The shareholder model: making America's global leadership more effective.

• Author: Gvosdev, Nikolas K.
• Position: Quarterly

IRAQ HAS demonstrated both the extent and the limitations of American power. The relatively swift ground campaign reinforced the lessons of the first Gulf War, Kosovo and Afghanistan: the United States possesses unparalleled military might and can bring overwhelming force to bear on any opponent. This is not, however, the whole story, for America's unchallenged military supremacy has not enhanced its ability to create and sustain broad international coalitions to pursue its long-term agenda. Realists understand the need to attract "investors" in continued American leadership, rather than relying on military pyrotechnics to produce consensus. Therefore, Washington must make it clear, not only through words, but through concrete actions, that other states have a stake in the international system and in the agenda that America sets. This does not mean that the United States offers other actors veto power over American policy. The United States must act, unilaterally if necessary, to protect its vital interests. But it does mean recognizing that "to get along, go along"--that other states are likely to accede to American leadership if their interests are bound up with ours and if they believe that acceding to Washington's requests enhances their own interests.

Last year, it seemed that the Bush Administration was prepared to follow this strategy in dealing with Iraq, giving other important actors a stake in removing the threat of a WMD-armed Saddam Hussein. In fall 2002, Washington had succeeded in crafting UN Security Council Resolution 1441, which declared Iraq to be in "material breach" of its cease-fire obligations, provided for a much more intrusive inspections regime and gave Iraq "a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations" or face "serious consequences" in the event of noncompliance. This resolution passed by unanimous vote in the Security Council and was a major victory for American diplomacy. Moreover, Resolution 1441 signaled that the other major powers were prepared to accept American leadership in resolving the Iraqi problem.

But 2003 witnessed one setback after another. Idealistic rhetoric about justice and freedom for the Iraqi people found only a limited audience overseas, primarily among some segments of the Labour Party in Britain and among some politicians from "New Europe." In many countries, both the political establishment and mass public opinion reacted skeptically to such claims. Other states also disputed the American contention that Iraq posed an imminent threat to regional and global security--and Washington was unable to persuade them to adopt its own view. (l)

Instead, calls were made for the inspection process to continue, for months or even years if necessary, to locate and destroy any remaining weapons of mass destruction. Washington's attempts to secure a second Security Council resolution explicitly authorizing the United States and other states to use force to secure compliance collapsed.

What made this setback even more galling for the administration is that it was long-time NATO allies France and Germany that led active European opposition to a U.S. war with Iraq. Their resistance provided the cover for other states, such as Russia and Turkey, to declare their reluctance to endorse a military solution for Iraq. Even rotating Security Council members with no direct stake in the crisis--such as Mexico and Chile--sent signals that they would oppose a second resolution authorizing the use of force.

Pundits spilled gallons of ink lambasting the cravenness, cowardice and greed of our supposed partners in abandoning us in our hour of need. But all of the available evidence...