Signaling Democratic Progress through Electoral System Reform in Post-Communist States

• Author: William O’Brochta,Patrick Cunha Silva
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/10659129211043865
• Published date: 01 December 2022
• Date: 01 December 2022

Article

PoliticalResearchQuarterly

2022,Vol.75(4)1037–1050

©TheAuthor(s)2021

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DOI:10.1177/10659129211043865

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SignalingDemocraticProgressthrough

ElectoralSystemReformin

Post-CommunistStates

WilliamO’Brochta

1

andPatrickCunhaSilva

2



Abstract

Theinternationalcommunityinvestsheavilyindemocracypromotion,buttheseeffortssometimesemboldenleadersnot

interestedintruedemocraticreform.Wedevelopandtestaformalmodelexplainingwhythisoccursinthecontextof

electoralsystemreform—oneofthemostimportantsignalsofdemocraticquality.Ourformalmodelcharacterizes

leadersaseithertrulyreformmindedorpseudo-reformers,thosewhoincreaseelectoralsystemproportionalityin

ordertoreceiveinternationalcommunitybenefitswhileengaginginelectoralfraud.Wehypothesizethattheinter-

nationalcommunitywillbemore(less)likelytodetectfraudwhenleadersdecrease(increase)proportionality,regardless

ofwhetherthereisevidenceofnumericalfraud.Usingamixed-methodsapproachwithcross-nationalandcasestudy

datafrompost-Communiststates,wefindthattheinternationalcommunityisgenerallylesslikelytodetectfraud

followinganincreaseinproportionalityandviceversa.Wesuggestthatdemocracypromotersover-rewardperceived

democraticprogresssuchthatpseudo-reformersoftenbenefit.

Keywords

proportionality,electoralfraud,electoralsystemreform,democracypromotion,post-Communiststates

Introduction

Democraticgovernmentsandnon-governmentalorgani-

zationsspendbillionsofdollarseachyearpromoting

democracyindevelopingnations.Despitethetime,en-

ergy,andmoneythattheinternationalcommunitypours

intodemocracypromotion,theseeffortshaveproduced

mixedresults(e.g.,Goldsmith,2008).Indeed,scholars

haveidentifiedcaseswheredemocracypromotionresults

inunintendedconsequencesthatenablerecipientcountry

leaderstoobtainbenefitsfromtheinternationalcom-

munitywithoutmakingseriousdemocraticprogress(e.g.,

Asunkaetal.,2019).Howandwhydotheseunintended

consequencescomeabout?Wedevelopandtestthe

predictionsofaformalmodelthatcapturestheconditions

underwhichdemocracypromotionresultsinnotrue

democraticprogress.

Whiletheinternationalcommunityinvestsinawide

rangeofdemocracypromotionstrategies,electionsareof

particularinterest(Carothers,2009),assubstantialde-

mocratizationoftheelectoralprocessenablesthede-

velopmentofstrongoppositionparties,helpingtoensure

long-termpoliticalchange.Wefocusonreformsthat

changetheproportionalityofelectoralsystems.

1

Such

reformsarevisibletomembersoftheinternational

community:changingelectoralrulestypicallyinvolvesa

constitutionalamendment,legislativeapproval,orexec-

utiveorder.Moreimportantly,proportionalityreformsare

common.CrispandCunhaSilva(2020)showthatbe-

tween1980and2018,LatinAmericancountriesreformed

theirelectoralsystems44times.

Theinternationalcommunityhaslongbackedreform

effortstoincreaseelectoralsystemproportionalityand

seeminglyplacesweightonwhethercountryleadersdoso

(e.g.,Tomini,2014).Leadersperceivedasdemocratizing

standtogainfrominternationalorganizationswhovalue

democracypromotion.Evenweaksignsofdemocratic

progress—likeinstitutionalruleschanges—cangenerate

increasedinternationalgoodwill,favorableelectoralob-

servationreports,andforeignaid(Dimitrovaand

1

LouisianaTechUniversity,Ruston,LA,USA

2

WashingtonUniversityinStLouis,StLouis,MO,USA

CorrespondingAuthor:

WilliamO’Brochta,LouisianaTechUniversity,1308WestRailroad

Avenue,Ruston,LA71272,USA.

Email:obrochta@latech.edu