Should brands “nudge us for good”? Towards a critical assessment of neuro‐liberal corporate social responsibility

AuthorSven Brodmerkel
Published date01 February 2019
Date01 February 2019
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1002/pa.1898
ACADEMIC PAPER
Should brands nudge us for good? Towards a critical
assessment of neuroliberal corporate social responsibility
Sven Brodmerkel
Faculty of Society and Design, Bond
University, Gold Coast, Queensland, Australia
Correspondence
Sven Brodmerkel, Faculty of Society and
Design, Bond University, Gold Coast, Qld
4229, Australia.
Email: sbrodmer@bond.edu.au
This article critically investigates the recent emergence of neuroliberal corporate
social responsibility (CSR). Neuroliberal CSR is inspired by libertarian paternalism, a
form of behavioural governance popularised by behavioural economist Richard Thaler
and legal scholar Cass Sunstein in their bestseller Nudge (2008). Libertarian paternal-
ism presumes humans to be predictably irrationaldue to hardwired cognitive biases
and thus advocates the design of policy interventions that use human psychology for
correcting these shortcomings in ways that benefit individuals and society. Although
the use of nudginginterventions has been critically scrutinised in the context of
public policy, little attention has been paid to the adoption of libertarian paternalist
principles in the corporate world. This paper uses Nudging for Good, an initiative by
the European Brands Association (AIM), to illustrate how major corporations adopt
and frame corporate nudging as a new and purportedly highly effective form of
CSR. However, as this paper argues, neuroliberal CSR raises concerns regarding its
effectiveness, transparency, and its individualisation and depoliticisation of social ills.
1|INTRODUCTION
Despite the attention corporate social responsibility (hereafter CSR)
has received, particularly since the 1990s, it is still a malleable and
contested business practice and theoretical concept. It is malleable in
that its core propositionthat corporations have obligations to society
that extend beyond the mere profit motive (Godfrey & Hatch, 2007)
has found expression in a broad range of activities including cause
marketing and commodity activism, social accounting and reporting,
and social innovation (Einstein, 2012; Fleming & Jones, 2013). And it
is contested with regard to the extent to which its ethical stance is
applied in its concrete practices and whether or not it can be realised
within the structure of a capitalist market society. Proponents of CSR
consider it to be an effective means for realising a conscious or soft
capitalism(Blowfield & Frynas, 2005) in which the interests of various
stakeholdersfrom shareholders to workers to the environmentcan
be profitably reconciled. Others see CSR mainly as aspirational talk
(Christensen, Moring, & Thyssen, 2013) harbouring the potential to
commit corporations to socially responsible practices or simply as
fluff(Ingham, 2006, p. 284). For more sceptical accounts, though,
CSR mainly serves as a vehicle for deflecting attention away from
questionable business practices and for extending the competitive
logic of capitalist market competition into evermore aspects of social
life (Banerjee, 2008; Fleming & Jones, 2013; Hanlon & Fleming, 2009;
Shamir, 2004).
CSR is therefore best understood as a dynamic, diverse set of
business practices and an evolving field of scholarship(Crane,
McWilliams, Matten, Moon, & Siegel, 2008, p. 6). New approaches
to CSR continuously manifest themselves in response to changing
forms of governance, stakeholder demands, theories of consumer
behaviour, and technological innovations, requiring practitioners and
scholars to regularly reevaluate conceptual frameworks and norma-
tive assessments in relation to these new practical adaptations of
the core proposition of CSR.
One such new approach to CSR is what I call neuroliberal CSR.
Neuroliberal CSR embraces libertarian paternalism, a purportedly
third way of governancepopularised by Nudge, a bestseller by Nobel
laureate Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein (2008). Drawing on findings
from cognitive psychology, neuroscience, and behavioural economics,
it suggests that humans are cognitive misers as a result of hardwired
heuristics and biases that systematically prevent people from making
rationaldecisions reflecting their authentic preferences. Libertarian
paternalists therefore encourage governments to design subtle market
interventions that counteract these irrationalities by going with the
Received: 12 October 2018 Accepted: 16 November 2018
DOI: 10.1002/pa.1898
J Public Affairs. 2019;19:e1898.
https://doi.org/10.1002/pa.1898
© 2018 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/pa 1of7

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