Shifting Away from Rehabilitation: State v. Ladd's Equal Protection Challenge to Alaska's Automatic Waiver Law

• Citation: Vol. 15
• Publication year: 1998

§ 15 Alaska L. Rev. 367. SHIFTING AWAY FROM REHABILITATION: STATE V. LADD'S EQUAL PROTECTION CHALLENGE TO ALASKA'S AUTOMATIC WAIVER LAW

Alaska Law Review
Volume 15
Cited: 15 Alaska L. Rev. 367

SHIFTING AWAY FROM REHABILITATION: STATE V. LADD'S EQUAL PROTECTION CHALLENGE TO ALASKA'S AUTOMATIC WAIVER LAW

Kimberly S. May

I. INTRODUCTION

II. CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF STATE V. LADD

A. Automatic Waiver in Alaska

B. Equal Protection Under the Alaska Constitution

C. State v. Ladd

III. THE FIRST PRONG: THE VITAL INTEREST IN REMAINING IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM

IV. THE SECOND PRONG: THE COUNTERVAILING STATE INTEREST

A. Conflicting State Interests: Deterrence and Rehabilitation

B. The State Interest in Allocating Risk to the Juvenile

C. The State Interest in Prosecutorial Discretion

V. THE THIRD PRONG: THE MEANS TO ENDS FIT

A. The Provision is Broad-Reaching

B. The Provision is Discriminatory as Applied

VI. RECOMMENDED ALTERNATIVES

A. Shift the Burden Back

B. Dual-Sentencing and Treatment Options: Alternatives to Automatic Waiver

VII. CONCLUSION

FOOTNOTES

I. INTRODUCTION

The Alaska Supreme Court recently granted review to a case that implicates the equal protection rights of juvenile defendants. In State v. Ladd, ^[1] the Fairbanks public defender's office challenged a provision of Alaska's automatic waiver law that effectively can create a disparate sentencing structure for juveniles convicted of the same crime. The automatic waiver law - which came into effect in 1994 when the Alaska legislature amended its juvenile delinquency laws - removes from the jurisdiction of juvenile courts minors over the age of sixteen charged with specified serious felo- [*pg 368] nies. ^[2] The minor can be returned to the juvenile system for sentencing if he or she is not convicted of the serious felony but is instead convicted of a charge that would not have triggered the waiver provision. However, to regain the benefits of juvenile treatment, the minor must demonstrate at a judicial hearing that he or she is amenable to treatment in juvenile rehabilitation programs.

This procedure differs from that accorded to juveniles originally charged only with the same lesser offense that is exempt from the automatic waiver. Minors originally charged with the lesser offense remain in the juvenile system unless the state requests a hearing and proves that the juvenile is not amenable to the treatment offered in juvenile rehabilitation programs, and consequently, should be tried in adult court. Adjudication and sentencing in adult rather than juvenile court deprives the minor of significant legal protections and presumptions. This Note argues that shifting the burden of proof to juveniles subject to the automatic waiver unfairly discriminates between these juveniles and those juveniles convicted of the same crimes but who were not subject to the waiver. This discrimination violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Alaska Constitution.

Despite due process and equal protection challenges, automatic waivers have been upheld in a number of jurisdictions. ^[3] [*pg 369] However, the provision at issue in Ladd differs from the waiver statutes of most states because it creates an unnecessary presumption against juvenile treatment after the juvenile has been found not guilty of the offense that triggered the waiver.

Part II of this Note explains the constitutional issues that arise from the automatic waiver statute and the resulting shift in the burden of proof. It also reviews the history of Ladd, the constitutional analysis applied by the underlying courts, and the question that is currently before the Alaska Supreme Court.

Part III then examines the first prong of the Alaska Constitution's three-pronged equal protection analysis: The minor's interest in being sentenced as a juvenile. Adult sentencing is significantly different than juvenile sentencing. As a juvenile, a minor is entitled to privacy, treatment, and leniency. Juveniles convicted as adults face harsher penalties and a permanent criminal record. Minors have little likelihood of rehabilitation when incarcerated with adult felons in prisons that lack suitable treatment programs. Part IV investigates the second prong of the court's analysis: the strength of the state interest in placing the burden of proof on the juvenile. Part V examines the third prong - the tightness of the relationship between the statutory provision and the goals the legislature intended to fulfill - and concludes that the Alaska Supreme Court should reverse the court of appeals and declare Alaska Statutes section 47.12.030(a) unconstitutional. In closing, Part VI discusses alternatives that accomplish the state's goals and promote the rehabilitation of youthful offenders, while avoiding the equal protection problems that the current statute creates.

II. CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF STATE V. LADD

A. Automatic Waiver in Alaska

In 1994, Alaska amended its juvenile justice provisions to include an automatic waiver law. The automatic waiver law removes from the protection of the Alaska Delinquency Rules, without a judicial hearing, those sixteen or seventeen year-old minors who are charged with an offense "(1) that is an unclassified felony or a class A felony and the felony is a crime against a person; or (2) of [*pg 370] arson in the first degree." ^[4] The removal causes the minor to be "charged prosecuted and sentenced in the superior court in the same manner as an adult." ^[5] In 1998, the statute was amended to include additional offenses within its provisions. ^[6]

The Alaska legislature was mindful that in some instances minors subject to automatic waiver would not be convicted of the original charge. The statute explicitly provides that a minor convicted of an offense that would not originally have triggered the waiver provision, "may attempt to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the minor is amenable to [rehabilitative] treatment." ^[7] Four factors will be considered in order to determine the minor's amenability to rehabilitation under juvenile programs: the seriousness of the offense with which the minor is charged, the minor's history of delinquency, the probable cause of the minor's delinquent behavior, and the facilities available for treatment. ^[8]

If a juvenile is not charged with one of the aforementioned offenses, he will remain in the juvenile system unless the state petitions the juvenile court for a waiver of jurisdiction. If removal is granted, the juvenile will be prosecuted in adult court. ^[9] In order to prevail at a juvenile hearing convened to consider the waiver, the state must show that the minor cannot be rehabilitated by the age of twenty. ^[10]

Therefore, if a juvenile originally is charged with an offense that would not trigger the waiver provision, the minor is presumed to be amenable to treatment, and under the Alaska Delinquency Rules for the same lesser crime, the state bears the burden to have [*pg 371] the juvenile placed in adult court. ^[11] Alternatively, when a minor is charged with a triggering offense, but is convicted instead of a lesser offense not specified in the statute, the minor is presumed to be unamenable to treatment. ^[12] This sentencing scheme treats two similarly-situated minors convicted of the same crime differently, and therefore implicates Alaska's constitutional guarantee of equal protection under the law.

B. Equal Protection Under the Alaska Constitution

The Alaska Constitution reflects equal protection principles ^[13] that are distinct from federal equal protection principles, and employs a "sliding scale" ^[14] in order to determine what kind of state justification permits encroachment on an individual interest. ^[15] As such, the Alaska Equal Protection Clause is more protective of individual rights than the United States Constitution and permits courts to enumerate interests deserving greater judicial protection beyond strictly defined classifications. A court may determine that an individual interest is very important and safeguard the right from state encroachment regardless of whether the classification (the types of individuals that are treated differently by the law) is based on race or gender or affects a fundamental right. ^[16] Even if [*pg 372] the court finds that the interest is not very important, it must still require that the government's methods have a "fair and substantial relation" to the statute's intended purpose.

The Alaska Supreme Court has rejected "the traditional two-tiered federal approach in favor of a more flexible 'sliding scale' test." ^[17] The difference in these types of analyses was set forth in State Department of Revenue v. Cosio ^[18] :

Analysis under our state equal protection clause is considerably more fluid than under its federal counterpart. Instead of using three levels of scrutiny, we apply a sliding scale under which "[t]he applicable standard of review for a given case is to be determined by the importance of the individual rights asserted and by the degree of suspicion with which we view the resulting classification scheme." As the right asserted becomes "more fundamental" or the classification scheme employed becomes "more constitutionally suspect," the challenged law "is subjected to more rigorous scrutiny at a more elevated position on our sliding scale." ^[19]

The...