Sixth Amendment Right To Trial By Jury

• Jurisdiction: Maryland

II. Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury

A. Applicability

1. Right to trial by jury is incorporated against the states but jury unanimity is not incorporated against the states

In Duncan, 391 U.S. at 149, the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury in criminal cases is incorporated against the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972), the Supreme Court held that, although the right to trial by jury is incorporated against the states, the requirement of jury unanimity is not incorporated against the states. Id. at 406.

2. Right to trial by jury is applicable only for serious offenses

The right to trial by jury applies only to serious offenses. In Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 68-69 (1970), the Supreme Court held that an offense is serious, for jury trial purposes, if there is authorized incarceration exceeding six months. See Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 148-49 (1969).

In Lewis v. United States, 518 U.S. 322, 330 (1996), the Supreme Court held that the requirement that potential incarceration exceed six months, in order to be serious for jury trial purposes, is not based on the cumulative potential sentence. Thus, charges are serious, entitling the defendant to trial by jury, only if potential incarceration exceeds six months on any given count. For example, if the defendant is charged, in one charging document, with five counts, each with a potential sentence of three months and an aggregate potential sentence of 15 months, it is not a serious offense for purposes of the right to trial by jury.

In Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 511 (1974), the Supreme Court held that, if there is no statutorily authorized incarceration, e.g., common law criminal contempt, the right to trial by jury is based on the amount of actual incarceration. See Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 211 (1968). In Wilkins v. State, 293 Md. 335, 338-40 (1982), the Court of Appeals held that a defendant cannot be imprisoned for longer than six months for direct criminal contempt without being afforded a jury trial.

In Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538 (1989), the Supreme Court recognized that a combination of (a) the seriousness of the offense; (b) imposition of other statutory penalties; and (c) incarceration may make an offense serious and entitle the defendant to trial by jury. The Court stated:

Although we did not hold in Baldwin that an offense carry ing a maximum prison term of six months or less automatically qualifies as a "petty" offense, and decline to do so today, we do find it appropriate to presume for purposes of the Sixth Amendment that society views such an offense as "petty." A Defendant is entitled to a jury trial in such circumstances only if he can demonstrate that any additional statutory penalties, viewed in conjunction with the maximum authorized period of incarceration, are so severe that they clearly reflect a legislative determination that the offense in question is a "serious" one.

Id. at 543. However, in Frank, 395 U.S. at 152, the Supreme Court held that there is no right to trial by jury when the maximum penalty is six months incarceration, notwithstanding the fact that a significantly longer period of probation could be imposed.

Under federal law, a defendant charged with criminal contempt has a right to trial by jury only when the sentence could exceed six months incarceration. In International Union, UMW v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 837-38 (1994), the...