Should Jurors be Informed about Parole Eligibility in Death Penalty Cases? An Analysis of Kelly V. South Carolina

• Published date: 01 September 2004
• Author: Rolando V. del Carmen,Dennis R. Longmire,Scott Vollum
• DOI: 10.1177/0032885504268187
• Date: 01 September 2004
• Subject Matter: Articles

10.1177/0032885504268187THE PRISON JOURNAL / September 2004Vollum et al. /KELLY V.SOUTH CAROLINA

SHOULD JURORS BE INFORMED

ABOUT PAROLE ELIGIBILITY

IN DEATH PENALTY CASES?

AN ANALYSIS OF

KELLY V.SOUTH CAROLINA

SCOTT VOLLUM

ROLANDO V. DEL CARMEN

DENNIS R. LONGMIRE

Sam Houston State University

The 5-to-4 decision by the U.S. Supreme Court in Kellyv. South Carolina represents

an important turning point in the death penalty sentencing procedure.Expanding on

their prior ruling in Simmons v. South Carolina, the Supreme Court, in Kelly, deter-

mined that a defendant is entitled to a jury instruction regarding parole eligibility

when the only alternative to a death sentence is life without paroleand the implication

of future dangerousnessis present. In this article, the controversial Kelly decision is

examined, and both the majority opinion and the two dissenting opinions are ana-

lyzed. The broad as well as the more specific implications and ramifications of this

important decision are presented.

Keywords: capital juries; death penalty jurisprudence; future dangerous-

ness; death penalty; capital punishment

I. INTRODUCTION

In Kelly v. South Carolina (2002), the U.S. Supreme Court revisited that

state’s attempt to keep a defendant’s parole eligibility out of the jury’s sen-

tencing consideration. Previously, in Simmons v. South Carolina (1994), the

Court held that, when a defendant’s future dangerousness is at issue and the

The authors gratefully acknowledge the insightful comments and helpful suggestions of the

anonymous reviewers. Address correspondence to Scott Vollum, College of Criminal Justice,

Sam Houston State University, Huntsville, TX 77341-2296; e-mail: stdsav12@shsu.edu.

THE PRISON JOURNAL, Vol. 84 No.3, September 2004 395-410

DOI: 10.1177/0032885504268187

© 2004 Sage Publications

395

only alternative to a death sentence is life in prison without parole (LWOP),

due process requires that the defendant be allowed to have the jury informed

through the trial judge’s instructions about parole ineligibility. In a 5-to-4

decision, the Kelly Court applied the Simmons rule and potentially changed

the face of the capital sentencing procedure in the United States.

This article examines the Kelly (2002) decision. Followinga discussion of

the facts, background, and opinions of the case, an analysis of the case is pre-

sented. The Court was divided in Kelly, yielding significant majority and dis-

senting opinions. Both will be assessed. The ramifications and implications

of Kelly—both its wide-reaching relation to death penalty jurisprudence and

its more specific impact on the capital case procedure—will be examined.

II. THE CASE

A. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On the evening of January 5, 1996, William Kelly attackedthe 23-weeks ’

pregnant manager of a Batesburg, South Carolina, fast-food restaurant. He

stabbed her 31 times, subsequently stole money from the cash register, and

left his victim to bleed to death. Kelly,who was 17 years old at the time, was

apprehended and, upon being read his Miranda rights, confessed to the mur-

der and robbery. Money and clothing stained with the victim’s blood were

found in his possession. Kelly was convicted of capital murder. The jury was

instructed by the trial court judge to determine whether any aggravating fac-

tors were present and whether to sentence Kelly to life in prison or death.

During the sentencing phase of the trial, the prosecution presented testi-

mony (a) that Kelly had made a knife while in prison for a prior conviction

and (b) that Kelly had participated in an escape attempt that included plansto

take female guards as hostages. On cross-examination of a psychologist, evi-

dence of Kelly’schildhood sadism and his desire to kill anyone who irritated

him was mentioned. In his closing argument, the prosecutor referred to Kelly

as “Bloody Billy” and the “Butcher of Batesburg.” The prosecutor also indi-

cated that Kelly was intelligent and, absent mental illness, asked the jury,

“Doesn’t that make somebody a little more dangerous?”

Based on Simmons (1994), counsel for Kelly requested an instruction by

the judge informing the jury that Kelly would be ineligible for parole if given

a life sentence. The judge refused by agreeing instead with the prosecution

that the state did not allege future dangerousness but, rather, that the evidence

presented by the prosecution had to do with the general character and charac-

teristics of the defendant. The trial judge concluded that Simmons did not

396 THE PRISON JOURNAL / September 2004