Shirking the Initiative? The Effects of Statewide Ballot Measures on Congressional Roll Call Behavior

• Author: Daniel A. Smith,Joshua Huder,Jordan Michael Ragusa
• Published date: 01 May 2011
• Date: 01 May 2011
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X10388137
• Subject Matter: Articles

American Politics Research

39(3) 582 –610

© The Author(s) 2011

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DOI: 10.1177/1532673X10388137

http://apr.sagepub.com

388137APR39310.1177/1532673X10388

137Huder et al.American Politics Research

© The Author(s) 2011

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1University of Florida, Gainesville

Corresponding Author:

Daniel A. Smith, University of Florida, Department of Political Science, 234 Anderson Hall,

P.O. Box 117325, Gainesville, FL 32611-7325

Email: dasmith@ufl.edu

Shirking the

Initiative? The

Effects of Statewide

Ballot Measures on

Congressional Roll

Call Behavior

Joshua Huder1, Jordan Michael Ragusa1,

and Daniel A. Smith1

Abstract

Do ballot measures affect congressional voting behavior? Examining the

issues of gay marriage, campaign finance, and minimum wage, we test if the

results of statewide ballot initiatives inform congressional roll call votes on

legislation occupying the same issue space. Theoretically, we expect signals

from ballot measures—which provide precise information about the pref-

erences of a member’s voting constituency—reduce policy “shirking” by

members. Our findings across the three issues indicate that ballot initiative

outcomes alter the floor votes of members of the House, reducing legisla-

tive shirking, but we find that the educative effect of ballot measures is attenu-

ated in the Senate due to institutional factors. We attribute the positive

effect in House to the precise signal ballot measures provide members about

the preferences of the median voter in their district.

Keywords

Congress, direct democracy, ballot measures, roll call votes

Huder et al. 583

For over a century, the federal government has responded, either directly or

indirectly, to the passage of statewide ballot measures. From tax cuts, eutha-

nasia, school choice, and affirmative action, to medical marijuana, minimum

wage, eminent domain, and gay marriage, statewide ballot measures have

influenced the policy agenda at the national level. Furthermore, recent stud-

ies have shown that ballot measures have “educative” and “spillover” effects

that can shape the political landscape by altering the strategies of political par-

ties and interest groups engaged in federal campaigns, as well as the choices

of voters (Campbell & Monson, 2008; Donovan, Tolbert, & Smith, 2008;

Nicholson, 2005; Smith & Tolbert, 2004). There is little question, then, that

the process of direct democracy not only affects the political process within a

state, but also the political process at the federal level.

But might ballot measures alter the behavior of members of Congress?

Though perhaps nonobvious to congressional scholars, statewide ballot mea-

sures may affect congressional vote choice by filling a policy void due to con-

gressional inaction, leading eventually to intergovernmental cooperation. At

other times, statewide ballot measures may challenge federal statutes, exac-

erbating tension between the federal government and the states (Ferraiolo,

2008). In the ongoing dance of federalism, ballot measures in the American

states can have a national influence despite their subnational nature (Magleby,

1998). What scholars have yet to examine, though, is whether initiatives and

referendums in the states influence (both directly and indirectly) congressio-

nal roll call voting behavior.

Drawing on an original data set, we investigate whether statewide ballot

measures inform the legislative behavior of members of Congress. Specif-

ically, we are interested in whether the passage (or defeat) of initiatives and

referendums in a member’s district or state may indirectly influence his or

her vote when considering similar pieces of legislation on the floor of the

Senate and House. Though the substantive nature of the congressional votes

we consider may be of interest to some (votes to regulate campaign finance,

raise the minimum wage, and ban same-sex marriage), we are theoretically

interested in whether added information about the median voter, derived

from statewide ballot measures, may help reduce “shirking” by members of

Congress. That is, we are interested in whether having statewide popular

votes, which provide inimitable insight to members of Congress as to what

the preference is of the median voter in their state or legislative district

(McDonagh, 1989, 1993), reduces shirking, or “legislative behavior that dif-

fers from what would be observed given perfect monitoring and effective

punishment by constituents” (Rothenberg & Sanders, 2000, p. 316; but see

also Overby, 1991).