Situational Predictors of Negotiation and Violence in Hostage and Barricade Incidents

• DOI: 10.1177/00938548211017926
• Date: 01 December 2021
• Published date: 01 December 2021
• Subject Matter: Articles

CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND BEHAVIOR, 2021, Vol. 48, No. 12, December 2021, 1770 –1787.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/00938548211017926

Article reuse guidelines: sagepub.com/journals-permissions

© 2021 International Association for Correctional and Forensic Psychology

1770

SITUATIONAL PREDICTORS OF NEGOTIATION

AND VIOLENCE IN HOSTAGE AND BARRICADE

INCIDENTS

DANIEL J. NELLER

Independent Practice

TIMOTHY C. HEALY

TAM K. DAO

SHANNON MEYER

Federal Bureau of Investigation

DANIELLE B. BAREFOOT

Independent Practice

We analyzed a data set containing 7,216 hostage and barricade incidents that had been reported to the Federal Bureau of

Investigation over a 35-year period. From two subsamples of the data set, we identified potential predictors of important

outcomes—resolution by negotiation or surrender and violence after onset. In a third subsample, we combined and weighted

the potential predictors to form two actuarial tools. We used three additional subsamples in the data set to cross-validate and

calibrate the scores of each tool. Predictive validity was acceptable across all subsamples.

Keywords: hostage; barricade; crisis; negotiation; violence prediction; risk assessment; HOBAS

Crisis incidents occur after conflicts go awry (Vecchi et al., 2005). The precipitants and

circumstances of such incidents vary widely (Grubb, 2020). Whereas some involve

distressed individuals contemplating suicide (e.g., Slatkin, 2003), others involve subjects

interrupted while committing criminal acts (e.g., McGowan, 2007). Still others involve

subjects who barricade themselves alone or with others after crimes or manhunts (e.g.,

AUTHORS’ NOTE: We are grateful to several colleagues, whose invaluable and steady support enabled us

to complete this project: Mark Flores, Scott Abagnale, Paul Dean, Mike DeVries, and Art Miller. We are also

grateful to colleagues who offered helpful comments: Robert Fein, Rick Frederick, Mary Rowe, and Mike

Vitacco. Opinions expressed in this article, along with any errors, are ours; they are not necessarily shared by

the U.S. Government, U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, or any other organization

with which any of us is affiliated. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Daniel J.

Neller, Independent Practice, P.O. Box 223, Southern Pines, NC 28388; e-mail: danieljneller@gmail.com; or

Timothy C. Healy, Crisis Negotiation Unit, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1 Range Road, Quantico, VA

22153; e-mail: tchealy@fbi.gov

1017926CJBXXX10.1177/00938548211017926Criminal Justice and BehaviorNeller et al. / HOSTAGE AND BARRICADE INCIDENTS

research-article2021

Neller et al. / HOSTAGE AND BARRICADE INCIDENTS 1771

Regini, 2002), or who take others hostage and make substantive demands in exchange for

their safe return (e.g., Pires et al., 2017).1

Crisis incidents transpire across a wide range of locations (Feldmann, 2001). Among

other places, they occur in homes (e.g., Wright, 1999), banks (e.g., Fuselier, 1999), schools

(Daniels et al., 2007), hospitals (e.g., Turner, 1988), forensic facilities (e.g., Vollm et al.,

2013), prisons (e.g., Katz, 2017), and airplanes (Dugan et al., 2005; M. A. Wilson, 2000).

Some take place across multiple locations (e.g., Amman & MacKizer, 2017).

The substantial majority of crisis incidents resolve following relatively rapid and suc-

cessful negotiation without harm to any participants (Butler et al., 1993). A minority involve

tactical interventions that end in the deaths of subjects (e.g., Donohue & Taylor, 2003;

Wesselius & DeSarno, 1983). And some resolve after violence is committed by subjects, in

which hostages, barricade victims, law enforcement officers, or bystanders are killed (e.g.,

Arin et al., 2019; Phillips, 2015). Among other factors, the very diversity and complexity of

crisis incidents pose a challenge for researchers and practitioners who seek to understand

the best ways to respond to these situations (Faure, 2003; Heppenstall & Hammond, 2018).

For decades the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has collected data on crisis inci-

dents (Lipetsker, 2004). Its centralized repository, Hostage and Barricade Database System

(HOBAS), contains reports of crisis incidents involving negotiations; the reports are volun-

tarily submitted mainly by other law enforcement agencies (Department of Justice, 2006).

Because of the voluntary nature of submissions, HOBAS might not sufficiently represent the

breadth of crisis incidents encountered by law enforcement officers (Mohandie & Meloy,

2010). In addition, as is common to law enforcement databases (cf. Canter & Youngs, 2009),

it is reasonable to expect HOBAS to contain many data omissions and coding errors.

Despite its possible limitations, HOBAS has many notable strengths that can advance

our understanding of crisis incidents. First, it is one of the largest databases of its kind. At

the time this article was prepared for publication, HOBAS contained information on more

than 9,000 crisis incidents. Second, HOBAS contains a wide breadth of case types, ranging

from barricades with or without victims to hostage-taking incidents involving subjects who

make substantive demands. Third, HOBAS contains data on crisis incidents that have

occurred across space and time, involving both domestic and international incidents and

covering multiple decades. (Personal communication with M. Flores, July 24, 2020).

A handful of researchers and practitioners have already utilized HOBAS to shed light on

crisis incidents. Murphy (2001) used HOBAS to quantitatively describe the features of

nearly 2,000 crisis incidents. Van Hasselt and colleagues (2005) used HOBAS to qualita-

tively describe a small sample of domestic violence-related incidents. Booth and colleagues

(2009, 2010) used HOBAS to quantitatively and qualitatively describe features of small

samples of captive-taking incidents in the contexts of domestic and workplace violence.

Small-scale descriptive and qualitative studies such as these contribute richly to our

understanding of crisis incidents (Daniels et al., 2015; Vecchi et al., 2013); however, they

do not leverage HOBAS in a way that generates actionable intelligence (cf. Bolz, 2001).

That is, prior studies involving HOBAS have not produced demonstrably robust informa-

tion or decision-making aids to inform incident commanders about the outcomes that matter

most to them—risk of violence and probability of resolution by negotiation or surrender

(RNS; for example, Noesner, 1999; Vecchi, 2002).

Indeed, aside from hostage situations transpiring outside of North America (e.g., Corsi,

1981; Yun & Roth, 2008), very few published studies have generated statistically based

decision-making aids, or actuarial tools, for use in crisis incidents. An exception involves a