Should Irregular Immigrants Be (Rapidly) Enfranchised?
| Date | 01 June 2017 |
| Author | Kim Angell,Robert Huseby |
| DOI | 10.1177/1065912917695188 |
| Published date | 01 June 2017 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
research-article2017
Article
Political Research Quarterly
2017, Vol. 70(2) 363 –373
Should Irregular Immigrants
© 2017 University of Utah
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Be (Rapidly) Enfranchised?
https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912917695188
DOI: 10.1177/1065912917695188
journals.sagepub.com/home/prq
Kim Angell1 and Robert Huseby1
Abstract
Theories of voting rights differ quite sharply with regard to whether or not they support (rapid) enfranchisement of
irregular immigrants. In this paper, we first outline these theories and their implications. We then assess a number
of reasons against rapidly enfranchising irregular immigrants. We find, on reflection, that none of these reasons are
persuasive. While this result is not in itself sufficient to draw strong conclusions, it does offer some support to the
more inclusive theories of voting rights, and poses a challenge to the less inclusive ones.
Keywords
enfranchisement, irregular immigrants, the all-affected principle, the all-subjected principle, voting rights
Introduction
This includes the all-affected principle (AAP; Goodin
2007), the subjected to coercion principle (SCP; Abizadeh
The right to vote is vital, and the question of who should
2008; López-Guerra 2005), and the neo-republican prin-
have it is highly important.1 One group that is routinely
ciple (NRP; Sager 2014). Although these principles con-
denied this form of political participation is irregular immi-
stitute the ideal demos in different ways, we explicate that
grants.2 Irregular immigrants are resident non-citizens who
they all imply (rapid) enfranchisement of irregular immi-
have been denied (or not been granted) access by the
grants.5 This is done in the section “Theories of Democratic
state. They have no legal right to reside on its territory,
Inclusion: Enfranchising Irregular Immigrants?” There,
and although they typically plan to stay indefinitely, they
we also present an exception to these quite inclusive theo-
live under constant risk of expulsion. People in this group
ries: the social membership principle (SMP), according to
can ordinarily not apply for citizenship, and will often
which a person can claim voting rights only after having
remain political outcasts for the duration of their stay,
spent an extended period of time within the state (e.g.,
which in many instances lasts a lifetime.3
Carens 2005). The SMP thus coheres well with the pre-
Recent years have seen a surge in international migra-
sumed intuition against rapidly enfranchising irregular
tion. People flee from wars and failed states in search of
immigrants.
a safe haven and better life prospects in liberal democra-
Our aim is not to develop a new substantive position on
cies. Because of the restrictive practices just mentioned,
immigrant enfranchisement. Instead, we shall add to the
an increasing part of the inhabitants of such democratic
debate by providing a new perspective on the plausibility
states is kept from enfranchisement. Insofar as the history
of existing theories.6 In the section “The Intuition and
of modern democracy has largely been one of ever-
Possible Explanations of It,” we assess those reasons
increasing inclusion, the current restrictive practices
against enfranchising irregular immigrants that we find the
arguably amount to a discontinuation of that history.
most plausible and convincing. If we are correct, none of
Still, for many people, there will be something intuitively
these reasons can conclusively justify exclusion. The
correct about those restrictive practices. Regardless of the
upshot is that the more inclusive theories (AAP, SCP, and
theoretical reasons one might have for extending the right to
NRP) are strengthened, all else equal. If there are no good
vote, it would nonetheless seem wrong to rapidly enfran-
reasons against rapidly enfranchising irregular immigrants,
chise irregular immigrants. The aim of this paper is to criti-
cally assess that widespread intuition. Are there any good
reasons not to rapidly enfranchise irregular immigrants?4
1University of Oslo, Norway
The motivation for asking this question stems from the
observation that various existing voting rights principles have
Corresponding Author:
Robert Huseby, Department of Political Science, University of Oslo,
strikingly inclusive (and thus presumably counterintuitive)
P.O. Box 1097 Blindern, 0317 Oslo, Norway.
implications on the issue of enfranchising irregular migrants.
Email: roberthu@stv.uio.no
364
Political Research Quarterly 70(2)
the intuition against doing so is cast into doubt. This
This idea can be specified in different ways, turning on
removes (or at least attenuates) the problem that this intu-
what it means to be “relevantly affected” (Arrhenius
ition poses for the inclusive theories. The less inclusive
2005; Beckman 2009, 38–50). In its most prominent
voting rights principle (SMP), on the other hand, loses an
statement, AAP claims that everyone who is “possibly
apparent asset.
affected” by a political decision should be enfranchised
The support our analysis provides for the more inclu-
on it (Goodin 2007, 53–55). AAP advocates dramatic
sive theories, however, is both indirect and tentative. It is
increases in enfranchisement, within as well as outside a
indirect because we do not provide reasons in favor of
polity’s borders. In an increasingly globalized world,
enfranchising irregular immigrants. We only reject rea-
many domestic political decisions will possibly affect
sons against doing so. The support is, moreover, tentative
scores of foreigners. Within the polity’s borders, the
for several reasons. First, although the problem of coun-
expansion of enfranchisement will also be dramatic.
terintuitively enfranchising irregular immigrants can be
Insofar as the decisions of a polity will possibly affect
set aside, there might be other problems with all the
every inhabitant, the AAP will enfranchise irregular
inclusive theories. To provide an overall assessment of
immigrants. Moreover, because the state’s laws will pos-
their plausibility falls outside our present scope. Second,
sibly affect them from the moment they set foot on its
the less inclusive SMP might be vindicated on other
territory, they will be rapidly enfranchised.
grounds than the one we examine (and reject) here. Third,
An alternative view holds that one should have the
although we intend to assess the most relevant reasons
right to vote if one is subjected to (or “bound by”) the
against enfranchising irregular immigrants, we cannot
state’s decisions (cf. Dahl 1989, 120). To appreciate this as
claim to be exhaustive; other (more persuasive) reasons
a distinct alternative, consider the following example: if
might exist (including eventual improved versions of the
Germany passes a law demanding manufacturers on
reasons we discuss). Fourth, as mentioned, we expect that
German soil to build chimneys tall enough to carry emis-
the restrictive implication for irregular immigrant enfran-
sions to Scandinavia, this law would affect but not subject
chisement, which follows from SMP, will strike many as
Scandinavians (Goodin 2007, 49–50). Conversely,
intuitively correct. Those who maintain their stance
although a teetotaler will be subject to a law restricting the
against enfranchising irregular immigrants might be
sale of alcohol, this law would arguably have little impact
happy to regard the SMP in itself as sufficient explanation
upon her (isolated) interest in beverage availability.
for that intuition.
What does it mean to be “subjected to” collective deci-
Before proceeding, note that we assume a premise of
sions? The arguably most prominent view focuses on the
universal moral equality. This premise does not rule out
value of personal autonomy and the presumptive need to
associative duties or forms of partiality. It does, however,
justify any act of coercion. According to SCP, any person
require convincing arguments in favor of such duties and
who is subject to a polity’s coercive laws should have the
partiality (Singer 2004). This premise, we take it, lies
right to partake in the making of those laws (Abizadeh
somewhere between Miller’s (2016, chap. 2) concepts of
2008, 45; López-Guerra 2005). A state subjects a person
“weak” and “strong” cosmopolitanism. The weak form
to coercion either through a coercive act that “preemp-
accepts (as we do) universal moral equality, but accepts
tively deprives a person of some options that she would
in addition various forms of duties arising from associa-
otherwise have had” or a coercive threat that “communi-
tions between people, including national associations.
cates the intention to undertake an action in the future
Such duties may justify (a degree of) partiality toward
whose (anticipated) effect is to prevent a person from
one’s compatriots. On strong cosmopolitanism, on the
choosing an option that she otherwise might choose”
other hand, such partiality is unjustified. Our premise
(Abizadeh 2008, 40).
occupies a middle ground primarily because it neither
SCP and AAP share the implication that irregular
rules out nor accepts partiality out of hand. Rather, the
immigrants should be rapidly enfranchised. A state’s laws
view is open to those forms of partiality that turn out to be
are in...
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