Small Donors in Congressional Elections

• Published date: 01 September 2019
• Author: Michael P. McDonald,Tyler Culberson,Suzanne M. Robbins
• Date: 01 September 2019
• DOI: 10.1177/1532673X18763918
• Subject Matter: Articles

https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X18763918

American Politics Research

2019, Vol. 47(5) 970 –999

© The Author(s) 2018

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DOI: 10.1177/1532673X18763918

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Article

Small Donors in

Congressional

Elections

Tyler Culberson1, Michael P. McDonald2,

and Suzanne M. Robbins2

Abstract

Candidates raise substantial sums of money to compete in federal elections.

Scholars and election observers are concerned by potential corruption

related to the reliance on donors who make significant contributions. One

reform effort to counterbalance large donors is encouraging small donor

participation. Still, some worry that ideologically extreme candidates are

best able to raise small donations. We analyze internal U.S. Federal Elections

Commission data to examine small donor giving in the 2006 through 2010

U.S. House elections. We find small donors may expand the scope of

participation, in that the supply of small donors is unrelated to income and

that all types of candidates—incumbents, their challengers, and open seat

candidates—are equally adept at attracting small donors. Candidates in the

most competitive races raise the most in small contributions. We temper

reformers’ enthusiasm, finding that ideologically extreme incumbents tend

to raise more money from small donors.

Keywords

campaign finance, small donors, elections

1The Campaign Finance Institute, Washington, DC, USA

2University of Florida, Gainesville, FL, USA

Corresponding Author:

Suzanne M. Robbins, University of Florida, 205 Anderson Hall, P.O. Box 117325, Gainesville,

FL 32611-7011, USA.

Email: suzanne.robbins@ufl.edu

763918APRXXX10.1177/1532673X18763918American Politics ResearchCulberson et al.

research-article2018

Culberson et al. 971

Introduction

Donating to political campaigns is a form of political participation. Unlike

voting, where each eligible citizen has only one vote in a geographically con-

strained race, citizens can donate to more than one candidate, across multiple

jurisdictions, up to regulated limits. Much has been made of the political

inequality resulting from a donor class of “fat cats” who underwrite American

elections. Early research noted that “the bulk of political money is supplied

by a relatively small number of people” (Heard, 1962, p. 48). If, as studies

find, wealthy individuals are more likely to donate, and if elected officials are

responsive to these “monetary surrogate” constituents (Mansbridge, 2003, p.

523), then policy outcomes may favor the wealthy (e.g., Bartels, 2005), and

distort representation in favor of a minority with more resources (e.g., Farrar-

Myers & Dwyre, 2008). To counter the potential corrupting effect of large

donors, some in the reform community have revived arguments to empower

small and local donors thus “ . . . expanding the range of citizens who can

participate in the political process” (Bauer & Potter, 2013; see also Corrado,

Malbin, Mann, & Ornstein, 2010; Potter & Morgan, 2013).

Public concern over large donations and the merits of empowering small

donors date to the Progressive Era (Mutch, 2014; Weyl, 1913). Parties and

candidates have pursued the “small donor” over time, even if for little more

than good public relations. As then-Senator John Warner (R-VA) noted, “Of

all the sources of private monies, the most desirable and least controversial is

that contributed by instate individuals in small amounts” (cited in Rosenberg,

2002, p. 1). Despite the desirability of small donors, some argue candidates’

pursuit of small contributors is an inefficient use of campaign time and

resources (Gais, 1998; Heard, 1962; Sorauf, 1988). Candidates for federal

office must raise large sums of money to fund their expensive campaigns, so

it is more economical to raise money from a large donor than many small

donors. Advances in technology have perhaps changed this calculus by

reducing candidate costs to cultivate small donors (Christenson, Smidt, &

Panagopoulos, 2014; Malbin, 2013). Furthermore, a handful of places such

as New York City and Los Angeles have enacted reforms such as matching

small donations to encourage more small donor activity (Malbin, 2013;

Malbin, Brusoe, & Glavin, 2012); others advocate for publicly funded vouch-

ers that citizens may donate to candidates (i.e., Hasen, 2016).

What might be expected if reforms are adopted to encourage small dona-

tions and if candidates more often pursue them? Wilcox (2008) finds both

ideologically extreme and moderate candidates successfully use the Internet

to attract small donors. Moreover, ideologically extreme individuals are well

known to participate at high rates in voluntary campaign activities, including