Should We Elect or Appoint State Government Executives? Some New Data Concerning State Attorneys General
| Author | William N. Thompson |
| Published date | 01 January 1974 |
| Date | 01 January 1974 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/027507407400800102 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
17
Should
We
Elect
or
Appoint
State
Government
Executives?
Some
New
Data
Concerning
State
Attorneys
General
WILLIAM
N.
THOMPSON
Political
Science
Department,
Western
Michigan
University
Kalamazoo,
Michigan
This
article
presents
data
which
may
be
useful
in
answering
an
often
asked
question:
should
we
elect
executive
officers
of
our
state
gov,;rnments,
or
should
they
be
appointed?
The
data
analyzed
here
concern
specifically
the
office
of
state
attorney
general.
While
au
states
have
an
elected
governor,
some
elect
no
other
executives,
and
others
independently
elect
as
many
as
ten
executives.
State
treasurers
are
popularly
elected
in
forty
states,
secretaries
of
state
in
thirty-nine,
state
auditors
in
thirty,
and
superintendents
of
education
in
twenty-six.
The
office
of
attorney
general
is
the
most
prevalent
elective
executive
office
subordinate
to
the
governor.
In
forty-two
states,
it
is
an
elective
position.
In
six
states,
Alaska,
Hawaii,
New
Hampshire,
New
Jersey,
Pennsylvania,
and
Wyoming,
the
governor
makes
appointments
to
the
post;
appointments
are
made
by
the
legislature
in
Maine
and
by
the
Supreme
Court
in
Tennessee.’
The
fact
that
many
executive
officials
are
independent
of the
control
of
the
governor
has
resulted
from
traditional
notions
of
state
government
which
are
over
one
hundred
years
old.
The
influence
of
Jacksonian
democ-
racy
saw
the
emergence
of
an
elected
governor
independent
and
co-equal
with
the
legislative
and
judicial
branches
of
government.
However,
co-
terminous
with
this
strengthening
of
the
governor’s
office
came
a
weaken-
ing ;
the
same
influence
of
Jacksonian
democracy
which
led
to
independence
of
the
governor
dictated
also
the
popular
election
of
the
governor’s
sub-
ordinates.
Many
states
which
had
originally
provided
for the
appointment
of
the
attorney
general
turned
to
the
practice
of
having
him
popularly
elected.
For
example,
Alabama’s
1819
constitution
provided
for
legislative
appointment,
but
in
1876,
the
office
became
popularly
elected.
Louisiana
provided
for
gubernational
appointment
in
1812,
for
popular
election
in
1852.
Michigan’s
first
State
charter
(1835)
provided
for
appointment
by
the
governor.
The
next
State
constitution
(1850)
stipulated
election.
Mis-
souri
established
an
appointive
office
in
1820,
but
changed
it
to
an
elective
1
See
Book
of
the
States,
1972-73.
18
one
in
1852 2
With
the
exception
of
Wyoming,
which created
an
appointive
office
in
1889,
and
Alaska
and
Hawaii,
which
continued
territorial
prac-
tices
by
making
the
State
office
appointive,
the
historical
trends
have
been
unidirectional.
Although
debates
have
flourished
in
almost
every
state
regarding
this
question,
no
state
has
ever
turned
the
office
from
an
elective
one
back
into
an
appointive
one.
The
same
is
not
true
for
other
state
offices.
The
numbers
of
states
independently
selecting
secretaries
of
state,
state
auditors,
treasurers,
and
superintendents
of
education
have
slowly
declined
in
recent
decades.
Although
a
counter
trend
to
the
traditions
of
Jacksonian
Democracy
has
not
affected
state
practices
to
a
great
extent,
a
marked
counter
attack
to
the
precepts
of the
multiple
election
of
executives
has
been
witnessed.
As
early
as
the
1880s,
arguments
were
heard
for
greater
centralization
of
power
and
responsibility
in
the
state
executive
branch.
A
young
Political
Science
Professor
at
Bryn
Mawr
College
wrote
in
1887:
Large
powers
and
unhampered
discretion
seem
to
me
the
indispensable
conditions of
responsibility.
Public
attention
must
be
easily
directed,
in
each
case
of
good
or
bad
administration,
to
just
the
man
deserving
of
praise
or
blame.
There
is
no
danger
in
power
if
only
it
not
be
irresponsible.
If
it
be
divided,
dealt
only
in
shares
to
many,
it
is
obscured;
if
it
be
obscured,
it
is
made
irresponsible.3
3
As
this
scholar,
Woodrow
Wilson,
was
about
to
enter
the
New
Jersey
governorship,
he
suggested
that
control
of
government
by
the
people
could
best
be
achieved
if
they
elected
&dquo;only
the
chief,
the
really
responsible
official&dquo;
and
then
allow
him
to
&dquo;appoint
all
minor
officials,
all
executive
agents.&dquo;4
This
theme
of
a
&dquo;Responsible
Executive&dquo;
has
been
repeated
in
scores
of
arguments
from
would-be
government
reformers
ever
since.
For
instance,
Terry
Sanford,
former
Governor
of
North
Carolina
argues:
Generally,
too
many
constitutions
require
the
election
of
too
many
state
officials,
forgetting
the
printers,
inspectors
of
hides,
and
surveyors,
too
many
officers
of
cabinet
rank
are
elected
by
the
people
under
specific
requirements
of
the
state
constitution.
It
is
argued
that
this
holds
government
closer
to
the
people,
that
the
2
See
Lewis
Morse,
"Historical
Outline
and
Bibliography
of
Attorneys
General
Reports
and
Opinions,"
XXX
Law
Library
Journal,
(1937),
pp.
39-245.
3
Woodrow
Wilson,
"The
Study
of
Administration,"
LVI
Political
Science
Quarterly,
(December,
1941)
pp.
497-8.
Reprint
of
1887
article
from
V.
2
of
the
same
Quarterly.
4
Woodrow
Wilson,
"Hide-and-Seek
Politics,"
CIXL
The
North
American
Review
,
(May,
1910),
p.
599.
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