Should juvenile adjudications count as prior convictions for Apprendi purposes?

• Jurisdiction: United States
• Date: 01 February 2004
• Author: Hochberg, Jeremy W.
• Published date: 01 February 2004
• Author: Hochberg, Jeremy W.

In Apprendi v. New Jersey, the Supreme Court held that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." (1) From this holding, the Court established the general rule that due process requires a jury to decide all issues leading to a sentence enhancement above the prescribed statutory maximum. The Court carved out a limited exception for prior convictions only. As a result, if a trial court judge finds that the defendant had a prior conviction, he may use this fact to enhance the defendant's sentence beyond a statutory maximum without submitting it to a jury. (2) The Third, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits are divided on the question of whether juvenile adjudications can and should be characterized as "prior convictions" for sentence enhancement purposes. (3) In addition to this circuit split, as of January 2004, one state supreme court already has weighed in on this issue. (4)

This Note examines the fundamental problems with allowing a judge to count juvenile adjudications as prior convictions for sentence enhancement purposes, within the meaning of the Apprendi exception, without carefully scrutinizing the circumstances of the adjudication. The Court's decision in Apprendi did not address "the unique issues that distinguish juvenile adjudications from adult convictions, such as the lack of a right to a jury trial." (5) Although it may be safe to assume these safeguards existed in prior adult convictions, it is a mistake for a court to assume, without further inquiry, that a juvenile received sufficient procedural safeguards in his juvenile adjudication. Moreover, courts should not assume that the "fact" of a juvenile adjudication always establishes that the juvenile was "guilty," because the traditional purpose of the juvenile court system is to rehabilitate, not to establish guilt.

In this Note, Part I examines the Apprendi exception for prior convictions and the Court's rationale behind this exception. Part II describes the circuit split among the Third, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits over whether a juvenile adjudication should count as a prior conviction for Apprendi purposes. Part III outlines the history and goals of the juvenile court system, specifically examining the fundamental tension between the juvenile justice system's treatment rationale and the adult criminal justice system's punishment rationale. Part IV surveys various states' current practices of using juvenile adjudications for sentence enhancement purposes. Part V analyzes the problems with characterizing a juvenile adjudication as a prior conviction for Apprendi purposes without carefully scrutinizing the juvenile adjudication to determine whether the juvenile received sufficient procedural safeguards for the court to rely on that proceeding. Part VI evaluates three different approaches--building on current case law--which the Court could take to resolve the circuit split. The Court could decide that juvenile adjudications always count as prior convictions, that they never count as prior convictions, or that juveniles should have the right to a jury trial. This Note argues, based on the fundamental legal and procedural differences between a juvenile adjudication and an adult conviction, the Court should not automatically allow a juvenile adjudication to count as a prior conviction without further inquiry. Finally, this Note concludes by recommending that a court scrutinize a juvenile adjudication to identify any factual issues and determine whether the juvenile received sufficient procedural safeguards before deciding whether that adjudication should count as a prior conviction and whether it needs to be submitted to a jury.

1. THE APPRENDI EXCEPTION FOR PRIOR CONVICTIONS

   1. Apprendi v. New Jersey

      In June 2000, the Supreme Court changed the course of sentencing law in the landmark decision Apprendi v. New Jersey. (6) The complex and frequently analyzed Apprendi decision rests on easily understood facts. On December 22, 1994, police arrested Charles C. Apprendi, Jr., for "fir[ing] several .22-caliber bullets into the home of an African-American family that had recently moved into a previously all-white neighborhood in Vineland, New Jersey." (7) That same day, Apprendi "made a statement--which he later retracted--that even though he did not know the occupants of the house personally, 'because they are black in color he does not want them in the neighborhood.'" (8) Apprendi pled guilty to two counts of firearm possession. (9) The prosecution reserved the right to seek an enhanced sentence under the New Jersey hate crime statute. (10) New Jersey law prescribed a sentencing range of five to ten years imprisonment for the most serious count, the possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose. (11) The law prescribed a range of ten to twenty years imprisonment for such an offense committed as a hate crime. (12) The trial judge sentenced Apprendi to twelve years in prison pursuant to this hate crime enhancement. (13)

      Apprendi appealed to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey, raising a Due Process Clause challenge to the hate crime statute. (14) He argued that "the finding of bias upon which his hate crime sentence was based must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt." (15) The New Jersey intermediate appellate court found that "the state legislature decided to make the hate crime enhancement a sentencing factor, rather than an element of an underlying offense," and therefore it need not be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. (16) A divided New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed, explaining that the statute "did not 'create a separate offense calling for a separate penalty.'" (17)

      The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the procedural due process question of "whether Apprendi had a constitutional right to have a jury find ... [racial] bias on the basis of proof beyond a reasonable doubt." (18) In a 5-4 decision, the Court adopted the principle that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." (19) The fact of a prior conviction allows a judge to enhance a sentence beyond the sentencing guideline range without submitting that fact to a jury.

   2. History of the Apprendi Exception

      The Apprendi exception for prior convictions is based on the Court's holding in Almendarez-Torres v. United States. (20) Almendarez-Torres involved a statute that authorized a maximum prison sentence of two years for an alien who returned to the United States despite previous deportation, (21) but a maximum prison sentence of twenty years for such an alien whose "initial 'deportation was subsequent to a conviction for [the] commission of an aggravated felony.'" (22) The question before the Court was "whether this latter provision defines a separate crime or simply [is a sentencing factor] authoriz[ing] an enhanced penalty." (23) The Court held: "[It] is a penalty provision, which simply authorizes a court to increase the sentence for a recidivist. It does not define a separate crime." (24) While normally elements of an offense must be stated "in the indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven by the [prosecution] beyond a reasonable doubt," the Almendarez-Torres Court held that a prior conviction does not face these requirements because recidivism is a sentencing factory. (25)

   3. Rationale Behind the Apprendi Exception

      In order to determine whether a juvenile adjudication should count as a prior conviction, it is necessary to analyze the rationale behind the exception. The Court's rationale for the prior conviction exception in Apprendi was that "the certainty that procedural safeguards attached to any 'fact' of prior conviction ... mitigated the due process and Sixth Amendment concerns otherwise implicated in allowing a judge to determine a 'fact' increasing punishment beyond the maximum of the statutory range." (26)

      The Court has not yet considered whether it is safe to assume that due process and procedural safeguards were adhered to in a juvenile adjudication. Although the Court held that it is sufficient for a judge to rely on the "fact" of a prior conviction, it nevertheless adopted its Apprendi exception for prior convictions only after scrutinizing the facts in Almendarez-Torres. In its interpretation of Almendarez-Torres, the Court noted that "Almendarez-Torres had admitted the three earlier convictions for aggravated felonies--all of which had been entered pursuant to proceedings with substantial procedural safeguards of their own." (27) The Court thus left open the issue of whether a juvenile adjudication would count as a prior conviction, within the meaning of Apprendi, if that adjudication lacked sufficient procedural safeguards. Indeed, while Justice Thomas joined the Apprendi majority in ruling that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt," his concurring opinion nevertheless suggests that he would reconsider the majority opinion in Almendarez-Torres which is the foundation for the Apprendi exception in the first place. (28)

      In Jones v. United States, the Court analyzed a triumvirate of procedural safeguards associated with prior convictions. (29) It stated, "unlike virtually any other consideration used to enlarge the possible penalty for an offense ... a prior conviction must itself have been established through procedures satisfying the fair notice, reasonable doubt, and jury trial guarantees." (30) The Court also emphasized the importance of the reasonable doubt and jury trial safeguards in Apprendi. The Court noted:

      [T]here is a vast difference...