SHARE REPURCHASES AND THE FLEXIBILITY HYPOTHESIS

Date01 September 2017
AuthorSubramanian Rama Iyer,Ramesh P. Rao
Published date01 September 2017
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/jfir.12125
SHARE REPURCHASES AND THE FLEXIBILITY HYPOTHESIS
Subramanian Rama Iyer
University of New Mexico
Ramesh P. Rao
Oklahoma State University
Abstract
Using the nancial crisis as a natural experiment, we test whether repurchases are more
exible than dividends. We document that the proportion of repurchasing rms that
reduced repurchase payouts is greater than the proportion of dividend payers that
reduced their dividends during the nancial crisis period. We nd that the market
performance of repurchase-reducing rms is better than that of dividend-reducing rms
over the nancial crisis period. Finally, we nd that the operating performance of share
repurchasers is better than dividend payers during the nancial crisis and postcrisis
periods. Overall, we conclude that share repurchases are more exible than dividends.
JEL Classification: G35
I. Introduction
Firms distribute cash through dividends and through share repurchases. Over the last two
decades, share repurchases have become increasingly popular and dividends less so.
1
One key differentiating factor between dividends and share repurchases is the potential
exibility offered by the latter. Brav et al. (2005) survey nancial executives and nd that
managers like the exibility of share repurchases and dislike the rigidity of dividends.
Survey results reveal that this preference for repurchases stems from the view that once a
rm initiates a dividend, it is expected to continue to pay dividends. This expectation acts
as a deterrent for non-dividend-paying rms to initiate dividend payouts. However, share
repurchases are not viewed as being subject to a similar expectation. Although most
We appreciate helpful comments and suggestions received from Betty J. Simkins, Joel T. Harper, Lee C.
Adkins, two anonymous referees, and presentations at the 2013 European Financial Management conference, 2013
Southwestern Finance conference, Oklahoma State University, and University of New Mexico.
1
By share repurchases we mean open-market share repurchases. We focus on open-market repurchases
because they are considered to be an alternative form of disbursing cash ows to shareholders similar to dividends
(Brav et al., 2005). Historically, rms have also engaged in non-open-market share repurchases, which were
considered to be one-off events used mainly to signal undervaluation (e.g., Dutch auction and tender offer
repurchases). However, non-open-market repurchases have been relatively few and have become especially rare in
recent years. Oded (2011), who studies three decades of data, nds that open-market repurchases outnumber tender
offers by a ratio of 10 to 1. In our sample period encompassing the estimation period through the crisis period
(20002009), we nd that only 5% of all share repurchase announcements employed a non-open-market
repurchase method.
The Journal of Financial Research Vol. XL, No. 3 Pages 287313 Fall 2017
287
© 2017 The Southern Finance Association and the Southwestern Finance Association
RAWLS COLLEGE OF BUSINESS, TEXAS TECH UNIVERSITY
PUBLISHED FOR THE SOUTHERN AND SOUTHWESTERN
FINANCE ASSOCIATIONS BY WILEY-BLACKWELL PUBLISHING
managers agree that reducing dividends will draw negative abnormal market reaction,
only a small proportion of nancial executives consider reducing repurchases as having
such an adverse consequence.
2
Consequently, it is not surprising that when asked to pick
between dividends and repurchases if they were to initiate a payout policy today, two-
thirds of managers choose repurchases over dividends.
3
Consistent with the reservations expressed by managers on dividends, Fama and
French (2001) note that the proportion of rms paying cash dividends has decreased
drastically. They document a lower propensity to pay dividends even after controlling for
the observed tilt in listed rms toward rm characteristics that do not favor payment of
dividends: small, low-earnings, and high-investment rms. They also state that the
perceived value from paying dividends has declined. Grullon and Michaely (2002) and
Jagannathan, Stephens, and Weisbach (2000) nd that share repurchases have increased
in prominence compared to dividends. Grullon and Michaely document that large,
established rms have not decreased their dividend payouts, but they display a higher
propensity to pay out cash through share repurchases.
4
Together, these two papers nd
that the increase in share repurchases can explain the decreasing propensity to pay
dividends, which also corroborates the survey evidence in Brav et al. (2005). However,
none of these studies explicitly tests the exibility hypothesis. The exibility offered by
share repurchases could be a primary factor explaining why rms choose to repurchase
shares instead of paying dividends.
5
Flexibility refers to the ability of rms to decide whether to distribute cash to
shareholders or to keep it in the rm (e.g., for investments). Dividends and share
repurchases may differ in their inherent exibility. Instituting dividends may preclude
rms from investing in protable ventures or enhancing liquidity if reducing dividends is
met with adverse market reaction. As noted earlier, share repurchases may not suffer
from this drawback. Additionally, repurchasers may have the exibility to alter or
suspend an already announced repurchase program. A dividend once announced is rarely
reversed. On the contrary, a share repurchase announcement is not a rm commitment.
Firms can decide to delay or even suspend an ongoing open-market share repurchase
program if the economy turns hostile.
2
These observations can be gleaned from Table 3 in Brav et al. (2005).
3
Financial exibility appears to play a signicant role in other corporate nancial policies, for example,
capital structure (Graham and Harvey 2001). Using a novel measure to capture the value of nancial exibility,
Rapp, Schmid, and Urban (2014) nd that nancial exibility is signicantly related to several rm policies,
including payout policy.
4
However, in a recent paper, Floyd, Li, and Skinner (2015) suggest that dividends are resilient and on an
aggregate basis have exhibited remarkably stable payout ratios over the past 15 years.
5
Contemporaneous to our study, Bliss, Cheng, and Denis (2015) also examine the exibility of repurchases
and dividends using the nancial crisis as a natural experiment. Although our conclusions are similar, we provide
additional insights beyond their paper: (1) Bliss, Cheng, and Denis (2015) do not examine the market and operating
performance effects associated with the relative exibility of repurchases and dividends during the nancial crisis
period, and (2) they do not control for rm characteristic differences between various payout types simultaneously,
though they do control for rm characteristics within each payout type. That is, if repurchasers are fundamentally
different from dividend payers, the observed results with respect to exibility may be due to differences in rm
traits rather than inherent differences in exibility.
288 The Journal of Financial Research

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