral discrimination, usually against groups of people. To achieve social justice, these groups need to be liberated from their oppression by the powerful. SJM supporters focus on social structures and systemic evils embedded within them, which oppress people.

For Horkheimer, a CT seeks "emancipation from slavery," domination, and oppression, with the goal of liberating humans "to create a world which satisfies the[ir] needs and powers" ([1972] 1982,246). More than just a philosophical theory, CT aims to be both prescriptive and descriptive by drawing upon the social sciences and philosophy in social inquiry. Philosophy provides its contribution by organizing and defining problems from empirically gathered resources toward the objective of "decreasing domination and increasing freedom in all their forms" (Bohman 2005).

Like Karl Marx (1818-83), Horkheimer sees reason as historicized, which stresses the "historical situatedness of each individual consciousness as a particular moment" (Thornhill 1998). CT is a nominalist theory, for historicism emphasizes particulars and rejects the reality of universals. As such, CT focuses on discrete, historical particulars (not abstract, universal ideas or principles), which determine cultural phenomena.

As a historicist, Horkheimer denies that we can access reality directly. We instead always work from our situated, historically located standpoints, being unable to transcend them and gain direct access to reality. Thus, all our knowledge is aspectual, having been drawn from contingent, limited, and particular vantage points.

Also like Marx, Horkheimer embraces materialism in ontology. Foreshadowing more contemporary arguments, he claims that "materialism requires the unification of philosophy and science" ([1972] 1982, 24). In addition, Horkheimer sees individual humans as concrete particulars and not in terms of a universally common nature. Their freedom is grounded in their holistic relation to social totality and nature (Bohman 2005). Humans seem to be holistically embedded in nature, as though they are nothing but material beings.

So far we have seen how CT stresses the nominalist emphasis upon particulars. Yet nominalism has some additional features that distinguish it from realism. First, I explore realism. Consider two red delicious apples. On a realist view, the two apples literally share the same qualities: both have the same nature, and both have the same red color instanced in them. Or consider two people who have the character quality of being just. On Aristotle's realist virtue ethics, they literally share the same virtue, justice, which is instanced in both of their souls. These shareable qualities are called universals: each one is one thing in itself, yet it can be instanced (be present) in many individuals. So, for example, there is a quality of justice, yet this very same quality can (and should) be instanced in many people. For this reason, a universal often is called a "one-in-many." Plato's universals (the "forms") are metaphysically abstract; that is, they themselves are not located in space and time as such. Justice, redness, and "appleness" are examples of his universals. Nevertheless, they...