Smuggling Armageddon.

• Author: Neve, Thomas

Smuggling Armageddon

Rensselaer W. Lee III (New York: St. Martin's Griffin Press, 2000) 220 pp.

Since the demise of the Soviet Union almost a decade ago, the United States' strategic relations with Russia have shifted from the containment of nuclear war to trying to prevent nuclear proliferation. The end of communism and the economic collapse of Russi--combined with the disintegration of the Soviet empire--and the resulting relaxation of control over the vast nuclear arsenal still poses a significant risk to the international community Although Ukraine and Belarus committed to returning the deployed nuclear weapons based on their soil to Russia in 1991, the facilities and nuclear materials remain there. The formerly "secret cities" where Soviet scientists designed and constructed tens of thousands of nuclear warheads are still standing, staffed by underpaid scientists who, no longer having any ideology to follow, are willing to sell their expertise and the materiel they oversee to the highest bidder.

Rensselaer Lee's new book Smuggling Armageddon is a thorough examination of the problem of nuclear smuggling and proliferation from Russia to the Newly Independent States (NIS) and across the globe. At a time when public attention has focused away from a possibility of apocalyptic nuclear destruction to nuclear terrorism, Lee's book capitalizes on the public's fears and perceptions of mafia-style networks of nuclear-age gangsters trading former Soviet bombs and nuclear materiel to "rogue" states. His empirical research greatly reinforces the professional policy-makers' portfolio on counter-proliferation. He also includes countless "true-story" examples that make the book an arresting read for the uninformed.

The book begins with an exploration of the extent, framework and characteristics of illegal nuclear trading. The author uses evidence gathered from the agencies involved in monitoring nuclear smuggling, both Russian and Western, to support his argument that although illegal nuclear proliferation is not widespread at the present time, it has the potential to grow. Lee surmises that organized crime networks do not involve themselves with nuclear smuggling due to the lack of potential buyers and the technical expertise needed to deal in these substances effectively. His empirical evidence, alongside multiple examples, points toward amateurs, small-time businessmen and entrepreneurs, as the main culprits in search of a quick profit by hawking...