Should the U.S. weaponize space?

• Author: Pena, Charles V.
• Position: National Affairs

CONTROL OF SPACE is at the crux of the debate about the future of American military policy. The question is not about militarizing space. Clearly, the U.S. has been using and will continue to use space for military purposes. However, whereas space assets are currently used to support terrestrial (ground, sea, and air) military operations, what Sen. Robert C. Smith (R.-N.H.), the Space Commission (which was chaired by current Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld), and others have proposed is that the U.S. move toward "weaponizing" space.

There are those who feel the U.S. is currently at risk and should act now to seize the military high ground in space. Smith believes that "control of space is more than a new mission area--it is our moral legacy, our next Manifest Destiny, our chance to create security for centuries to come." The Space Commission argues that "space is not simply a place from which information is acquired and transmitted or through which objects pass," and "the U.S. must have the capabilities to defend its space assets against hostile acts and to negate the hostile use of space against U.S. interests."

Critics of such a policy shift are concerned that weaponizing space could trigger a dangerous arms race. They are quick to point out that no country currently has weapons in space and that an American move to deploy them (either offensive or defensive) would only provide unneeded impetus for other nations to follow suit.

Jonathan Pike of Globalsecurity.org contends that weaponizing space "runs fundamentally against the main theme of our space policy for the last half-century--to demonstrate America's power in space in a nonthreatening way." Air Force Lt. Col. Peter Hays and Karl Mueller (both faculty members at the School of Advanced Airpower Studies) argue that "it is no longer clear that the relationship between space and national security is, or should be, shaped primarily by international military competition."

Is there truly a clear and present danger in space? Is becoming more militarily active in space the next logical step? The Space Commission's rationale for U.S. vulnerability in space is relatively straightforward:

* The U.S. is more dependent on space than any other nation.

* The American military is increasingly dependent on space systems.

* U.S. security and economic well-being depend on its ability to operate successfully in space.

* Nations hostile to the U.S. either possess or can acquire the means to destroy American space systems.

* U.S. space systems are vulnerable to a range of attacks.

Accordingly, the Space Commission warns that Washington has not paid sufficient attention to the threat and, as a result, "the U.S. is an attractive candidate for a `Space Pearl Harbor.'"

It is indeed true that the U.S. is more dependent on space than are other countries and that the American military in particular is becoming increasingly dependent on space systems. Furthermore, space systems are currently undefended and, therefore, potentially vulnerable to attack. It does not necessarily follow, though, that the U.S. will suffer a "Space Pearl Harbor."

The more immediate threat is not against satellites in space, but to the land-based facilities (launch and ground-control) associated with space systems. Indeed, the Space Commission and others recognize that it will be significantly easier for a hostile adversary to threaten ground elements. Those elements could be susceptible to a variety of actions, including direct military assault (e.g., with aircraft missiles), terrorist attacks, sabotage, and jamming. Since this is a more-likely and less-expensive way to disable satellite capability, the primary focus should not be on protecting satellites in space, but on increasing security and defenses for satellite ground stations and mitigating jamming by the use of encryption, antijamming equipment, and "frequency hopping," which avoids interference from jamming on a particular frequency by switching to a new one after transmitting or receiving a packet of data. When this method is employed, the signal can be...