Shrink shrink shrink the Navy!

• Author: Preble, Christopher A.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, despite concerns over the Russian elections, it is time to prune the expensive maintenance of a worldwide naval presence.

The U.S. navy is a force in search of a mission, struggling to hold onto the budgetary and institutional gains made during the 1980s. For years, it organized itself around the Maritime Strategy, developed in 1986 to counter the potent Soviet naval fleet. Now, that plan is outdated. It was designed for the Cold War - a global confrontation that has been over for several years. The strategy and tactics of that era are valuable only as material for military historians.

A new strategy, promulgated in October, 1992, addressed only some of the changed conditions. In a white paper released jointly by the Secretary of the Navy, the chief of naval operations, and the commandant of the Marine Corps, the services articulated their vision of strategy and tactics for the coming years. The paper, ". . . From the Sea," candidly recognized that the old Maritime Strategy's focus on the Soviet Union no longer was relevant. While the 1993 Russian election results brought some concern, U.S. military strategists still regard the Cold War as over, but will keep an eye on future developments. The paper completely failed, however, to contemplate a major overhaul and reductions in force structure. Instead, the authors stated an amorphous goal of focusing "our procurement strategy on systems that best support the unique capabilities of the Navy and Marine Corps."

The underlying U.S. security strategy, as interpreted by the three military leaders, is equally vague, shifting from "a focus on a global threat" to one on "regional challenges and opportunities." The Navy's mission, in their view, should be to "help to shape the future in ways favorable to our interests by underpinning our alliances, precluding threats, and helping to preserve the strategic position we won with the end of the Cold War." Instead of the Soviet threat, the enemy appears to be "uncertainty" in any region deemed important to America's national interest.

Although the threat environment has changed, few specifics have been put forward about how the numbers and types of ships built and operated by the Navy will support a new over-all strategy. When asked to propose additional cuts in naval forces, military leaders have recommended eliminating only those ships already nearing the end of their serviceable lives, with no thought of how that action relates to the current situation. More serious thinking is required. Naval policy planners must be willing to dismantle some of the cornerstones on which the Maritime Strategy was built. At the very least, they must consider how a smaller U.S. Navy could accomplish the service's mission. The nation's political leaders must adopt a post-Cold War security strategy that includes a more limited, realistic role for the Navy.

Four basic principles should guide the development of a future naval force structure. First, downsizing the Navy is possible and desirable because of the dramatic geopolitical events that have taken place. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, there no longer is a large-scale, monolithic threat to American security. Although the post-Cold War world assuredly will be a disorderly place, aggressive powers that might wish America ill will be far smaller and less capable militarily than was the Soviet Union. Moreover, the U.S. possesses the most technologically advanced, well-trained, and well-maintained navy in the world. Its vast strength advantage relative to that of any competing naval force would not be eroded significantly by major reductions in manpower and equipment. As they are made, the post-Cold War Navy should be structured around far fewer aircraft carrier battle groups.

Second, the Navy should be composed primarily of smaller, less expensive multi-mission cruisers, destroyers, and frigates. Third, long-term strategy virtually should eliminate the practice of maintaining a forward presence in a particular geopolitical region (e.g., the Western Pacific, Mediterranean, or Arabian Gulf). The vague strategy put forward in ". . . From the Sea" failed to do that. The authors refused to recognize that the Navy's ability and readiness to respond to threats to vital U.S. interests, wherever they emerge, would not be hindered by stationing forces and conducting naval exercises close to home.

Finally, and most important, cuts in naval forces must be accompanied by a new national security strategy. The scope of military missions should be restricted sharply and various overseas commitments eliminated. The rules of conduct guiding the use of force must include a careful appraisal of America's vital interests by the nation's political leaders. If force reductions are made, but the current practice of responding to myriad threats throughout the world remains unchanged, serious problems will arise. As fewer and fewer naval assets are stretched to the limit to cover excessive global commitments, and as deployments and time away from home and family grow longer and longer, the erosion of morale will create a frustrated and weakened "hollow force."

The overwhelming strength of the U.S. Navy relative to that of the navy of any other world power is readily apparent. Regional infighting and a disintegrating military infrastructure have debilitated the once-powerful Soviet navy. That fleet largely has been divided among the successor republics of the-commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and probable further reductions and divisions will continue to degrade its over-all capabilities. The actual sizes of the "new" CIS fleets are subject to considerable debate; Russia, however, possesses the bulk of the remaining force.

Although the number of vessels in the various Russian fleets remains reasonably impressive, their readiness has been deteriorating steadily. Many ships sit idle in port without spare parts and, sometimes, even adequately trained crews. The financially beleaguered government in Moscow frequently lacks the funds to pay for routine maintenance, to say nothing of operating expenses.

In the final analysis, Russia possesses neither the resources nor the will to maintain a large blue-water (open-ocean) navy in the face of the daunting political and economic challenges at home. If the former Soviet fleet no longer poses a credible challenge to U.S. security, it is even more difficult to visualize such a challenge from any other country. The next largest 10 navies in the world - the United Kingdom, Japan, France, Germany, China, Spain, Italy, India, Russia, and Brazil - can not even approach the U.S. in numbers and technology. For instance, America has 50% more aircraft carriers than do all of those navies - except that of Russia - combined. The U.S. Navy holds a virtual monopoly on guided - missile cruisers, has twice as many attack submarines as the nearest competitor, China, and more than twice as many ballistic-missile submarines as all those nations combined.

Given the overwhelming strength of the U.S. Navy and the absence of a major challenger to national security, America is afforded the considerable luxury in its long- term planning of merely maintaining the quality of superior forces already in place and simultaneously reducing the total number of ships in service by decommissioning aging and...